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This study examines the process of institutionalisation, contradictions and unintended consequences of 
Corporate Governance (CG) regulations in Pakistan. Prior studies have mostly focused on outcomes of 
CG regulations. The ‘process’ centred approach adopted in this study contributes to the CG theory and 
literature by analysing the development processes of CG regulations and dynamics between different 
societal levels (i.e. macro and micro) through which CG regulations emerged, developed and were 
implemented in a specific social context.  
In doing so, this study has developed a multi-level analytical framework to examine process of 
institutionalisation, transposition and implementation of CG regulations at three different societal levels 
i.e. socio-political and economic (SPE) level, organisational field and organisational levels. The analytical 
framework combines neo-institutional theory, structuration theory and Weber’s axes of tension to provide 
an understanding of the processes associated with the emergence and development of CG regulations in 
the context of Pakistan. Empirical data came from forty-one semi-structured interviews conducted at all 
three levels of analysis, and analysis of documents from published secondary sources between 1995 and 
2014.  
The longitudinal analysis finds that the process of institutionalisation, transposition, and implementation 
of CG regulations is far from linear and straightforward. Historically well-established political and 
business families in Pakistan raised strong opposition to the institutionalisation of CG reforms at all three 
societal levels. This resulted in unintended consequences. CG codes were diluted through compromises 
made at the SPE level. The regulatory environment at the organisational field level was weakened 
through political appointments in regulatory institutions. There were symbolic compliance, decoupling, 
and delisting trend at the organisational level.  
The analytical framework developed in this study may be used by future studies examining how CG 
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Chapter 1: Aims, objectives and organisation of the 
research 
1.1 CG regulations: emergence and development  
The East Asian financial crisis and collapse of Enron and WorldCom in the U.S. highlighted the 
need to strengthen Corporate Governance (CG) mechanisms across the world (Arnold, 2012, 
Carnegie and O’Connell, 2014, Carnegie and Napier, 2010). The CG reforms were not restricted 
to the developed world; many developing economies also initiated far-reaching programmes for 
corporate governance by producing codes of corporate governance and policy documents, 
voluntary or mandatory, both at the national or supranational level driven by transnational actors 
such as the World Bank (Solomon, 2007).  
Prior studies on CG reforms in the developing countries have mostly focused on the outcomes by 
adopting agency theory and institutional theory as theoretical lenses to identify causal reasons for 
reforms (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009, Yoshikawa et al., 2007, Siddiqui, 2010, Enrione et al., 
2006). The debate amongst scholars is oscillating between convergence and divergence of CG 
practices on the one hand (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009, 
Bebchuk and Roe, 1999) and efficiency vs. legitimacy reasons of CG reforms on the other hand 
(Siddiqui, 2010, Reed, 2002, Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). The mainstream CG literature that 
adopts institutional theory seems to assert that in the case of the developing economies, CG 
reforms are mainly initiated due to the pressures from International Financial Agencies (IFAs) as 
a prerequisite for obtaining loans (Siddiqui, 2010, Uddin and Hopper, 2003), and are in line with 
the Anglo-American CG model
1
 (Özcan and Çokgezen, 2003, Mukherjee-Reed, 2002, Uddin and 
Hopper, 2003). However, limited focus of prior institutional theory-based research considered 
institutionalisation as an outcome rather than a political process “…reflecting the power of 
                                                 
1
 A detailed description of the Anglo-American CG model is discussed in Chapter 2.  
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organised interests and the actors who mobilise around them” (Dillard et al., 2004, p 510) and 
neglecting the role of power dynamics and political interests (Dillard et al., 2004, DiMaggio, 
1988, Ezzamel and Xiao, 2015). Hancher and Moran (1989, p 4) acknowledged regulations are 
“…indisputably a political process, and it thus exhibits one of the defining features of any such 
process – it involves the contest for power.” The advocates of the Anglo-American CG model 
assume that its implementation is unproblematic (Mueller, 2006, Hansmann and Kraakman, 
2001). The process of institutionalisation, transposition and deinstitutionalisation of CG 
regulations has received little attention in accounting literature (Contrafatto, 2014). Although 
few prior studies have examined the process through which accounting regulations are developed 
and interpreted (see, for example, Shapiro and Matson, 2008, Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013, 
MacDonald and Richardson, 2004, Young, 1995, Young, 1994), developing countries such as 
Pakistan have been neglected to date. Our knowledge of the process of the emergence and 
development of CG regulations in the different natinal context remains rudimentary (Malsch and 
Gendron, 2011), and in the developing countries it is largly missing. 
The prior institutional research seems to have ignored national level actors, given the emergence 
and dominance of transnational actors such as the Work Bank, IMF, and Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). However, these transnational actors have not displaced the nation-state and its 
local powerful actors. The diffusion of the internationally accepted regulatory model within the 
national context is contingent on the ability and acceptability of national level actors (Yoshikawa 
and Rasheed, 2009, Yoshikawa et al., 2007, Yapa, 2014, Ezzamel and Xiao, 2015). The power 
dynamics and interests of influential national actors can shape and resist the transformation 
process despite external pressures for change (Jayasinghe and Thomas, 2009). The powers and 
interests of national players have received less attention in diffusion studies, given the inability 
of the local players to influence the process and outcomes of reforms within their national 
context (Yoshikawa et al., 2007). The regulatory context does not exist in isolation (Richardson, 
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2009, Humphrey et al., 2009, Malsch and Gendron, 2011); exploring these local contexts can 
unveil contingent issues and challenges that regulators have to confront as part of the effort to 
translate global regulatory trends within their national context (Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013, 
Malsch and Gendron, 2011, Caramanis, 2005, Arnold, 2005). Yoshikawa et al. (2007) suggest 
that diffusion of CG in the national context is a complex and dynamic process, which involve the 
interaction among a range of actors pursing their self-interests. Thus, an examination of national, 
social, economic, and political contexts and the role and power of national actors in the process 
of emergence and development of CG regulations are important dimensions that can provide 
unique perspectives to the existing literature in the field of CG. 
In response to calls for an enhanced focus on the influence of national political and social 
contexts for the development and interpretation of accounting regulations (Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2008, Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013, p. 169, Cuervo, 2002, Reaz and Hossain, 2007, 
Roberts, 2004), and to fill the research gap identified above, this study seeks to contribute to the 
literature by analysing the process of emergence and development of CG regulations’ in the 
Pakistani national context. Pakistan is an ideal case because multiple influential institutional 
actors - both transnational and national - coexist and interact with each other. The powers, 
interests and political nature of interactions between the key actors such as IFAs, historically 
dominant political and business families, government and regulators may influence the CG 
regulations’ production process in Pakistan. By focusing on CG regulations’ production process, 
this study is trying to avoid the institutional theory’s limited focus on institutionalisation as an 
outcome that neglects the role of power and interests.  
There is a close but complicated link between diffusion and isomorphism as diffusion is a 
prerequisite for isomorphism, but diffusion may not always result in isomorphism (Boxenbaum 
and Jonsson, 2008). Prior diffusion studies treated the diffusion of a particular practice or 
structure as the outcome given that diffusion leads to isomorphism. For example, prior 
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institutional research which involved the concept of institutional isomorphism argued that 
mimetic, normative or coercive pressures from IFAs resulted in the diffusion of the Anglo-
American model of CG in the developing countries and considered that isomorphism does not 
affect the substance of the codes (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008, Siddiqui, 2010, Reed, 2002, 
West, 2006). However, these studies failed to capture the political bargaining process that takes 
place in determining the contents of the adopted CG regulations. Yoshikawa et al. (2007) 
conducted a multiple-case, multiple-level study in the context of Japan and argued that the 
spread of innovations across countries is far from linear and straightforward. International 
pressures from the foreign capital and product market may not lead to the convergence of CG 
reforms towards the Anglo-American model of CG. In prior diffusion studies, similarities with 
the Anglo-American model of CG were emphasised while the differences were played down. 
However, our knowledge about the extent to which the contents of newly introduced CG 
regulations are consistent with the claims of similarity with the Anglo-American model is 
rudimentary. Thus, this study in addition to the understanding of the process of emergence and 
development of CG regulations is also examining how this political process shapes the CG codes 
that were introduced in Pakistan.  
1.2 Institutionalisation of CG codes in Pakistani family-controlled publicly 
listed companies  
The introduction of CG codes at the country level does not automatically guarantee that the 
organisations will comply with it or that it will bring desirable goals (Uddin and Choudhury, 
2008, Yapa, 2014). The level of compliance with CG regulations may vary significantly across 
the countries (Weir and Laing, 2000, Arcot et al., 2010, MacNeil and Li, 2006, Krambia‐
Kapardis and Psaros, 2006, Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). Prior corporate governance research at 
the organisational level has also followed efficiency and legitimacy conceptions in order to 
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evaluate governance practices. From the shareholder centric point of view, existing studies tried 
to establish a link between organisational compliance with CG regulations and their performance 
(Aguilera et al., 2008, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, Weir and Laing, 2000, Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein, 2007, Hutchinson et al., 2008, Cornett et al., 2008, Gompers et al., 2003, Park and 
Shin, 2004). As Aguilera et al. (2008) argued, compliance with the code requires significant  
implementation costs, thus it is reasonable for companies to expect benefits from the compliance 
in the form of improved firm performance and positive market reaction. On the other hand, 
institutional scholars focused on analysing the influence of the institutional environment on their 
CG practices. Organisations are embedded in their institutional environment that is characterised 
by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual organisations must conform if 
they are to receive support and legitimacy (Scott and Meyer, 1983, Kogut and Zander, 1992, 
Claessens et al., 2002, Barontini and Caprio, 2006, Villalonga and Amit, 2006). The CG codes 
introduced in a given context may compete with taken for granted norms and values existing at 
the organisational level and resulting in conflict, unintended consequences and decoupling 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). As Uddin and Choudhury (2008) reported, firms within the context 
of Bangladesh symbolically complied with CG codes due to regulative pressures and decoupled 
actual practices from intended ones. Fiss and Zajac (2004) find that many German firms that 
adopted governance practices did not actually implement them. Very few studies have focused 
on how firms actually implement CG practices and engage in decoupling (Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 
Yoshikawa et al., 2007).   
Prior studies have mostly measured compliance through information available in the annual 
reports, i.e. in the form of the tick-box (Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013, Badrul Muttakin et al., 
2014). There is a lack of field research examining the process of how CG mechanism are in 
operation at the organisational level (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). There is a dearth of research 
on how code of governance affects the process of governance within the organisation. The 
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knowledge about how CG mechanisms operating at the organisational level is still embryonic. 
Questions that need to be asked include: how is the board of directors performing their fiduciary 
duties? How are decisions made within the board meetings? What is the role of independent 
directors? To what extent are firms able to protect the shareholders’ rights? Overall, to what 
extent have firms incorporated CG mechanisms described in the CG codes into actual 
organisational routine practices and processes? There are lots of unanswered questions regarding 
the actual governance practices within the organisations which require researchers to knock on 
the doors of the organisations.  
Prior researches largely followed a top-down impact of corporate governance regulations on 
organisational practices. These studies only focused on the influence of the institutional 
environment on the organisations and ignored the influence that organisations can put on the 
institutional environment. These studies assume the submissive role of organisations is to 
passively adhere to enacted CG codes. They shed little light on how organisational practices can 
affect and shape the contents of the codes or laws. In addition, prior CG studies analysed a 
country as the unit of analysis or treat organisations as the unit of analysis. There is a lack of 
research on multiple level studies within the field of corporate governance. Corporate 
governance is a complex process and involves interactions across firms and institutional levels 
(Yoshikawa et al., 2007, Dillard et al., 2004). 
This study is conducted within the context of Pakistan. In the context of Pakistan, political and 
business families are not only dominating at the socio-political and economic context, but also at 
the organisational level (Papanek, 1967, Attiya and Robina, 2010, Cheema, 2003, Husain, 2009). 
Most of the listed companies are controlled by few families and institutions (Papanek, 1967, 
Rashid, 1976, Cheema, 2003). Family businesses are a global phenomenon (Anderson et al., 
2003, Breton‐Miller et al., 2004, Miller et al., 2013, Claessens et al., 2000, La Porta et al., 1999, 
Kabbach and Crespi-Cladera, 2012) and play a significant contribution in the global economy. 
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According to Family Firm Institute (2008), family businesses are annually generating 
approximately 70-90% of global GDP. The family businesses have received much attention in 
accounting research (Kabbach and Crespi-Cladera, 2012, Schulze et al., 2002, Tsamenyi et al., 
2008, Young et al., 2008). However, existing family business studies provide limited insight 
about the compliance practices within family-controlled listed companies.
2
 The accounting 
studies within family businesses have mostly employed quantitative data from published sources 
(Salvato and Moores, 2010, Prencipe et al., 2014). Salvato and Moores (2010) analysed the 
accounting research in family firms and selected 47 articles for analysis and found that none of 
the reviewed studies employed field research.  
This study seeks to fill the research gaps identified above and contribute to the corporate 
governance literature by examining the organisational level factors which may affect the 
institutionalisation of CG codes
3
 within the family-controlled listed companies. In addition, this 
study will also examine how the tensions, conflicts, decoupling and unintended consequences at 
the organisational level influence CG codes’ development process at the socio-political and 
economic level.  
1.3 Research objectives and questions 
This study aims to achieve the following research objectives: 
1- To explore the wider socio-political and economic environment in relation to the process 
of emergence and development of corporate governance regulations in Pakistan.  
2- To identify organisation field level factors that may affect the implementation process of 
corporate governance codes at the organisational level in Pakistan.  
                                                 
2
 Family-controlled listed companies are those listed companies in which multiple members of the same family are 
involved as major owners or managers, either contemporaneously or over time (Miller et al., 2007).  
3
 State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has issued separate CG codes for banking sector. These codes are not part of this 
study. This study is examining the process of development and implementation of CG codes applicable on listed 
companies only.  
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3- To examine organisational level factors that may affect the institutionalisation process of 
corporate governance codes in family-controlled public listed companies in Pakistan.  
In order to achieve the research objectives identified above, this study aims to answer the 
following two main research questions: 
RQ1: Why and how have corporate governance regulations emerged and developed in Pakistan? 
RQ2: To what extent did the institutionalisation of corporate governance codes occur in the 
family-controlled listed companies?  
This study tries to answer the main research questions by looking into the following sub-research 
questions.  
1. How has the national socio-political and economic context played its role in the 
institutionalisation of CG regulations and the ways in which these regulations have been 
disseminated in the organisational field and organisational level?  
2. How has the CG codes’ institutionalisation process at the organisational field level been 
constrained and/or enabled by the ideas prevailing at both the socio-political and 
economic level and organisational level? 
3. What is the state of CG mechanisms within family-controlled listed companies?   
4. What are the unintended consequences of the implementation of CG codes in family-
controlled listed companies?  
1.4 Importance of this study 
This study seeks to contribute to knowledge and understanding as follows.  
This study has presented a longitudinal analysis (1995-2014) of the process of 
institutionalisation, transposition and deinstitutionalisation of CG codes across three societal 
levels (i.e. SPE, field and organisational level) by using multi-theory multi-level analytical 
framework. The analytical framework is comprised of neo-institutional sociology theory, 
structuration theory and Weber’s axes of tension. Existing accounting studies have either focused 
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on macro level analysis or organisational level analysis. This study, using a multi-level analytical 
framework, theorises how CG regulations developed at the socio-political and economic level 
(macro analysis) link with organisational field and organisational level mechanisms which lead 
to the implementation of regulations (micro analysis). The process focused approach using multi-
level analytical framework adopted in this study will be helpful in understanding the 
development of CG regulations globally not necessarily limited to developing countries.  
This study adds complexity to the efficiency-legitimacy and divergence-convergence debate by 
revealing that the development process of CG regulations is dynamic, political and non-linear as 
a result of complex interactions at the three societal levels of analysis. In contrast to the naïve 
argument that diffusion of the Anglo-American model is due to the pressures from IFAs 
(Siddiqui, 2010), this study has demonstrated that the CG regulation development and 
implementation process is an expression of power and politics. CG codes exacerbate the clashes 
over rationalities, power and material issues.  
Existing studies of regulations development and implementation are limited to developed 
countries (Shapiro and Matson, 2008, Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013, MacDonald and Richardson, 
2004, Young, 1995, Young, 1994), while knowledge about emerging economies is embryonic 
(Malsch and Gendron, 2011). This study responds to calls for “an enhanced focus on the 
influence of national political and social contexts on the development and interpretation of 
accounting regulations” (e.g. Uddin and Choudhury, 2008, Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013).  
This study contributes to the literature of family business by presenting an ideal case of Pakistan. 
This study has demonstrated that state, regulators and families have different competing 
interests, which influenced the institutionalisation and transposition of CG regulations. Family-
controlled listed companies are complying with CG mechanism due to the regulatory reasons, 
however, decoupled routine practices and processes from intended CG controls are defined in 
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codes. Family-controlled listed companies have perceived CG codes as less useful and a threat to 
their control and dominance in company affairs, and thus lack motivation to implement codes in 
true letter and spirit. 
1.5 Organisation of the thesis 
Chapter 2 provides a discussion about the development and emergence of corporate governance 
reforms around the globe and especially in developing countries. This chapter critically analyses 
the concept of corporate governance, development of corporate governance reforms at the 
country level, the nature and causes of CG reforms, and limitations of prior research. In addition, 
this chapter reviews governance literature at the firm level and discusses issues related to CG 
codes’ implementation, compliance and its effectiveness and limitations. This chapter also sheds 
light on family firms and CG governance issues in family-controlled listed companies.  
The purpose of chapter 3 is to discuss the conceptual framework used for this study to 
understand the process of institutionalisation, transposition, deinstitutionalisation and decoupling 
of corporate governance reforms at the socio-economic and political level, organisational field 
level and at the organisational level. It first discusses the contemporary theoretical framework 
available for understanding the institutionalisation process and their limitations. This discussion 
is followed by a detailed analysis of the conceptual framework chosen in this study.  
Chapter 4 explains the research methodology and the research method used. It provides 
discussion on the nature of social science research, the assumptions underpinning views about 
society, the research paradigm employed and the methods used in the research. It then discusses 
the process of conducting the interviews, the rationale for conducting interviews, the interview 
questionnaire and its rationale, document analysis and its rationale, data analysis and the report 




Chapter 5 is concerned with the socio-political and economic context of Pakistan within which 
the CG regulations have emerged and developed.  
Chapter 6 is first findings chapter. This chapter presents the process of emergence and 
development of CG codes within Pakistani context. This chapter is concerned with why, how 
and what types of CG codes have been introduced in Pakistan. The chapter provides the analysis 
of the socio-political and economic context of Pakistan. The discussion in chapter 5 sets the 
scene of the institutional context within which the institutionalisation of CG regulations takes 
place. This chapter empirically addresses the first research question; why, how and what types of 
CG regulations have emerged and developed in Pakistan.  
Chapter 7 discusses to what extent did the CG Codes (2002, 2012) adopted by Pakistan become 
institutionalised and then subsequently decoupled in the family-controlled listed companies and 
its unintended consequences. This chapter illustrates the state of CG mechanisms in family-
controlled listed companies. Overall, to what extent are family-controlled listed companies 
complying with CG regulations? Chapter 8 provides discussion and analysis. Chapter 9 provides 




Chapter 2: Emergence and development of CG 
regulations and practices: analysis from literature review  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyse the literature on diffusion of CG regulations and practices around the 
world in general and in developing countries in particular. This chapter will examine what types 
of CG regulations are diffused around the world and why countries have adopted CG codes. It 
will analyse key literature on diffusion of CG regulations and their limitations. This chapter will 
also analyse the impact of adopted reforms on CG practices at the organisational level and how 
prior studies evaluate the impact of CG regulations. In addition, an exploration of CG research 
based on family firms will also be part of the review. This discussion will lead to the 
identification of research gaps that this study aims to fill.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 briefly describes the definitions and interpretations 
of corporate governance. The following section 2.3 presents the diffusion of CG around the 
world. Section 2.4 reviews corporate governance reforms at the country level. This section 
further reviews the literature on the emergence and development of corporate governance 
reforms at the country level, the nature of the reforms, the reasons for the reforms and the 
theoretical and empirical limitations unveiled in prior research. The following section reviews 
the governance literature at the firm level and discusses issues related to code implementation, 
compliance and its effectiveness and limitations. Section 2.5 provides a discussion on family 
firms and governance issues. The conclusion ends this chapter.  
2.2 Corporate governance: definitions and interpretations 
This section defines corporate governance from different perspectives. The way theorists, policy 
makers, practitioners and researchers define GC is important in order to understand the nature of 
and reasons for CG reforms around the world. Corporate governance is an eclectic subject with 
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no single accepted definition. Corporate governance can be defined from a narrow financial 
perspective or in broader terms considering corporations are accountable to a wide range of 
stakeholders as well as society.  
Traditionally, financial economists have argued that the primary goal of the firm is to maximise 
shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This perspective of CG has emerged from the 





 centuries, shareholding became dispersed due to the separation between ownership and 
control, i.e. many US firms were controlled by the managers but owned by the weak minority 
shareholders. In such situations, shareholders may want to maximise profit, but on the other 
hand, managers may want to pursue self-interest. The previous literature has paid significant 
attention to the agency problems where companies were required to run in the best interests of 
the shareholders (Davis, 2009, Brennan and Solomon, 2008). From this perspective, renowned 
economists Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p737) defined CG as “the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” Similarly, in 
terms of shareholder-centric approach, Parkinson (1993,p. 159) defines corporate governance as  
[. . .] the process of supervision and control [. . .] intended to ensure that the 
company’s management acts in accordance with the interests of shareholders.  
This shareholder-centric perspective prioritises shareholder rights over all other stakeholders. 
Thus, companies’ main objective should be to maximise shareholder’s wealth. In the beginning, 
this ideology gained dominance is the US and other stock market-based economies (Yoshikawa 
et al., 2007). Jensen and Meckling (1976) extended agency theory
4
 to those problems rooted in 
separation of ownership from control in the modern form of corporations. Agency theory, which 
emerged from the seminal work of (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and (Jensen and Meckling, 
                                                 
4
 The next chapter has provided detail discussion about agency theory and institutional theory as theoretical lenses 
and their limitations. 
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1976), is concerned with contractual problems that can arise in any cooperative exchange.  
Agency theory considers that contracts tend to be incomplete and are subject to hazards because 
of the nature of people (self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion) and organisations (e.g., 
goal conflict among members). The information asymmetry makes it costly for principals 
(shareholders) to know what agents (managers) actually accomplished (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Thus from the agency theory point of view, CG is the mechanism available to minimise 
notorious agency problems arising due to the separation of ownership and control.  
However, the critics of this ideology contend that firms have broad responsibilities and cannot be 
restricted to dyadic relationships between firms and shareholders but also to other stakeholders 
(Blair and Stout, 1999). From the stakeholder’s perspective, corporate governance is seen as a 
web of relationships between not only a company and its shareholders, but rather between a 
company and its broad range of other stakeholders including employees, customers, suppliers, 
government, bondholders, and so on (Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013). Tricker (1984) defined 
corporate governance as:  
“…the governance role is not concerned with the running of the business of the 
company per se, but with giving overall direction to the enterprise, with overseeing 
and controlling the executive actions of management and with satisfying legitimate 
expectations of accountability and regulation by interests beyond the corporate 
boundaries.” 
The basis for the stakeholder concept of corporate governance is that companies are so large and 
their impact on society so pervasive that they should be accountable to the whole society, future 
society and the natural world (Solomon, 2007). She defined CG as: 
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“… the system of checks and balances, both internal, and external to companies, 
which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders 
and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity (p.14).” 
From this social-oriented perspective, organisations require more than financial resources to 
survive and thrive in their social structure (Scott, 2000). For organisations to survive, they must 
interact with their environment in ways perceived as acceptable to their various constituents in 
that environment (Dillard et al., 2004), i.e. incorporate institutionalised and rationalised elements 
into formal organisational structure as they maintain the appearance of rationality. Institutional 
theory is primarily concerned with an organisation’s interaction with the institutional 
environment, the effects of social expectations of the organisation, and the incorporation of these 
expectations as reflected in organisational practices and characteristics (Martinez and Dacin, 
1999, Scott, 2001, Baxter and Chua, 2003). Institutions provide guidelines and resources for 
acting as well as imposing constraints on behaviour by defining legal, moral, and cultural 
boundaries of legitimate activities. The institutional theory provides a legitimacy perspective that 
firms that are exposed to different institutional environments are pressured to adopt practices that 
have institutional legitimacy for symbolic reasons.  
The way CG governance is defined and interpreted is crucial as countries often follow either a 
shareholder- or stakeholder-centred model while developing their corporate governance 
regulations. Moreover, researchers used these expectations as criteria to examine corporate 
governance regulations and practices prevailing in specific contexts (Deephouse and Heugens, 
2009).   
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2.3 CG regulations around the world 
This section presents the diffusion of CG regulations around the world. The main purpose of this 
section is to argue that CG is an eclectic phenomenon influenced by both global and national 
level factors.  
Today codes of corporate governance have emerged all around the world (Enrione et al., 2006, 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). The emergence and 
development of codes of corporate governance did not follow a linear path (Table 2-1). The first 
code of corporate governance was issued in the USA in 1978, followed by Hong Kong in 1989, 
Ireland in 1991, and the United Kingdom in 1992. The issuance of the first four codes occurred 
over a period of fourteen years, however, there was an exponential rise in the diffusion rate since 
the issuance of the Cadbury Report in the UK in 1992 (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 
Enrione et al., 2006). Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) reviewed the diffusion of CG 
regulations around the world and found that by the middle of 2008, 64 countries had issued 196 
different codes of corporate governance. Some countries have had more than one code; the most 
notable are the UK and the USA with 25 codes each. South Africa was the first developing 
country and Sweden was the first civil law country to introduce codes in 1994. In Pakistan, the 
first code of corporate governance was issued in 2002 with a revised version in 2012. 
The diffusion of CG regulations around the world is noticeable; however, the categorisation of 
CG codes is very difficult. Every country exhibits different legal, economic, social, cultural, and 
political systems, which determine the system of CG residing in that country. Solomon (2010, p 
181) argued that “there are as many corporate governance systems as there are countries”. 
Although any effort to categorise CG systems is very difficult, the most common and generally 
accepted means is pattern of ownership, i.e. an/the insider/outsider model. The outsider-
dominated system refers to publicly listed firms where the manager controlled the firms but the 
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firms were owned by large number of outside shareholders. This situation resulted in a 
separation between ownership and control and the purpose of CG is to resolve the agency 
problem described earlier in this chapter. This type of system is also termed as a market-based 
system and is frequently referred to as an Anglo-American or Anglo-Saxon model due to the 
influence of the UK and US stock markets on other markets around the world. (Solomon, 2007). 
The insider-dominated system of CG refers to where few major shareholders owned and 
controlled publicly listed companies. This type of system is also termed as a relationship-based 
system and is commonly available in, but not limited to, Germany, Japan and South Asia with 
different variants (Solomon, 2007, Claessens et al., 2000, La Porta et al., 1999, Millar et al., 
2005). The main purpose of CG codes in insider-dominated systems is to resolve conflict 
between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008). The time line of 
introduction of CG codes around the world is presented in the table 2.2. The prior research 
highlighted that although CG codes in most of the countries are in line with shareholder centric 
approach to protect shareholders, but there are many countries who adopted stakeholders 
approach in developing their country specific CG codes (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009, 
Yoshikawa et al., 2007).  
Both global and national players have issued and promoted CG regulations. Prior literature has 
recognised different types of code issuers ranging from transnational institutions to national level 
code issuers. Transnational institutions have designed code to improve CG around the world and 
their codes are more general than the codes developed in each country. The role played by 
transnational institutions in the emergence of codes of corporate governance around the world is 
very encouraging and noticeable (see table 2.3-2). Transnational institutions started issuing code 
in 1995. The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) has become a repository of 
codes as its website
5
 contains a list of all recent codes of corporate governance. The Organisation 





for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) developed their most influential 
transnational CG codes in 1999 (Roberts, 2004). The World Bank used OECD CG codes as an 
evaluative criteria in examining CG practices in developing countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009, Coombes and Watson, 2001). The national institutions designed and issued CG 
codes to improve corporate governance of a home country. These national institutions can 
include stock exchanges, governments, directors associations, managers associations, 
professional associations and investor associations (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, Enrione 
et al., 2006).  It is important to understand who the issuers of the code are in the different 
institutional contexts because identifying these actors provides the source of innovation, a better 
appreciation for why the code was developed and how strongly they are enforced (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  
Table 2-1: Codes of Corporate Governance by Transnational Institutions  
Commonwealth 
o    CACG Guidelines: Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth November 1999 
International 
o    The Practice of Corporate Governance in Microfinance Institutions 2012  
o    Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) - Santiago Principles October 2008 
o    Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance for Institutions Offering Only Islamic Financial Services (Excluding Islamic 
Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds) December 2006 
o    ICGN Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles 8 July 2005 
o    Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations September 1999 
o    ICGN Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles 9 July 1999 
Latin America 
o    Latin American Corporate Governance White Paper 2003 
OECD 
o    OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises September 2005 
o    OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 22 April 2004 
o    OECD Principles of Corporate Governance May 1999 
Pan-Europe 
o    EFAMA Code for External Governance 6 April 2011 
o    ecoDa Corporate Governance Guidance and Principles for Unlisted Companies in Europe 24 March 2010 
o    EVCA Corporate Governance Guidelines June 2005 
o    EASD Principles and Recommendations May 2000 
o    Euroshareholders Corporate Governance Guidelines 2000 February 2000 
o    Sound business standards and corporate practices: A set of guidelines September 1997 
o    Corporate Governance in Europe June 1995 
United Nations 
o    Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure 2006 
(Source: European Institute of Corporate Governance) 
This section highlights that codes of CG are rapidly diffused around the globe. Both 
transnational and national players have issued and promoted CG regulations around the world. 
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The emergence of codes of corporate governance has generated a heated debate on the diffusion 
of CG regulations across the countries. Prior research on CG diffusion around the world had 
mostly focused on key issues such as the nature of CG reforms, the role of transnational and 
national players, and the reasons for these reforms. The following section provides a discussion 
on topics related to this debate. 
2.4 CG reforms worldwide – what and why 
2.4.1 Nature of CG reforms – convergence vs. divergence 
What type of CG model a country has adopted is one of the key areas of concern for prior CG 
research at the country level. In doing so, most of these studies have focused on convergence and 
divergence of the CG model that a country has adopted which ultimately leads towards the 
Anglo-American model (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, Yoshikawa et al., 2007, Collier and 
Zaman, 2005, Siddiqui, 2010, Mukherjee-Reed, 2002, Reed, 2002). The majority of these 
governance researches showed that governance regulations at the country level are gradually 
becoming more similar and are converging towards the internationally accepted Anglo-American 
model (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, Reed, 2002, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, Witt, 
2004, Siddiqui, 2010).  
Corporate governance policy documents and codes of best practices around the globe [for 
example, The Cadbury Report (1992), The Greenbury Report (1995), The Combined Code 
(1998), Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) (2002), The Higgs Report (2003), and The Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance (2003, 2006)], all approached corporate governance reforms from the 
perspective of protecting and enhancing the wealth of shareholders. The Cadbury Report (1992, 
p14) defined corporate governance as “the system by which organisations are directed and 
controlled”. The Cadbury report suggested that the board of directors is responsible for the 
governance of the company and is answerable to shareholders. 
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(Source: European Corporate Governance Institute) 
            
1992 UK           
1993            
1994 Canada South Africa          
1995 Australia France          
1996 Spain           
1997 Japan The 
Netherlands 
USA         
1998 Belgium Germany India Italy Thailand       
1999 Brazil Greece Hong Kong Ireland Mexico Portugal South Korea OECD ICGN Commonwealth  
2000 Denmark Indonesia Kenya Malaysia Romania The 
Philippines 
     
2001 China Czech 
Republic 
Malta Peru Singapore Sweden Uganda     
2002 Austria Cyprus Hungary Oman Pakistan Poland Russia Slovakia Switzerland Taiwan  
2003 Finland Lithuania Macedonia New Zealand Turkey Ukraine Latin America     
2004 Argentina Bangladesh Iceland Norway Mauritius Slovenia OECD     
2005 Latvia Jamaica ICGN         
2006 Bosnia 
Herzegovina 
Egypt Estonia Israel Lebanon Luxemburg Nigeria Saudi Arabia Sri Lanka Trinidad and 
Tobago 
UN 
2007 Bulgaria Colombia Jordan Kazakhstan Moldova Mongolia U.A.E     
2008 Albania Morocco Qatar Serbia Tunisia       
2009 Algeria Croatia Georgia Montenegro        
2010 Armenia Bahrain Baltic States Ghana Malawi Yemen      
2011 Azerbaijan Guernsey          
2012 Republic of 
Maldives 
          
2013 Barbados           
Table 2-2: Diffusion of CG regulations around the world  
21 
 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) analysed the adoption of CG codes in 49 countries and 
revealed that there is a convergence trend towards the Anglo-American model. They argued that 
most of the codes were designed to protect shareholder rights. Similarly, Zattoni and Cuomo 
(2008) noted  in their comparative study that all codes were meant to secure shareholder rights 
and required companies to adopt CG mechanism available in the Anglo-American model. 
Roberts (2004) identified that Russian codes of corporate governance are an attempt to impose 
the Anglo-American model on Russian businesses by emphasizing the importance of shareholder 
protection. Siddiqui (2010) presented data that showed that the CG model adopted by 
Bangladesh suggested listed companies to have a single-tier board structure where shareholders 
elect directors, the inclusion of an independent director, and separation of the chairman and 
CEO, etc. These guidelines are consistent with the OECD guidelines for CG. Similarly, the 
Anglo-American nature of reforms has been observed in other countries as well, for example in 
India (Reed, 2002), South Africa (West, 2006) and Japan (Yoshikawa et al., 2007).  
In summary, CG research focuses on the nature of CG reforms highlighting that CG codes 
around the world are mostly converging towards the Anglo-American model of CG. In doing so, 
these studies have put more emphasis on identifying the similarities between the adopted model 
and the Anglo-American model. This study argues that prior research emphasises similarities of 
CG regulations in developing countries with the Anglo-American model of CG while the 
differences were downplayed. The focus on the differences will allow an analysis of the degree 
of compromises and window-dressing in the adopted CG regulations. The unidirectional nature 
of CG reforms towards the Anglo-American model motivates researchers to identify why CG 




2.4.2 Reasons for reforms – efficiency vs. legitimacy  
There is another side of the debate that highlights why similar CG reforms particularly those that 
are in line with the Anglo-American model, are diffusing across the countries. This debate 
mostly oscillates between efficiency vs. legitimacy reasons that trigger countries to issue codes 
of good governance.  
The advocates of the shareholder-centric model argue that securing shareholders' rights and the 
sharp separation of (dispersed) ownership from managerial control is inevitably more efficient 
and modern than alternative forms of governance such as family firms, and bank-led groups (see, 
for example, Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, Mueller, 2006). The advocates of the agency 
theory perspective assume a link or causality between law, finance, and economic growth (La 
Porta et al., 1997, La Porta et al., 1998, Mueller, 2006). Pursuing shareholder interest, which is 
concerned with ensuring that firms should run in the best interest of shareholders, not only 
provides attractive locations for local companies to prosper (World Bank, 2000) but also for 
foreign investors to invest, thus promoting economic growth (Mueller, 2006). They argued that 
companies throughout the world should observe shareholder rights, maximise shareholder value, 
and be transparent in their reporting of corporate activities. Mueller (2006) argued that the best 
development strategy for developing countries is to create conditions that produce a large equity 
market. He argued that there is a positive relationship between the strength of a country’s 
corporate governance institutions and the size of its equity market, and that large equity markets 
foster faster economic growth. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that strong investment 
protection is necessary to persuade investors to invest in the companies otherwise weak 
shareholder protection is associated with a weak capital market. The proponents of the 
shareholder-centric model also argued that companies are no longer relying on domestic 
financial resources and hence, are attempting to attract foreign investments. Corporate 
governance is one of the ways to increase investors’ confidence in countries’ financial markets 
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and entice them to take a risk (Solomon, 2007). Other studies also promote corporate governance 
reforms in favour of shareholders around the world (Ananchotikul and Eichengreen, 2009, Daily 
et al., 2003, Klapper and Love, 2004). Thus, from the efficiency perspective, in an effort to 
increase a country’s economic growth and to attract local and foreign investments, the corporate 
governance system should focus on protecting the interest of shareholders. In doing so, many 
countries have introduced CG reforms toward the shareholder-centric model, i.e. the Anglo-
American model (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, Millar et al., 2005, Mueller, 2006).   
From the institutional theory perspective, for organisations to survive, they must interact with 
their environment in ways perceived as acceptable to their various constituents in that 
environment (Dillard et al., 2004). In highly institutionalised environments, social forces act to 
generate similarities among organisations this is what Powell and DiMaggio (1991) described as, 
organisations becoming isomorphic in an external institutional environment. An isomorphism is 
a “constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the 
same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p 66).  DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991) identified three kinds of isomorphic pressures – mimetic, normative, and coercive. 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when the organisation mimics the actions of successful 
organisations to demonstrate that they are enhancing their legitimacy or at least trying to 
improve their working conditions. Normative isomorphism stems from professionalisation where 
professional organisations collectively define working conditions to promote a cognitive basis to 
legitimise their practices. Coercive isomorphism occurs from both formal and informal pressures 
exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural 
expectations from the society they function within. The institutional perspective argues that 
organisations become isomorphic with an external institutional environment and are pressured to 
adopt practices that have institutional legitimacy for symbolic reasons.  
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Prior researches have used both efficiency and legitimacy perspectives to analyse why countries 
are adopting corporate governance regulations (for example see:, Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008, 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, Reed, 2002, Enrione et 
al., 2006, Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, Siddiqui, 2010, Ananchotikul and Eichengreen, 2009, 
Klapper and Love, 2004, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, La Porta et al., 1997). Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2004) conducted one of the earliest empirical studies to examine the forces influencing 
adoption of codes of good governance around the world between 1978-1999. They argued that 
countries have developed codes in response to both efficiency and legitimacy pressures. The 
efficiency of the governance system is defined in terms of shareholders rights and legitimacy is 
defined in terms of the conformity to widespread governance practices. Zattoni and Cuomo 
(2008) investigated the reasons behind the proliferation of codes of corporate governance in 60 
countries. They argued that the issuance of codes in countries with poor investor protection is 
prompted more by legitimisation reasons rather than efficiency reasons.  
Reed (2002) studied corporate governance reforms in developing countries and looked into the 
underlying causes of reforms. He mentioned that many developing countries introduced CG 
regulations in line with the Anglo-American model due to the legitimacy reasons. The poor 
economic performance resulted in a debt crisis in many developing countries which placed these 
countries under the direct influence of international financial bodies such as the IMF and the 
World Bank. These international financial bodies imposed a series of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) and these programmes increased attention towards governance issues. He 
identified that countries adopted a shareholder-centric model of CG due to three reasons. First, 
these reforms are important to promote efficiency amongst domestic firms and will enable them 
to compete against international firms that are entering into previously no-go domestic markets. 
Second, these reforms are important to boost the confidence of international investors by 
eliminating traditional cheap credit through government development banks. Lastly, these 
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reforms will provide a shield to the government’s unpopular liberalizing reforms (e.g. cutting 
back on spending) by indicating to the public that these reforms will develop more effective 
corporate structure that will generate the conditions for growth and development. The study 
states that developing economies tend to adopt the Anglo-American model of CG despite that 
such a model is based on assumptions of efficient markets and equity financing.  (Siddiqui, 
2010) found similar adoption reasons in Bangladesh and argued that the adoption of CG codes 
was not on efficiency grounds but rather on pressure from International Financial Agencies 
(IFAs) to which Bangladesh is highly relying on for monetary aid.  
Prior studies highlighted the crucial role of transnational institutions in the diffusion of corporate 
governance reforms around the world (Roberts, 2004, Arnold, 2005, Arnold, 2012). The global 
institutional pressure results in cross-border isomorphism or the occurrence of common 
organisational practices over time (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The World Bank helps 
developing and transition economies in evaluating their current corporate governance practices 
and asks them to upgrade to the international level. In collaboration with the IMF, the World 
Bank has issued corporate governance country assessment reports on the observance of standards 
and codes (ROSC) for 44 countries. This report evaluates the state of corporate governance 
practices existing in the country against the benchmark of the OECD principles of corporate 
governance. The corporate governance reforms suggested by international financial agencies as a 
pre-requisite for obtaining loans in developing countries serve as a coercive isomorphic pressure. 
Although the two perspectives (efficiency vs. legitimacy) provide a useful way to analyse the 
diffusion of CG reforms around the world, however, are these two lenses sufficient in explaining 
reforms and practices around the globe in a multifaceted context? The next section follows this 
debate.   
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2.4.3 CG research at the country level: theoretical and empirical limitations 
The prior literature on the emergence and development of corporate governance reforms at the 
country level has analysed the type of CG reforms and the reasons behind the diffusion of CG 
reforms over time in different countries around the world. The analysis of existing literature 
reveals that a pure economic view of agency theory and a legitimacy view of institutional theory 
alone or together are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of how corporate governance reforms 
emerged and developed in different contexts. These studies have provided some valuable insight 
into the diffusion of CG reforms, however such work is not without its limitations. This section 
identifies these limitations and scope of this study. 
The existing studies of diffusion of CG regulations around the world, particularly in emerging 
economies, usually focused on similarities between adopted codes and internationally accepted 
CG practices. These studies considered that isomorphism does not affect the substance of the 
codes. These studies emphasised similarities of CG regulations in developing countries with the 
Anglo-American model of CG (e.g. Siddiqui, 2010) while the differences were down-played. 
According to Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009), many studies take the codes as a black box 
and assume that codes are equivalent across countries and can be analysed as one common 
variable or as a comparable independent variable. Although most of the codes diffused around 
the world shared common principles, codes vary significantly because they were introduced to 
resolve corporate governance issues specific to a given country. Studies arguing that the 
adoption of CG regulations is the outcome of mimetic, normative, or coercive response to 
institutional pressures fail to capture the political bargaining process that takes place in 
determining the contents of the adopted regulations.  
The economic view of agency theory assumes that the biggest governance problem in the 
modern corporation is bilateral issues between management and shareholders. The agency theory 
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perspective reduces social relationships between firms to simple dyad relationships between 
economically rational and self-motivated agents (Lubatkin, 2007). Sociologists and legal 
scholars have criticised the supremacy of shareholders and recognised that it is a more political 
and normative effort from a broad coalition of players with common interests (Blair and Stout, 
1999, Deakin and Konzelmann, 2004, Arnold, 2005, Arnold, 2012, Davis, 2009).  Deakin and 
Konzelmann (2004) pointed out that even US corporate law does not regard shareholders as 
undisputed owners of the firm. This reductionist approach may be intended to reduce the 
complexity of the governance phenomenon, but it engenders the undersocialised and acultural 
view of firms, thereby reducing the model’s relevance (Lubatkin et al., 2007) in different 
contexts. 
The inherent problem in the shareholder-centric approach is its assumption that ownership 
structure in large corporations is dispersed across many small shareholders. La Porta et al. (1999) 
showed that outside the US and the UK, dispersion of ownership is more an exception than the 
rule. Subsequent studies confirmed the findings of La Porta et al. (1999) (see for example:, 
Claessens et al., 2000, Attig et al., 2002, Becht and Roell, 1999, Faccio and Lang, 2002). The 
applicability of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance outside the UK and the US, 
especially in Asian economies, has been questioned (Rwegasira, 2000, Siddiqui, 2010, Uddin 
and Choudhury, 2008, Özcan and Çokgezen, 2003, Mukherjee-Reed, 2002). In many countries, 
shareholding is concentrated in the hand of founding family members, lending banks and other 
companies through cross shareholdings. Young et al. (2008) suggested that in developing 
economies due to concentration of ownership, major conflict is not between management and 
shareholders, but rather it is between majority shareholders and minority shareholders and also 
suggested that in developing countries corporate governance should focus on resolving issues 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This study is looking into the 
process of the emergence and development of corporate governance in the family dominant 
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context of Pakistan where ownership is concentrated in the hands of founding families, and thus 
pure economic reasons of diffusion of corporate governance practices to solve agency conflict 
are not considered appropriate.  
The limited focus of prior diffusion studies on the economic view of agency theory and 
legitimacy view of institutional theory is incapable of explaining the process of the emergence 
and development of corporate governance reforms in any particular country. As suggested by 
Hancher and Moran (1989), regulation cannot occur without extensive cooperation and 
negotiation among key actors in the regulatory space. The narrow conceptualisation of 
institutional dynamics in prior research is fundamentally flawed because it maintained a 
distinction between technical forces and rational economic decision making on the one hand, and 
institutional forces and ‘irrationality’ on the other. Most of the previous studies identified causal 
factors of adoption at the macro level and looks into what or why questions and ignores the 
“how” question. The dichotomy of efficiency and legitimacy reasons of diffusion ignores other 
important aspects that can influence diffusion and the process of diffusion. This dichotomy has 
focused on diffusion as an outcome rather than a process and as a result has neglected the 
influence of political, social, cultural, and legal factors and the role of power and group interests. 
Even the scholars within diffusion studies often disagree about whether the reforms emerged and 
developed due to efficiency reasons or due to legitimation effects (Strang and Macy, 2001, 
Tolbert and Zucker, 1983, Westphal and Zajac, 1997).  
Prior institutional studies have highlighted that transnational organisations play a key role in the 
diffusion of regulations in emerging economies, and national regulators and regulatees passively 
adhere to internationally accepted regulatory practices. These institutional theorists often 
undermine their ability to respond proactively, strategically, and creatively to institutional 
pressures (Oliver, 1991, DiMaggio, 1988, Scott, 2001). DiMaggio (1988) argued that there is a 
need to study power and actors who actually create and influence institutions. Countries differ in 
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the way that power is allocated across organisations and actors and also how it is reflected in 
each nation’s legal system and overall institutional framework (Roe, 2003). Influential 
transnational actors (e.g. the World Bank, IMF, OECD, Asian Development Bank, and 
International Finance Corporation) have not displaced the nation state, marginalised local actors 
and transformed national institutional arrangements and organisational routines. Rather, they rely 
on the support of national regulators and local organisations to confer legitimacy on the 
transnational regulations they wish to implement (Cooper et al., 1996). If regulatory reforms 
were to change status quo or have adverse effects on organisational routines, then local actors 
may form a lobby to oppose reforms. It is thus important to understand power dynamics in 
regulation development processes and the roles of national actors in the production and 
implementation of regulation in a local context. Understanding how CG regulations are diffused 
in a local context can help unveil problems and game playing to smooth future regulatory efforts 
(see, for example, Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013, Malsch and Gendron, 2011, Caramanis, 2005, 
Arnold, 2005).  
Examining the existing literature, it can be analysed that pure economics and legitimacy reasons 
alone or together are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of how corporate governance reforms 
emerged and developed in different contexts. This study assumes that it is important to move the 
debate beyond the efficiency/legitimacy and convergence/divergence dichotomy and pay more 
attention to the process of emergence and development of corporate governance reforms. 
Yoshikawa et al. (2007) conducted a multiple-case, multiple-level study using a sample of 
Japanese firms to understand the diffusion of governance innovation. They argued that the 
spread of innovations across institutional levels and firms is far from linear and straightforward. 
International pressures from foreign capital and product market may not lead to convergence. 
Japanese companies decoupled themselves from governance reforms and customised their 
corporate governance practices according to their particular local circumstances. The local 
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companies refused the straightforward adoption of the Anglo-American types of reforms. 
Eventually, these companies forced government to revise the code of corporate governance to 
adjust to the Japanese reality and local demands. This study revealed that the diffusion of CG in 
the national context is a complex and dynamic process, which involves the interaction among a 
range of actors pursing their self-interests. Thus, national social, economic, and political contexts 
and roles and the power of local actors are important dimensions that should not be overlooked.  
Prior institutional research ignores countries’ internal dynamics that can play an important role in 
shaping corporate governance reforms. The corporate governance model cannot exist in 
isolation; each country has its own unique institutional arrangements and can influence the 
process of diffusion. There is some consensus amidst corporate governance scholars that “the-
one-size-fits-all” rule is flawed, and thus a wide diversity of approaches of corporate governance 
should be expected due to vast differences in national contexts where firms are embedded 
(Cuervo, 2002, Reaz and Hossain, 2007). Limited use of institutional theory requires an 
approach that should be able to provide robust explanations of broader institutional dynamics 
related to macro and micro institutional processes.  
In response to calls for “an enhanced focus on the influence of national political and social 
contexts on the development and interpretation of accounting regulations” (e.g. Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2008, Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013, p. 169, Cuervo, 2002, Reaz and Hossain, 2007, 
Roberts, 2004) and to cover the research gap identified, this study defines its first objective to 
explore the wider socio-political and economic environment in relation to the emergence and 
development of corporate governance regulations in Pakistan. While achieving this objective, 
this study attempts to find an answer to the question: Why and how have corporate governance 
regulations emerged and developed in Pakistan? In doing so, this study will examine how the 
national socio-political and economic context has played its role in the process of the emergence 
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and development of corporate governance regulations and the ways in which these ideas have 
been disseminated in the organisational field and organisational level.  
2.5 Corporate governance at the organisational level  
The diffusion of CG regulations around the world is remarkable, however the mere introduction 
of CG codes at the country level does not automatically guarantee that organisations will follow 
it or it will improve organisational effectiveness. Prior research again focused on efficiency and 
legitimacy conceptions in examining CG practices at the organisation level. From the 
shareholder-centric point of view, prior studies tried to establish links between organisational 
compliance with CG regulations and their performance. On the other hand, institutional scholars 
focused on analysing the influence of institutional environments on their CG practices. This 
section discusses the current stream of CG research at the organisational level and its limitation 
in defining the scope of this study.  
2.5.1 CG codes compliance and organisational performance 
The CG codes are mostly implemented either through mandatory or voluntary mechanisms. In 
the case of mandatory compliance, companies have no alternatives other than to comply with the 
code (MacNeil and Li, 2006). The well-known example of mandatory compliance is the US 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). The philosophy underlying voluntary compliance is to “comply or 
explain”, where companies are not required to comply with all the requirements of codes. In case 
of non-compliance, companies must explain their reasons for doing so (MacNeil and Li, 2006). 
This approach was initially introduced in the UK. Few studies have tried to examine the 
relationship between the implementation approach and the organisational compliance level. For 
example, Maassen et al. (2004) found that a voluntary approach, due to its flexibility to adjust, 
had a significant impact on the level of compliance. However, the level of compliance has varied 
significantly across the countries. Weir and Laing (2000) and Arcot et al. (2010) found an 
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increase trend of compliance with the Cadbury and Combined code, however, MacNeil and Li 
(2006) found significant evidence of non-compliance in the UK firms. Krambia‐Kapardis and 
Psaros (2006) have reported low levels of compliance with the code by companies listed on the 
Cyprus stock exchange. Uddin and Choudhury (2008) provide empirical evidence that 
Bangladeshi companies fail to comply with basic corporate rules and regulations, where even 
firms failed to audit their accounts.  
As Aguilera et al. (2008) argue that compliance with the code requires significant  
implementation costs, thus it is reasonable for companies to expect benefits from the compliance 
in the form of improved firm performance and positive market reaction. A fair amount of 
research tried to establish links between compliance with the shareholder-centric CG model and 
firm performance. The advocate of the shareholder-centric model used findings of these 
researches to promote the Anglo-American model around the world. They argued that 
compliance with the shareholder-centric model would boost investor confidence. Weir and Laing 
(2000) find that market returns are higher if firms have a remuneration committee and outside 
directors on board. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) measure benefits of firm’s compliance 
with SOX rules and suggest that corporate governance rules have an economically significant 
impact on firm value. (Jain and Rezaee, 2006) studied the market reaction to the firm’s stock 
price complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. They find that firms that are more compliant with 
the code received positive response from the market. 
Prior researches argued that compliance with shareholder-centric CG codes reduces the chance 
of earning management. Hutchinson et al. (2008) examine the effect of corporate governance 
reforms using a database of 200 listed companies in the Australian stock exchange for the 
financial years ending in 2000 and 2005. This reveals governance reforms which encourage 
firms to adopt better practices to reduce the chances of earning management. Cornett et al. 
(2008), using samples of the S&P 100 firms for the period of 1994-2003, show that earning 
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management is lower when there is a strong monitoring of management discretion through 
independent directors and institutional investors on board and with institutional ownership of 
shares and increase in response to the option compensation of CEOs. Machuga and Teitel (2007) 
examined effects of code of corporate governance on quality of earnings of Mexican firms and 
show that the quality of earnings improved after implementation of the code.  
Some studies used traditional measures of performance, such as returns and market value. 
Goncharov et al. (2006), using data of large German listed companies, assess the value relevance 
of the degree of compliance and show that the degree of compliance with the code is value-
relevant. The stock price of sample firms with a higher degree of compliance is higher. Gompers 
et al. (2003), using a governance index as a proxy for the level of shareholder rights of about 
1,500 large firms during the 1990s, show that firms with strong shareholder rights had higher 
profit, higher sales growth, higher firm value, and low capital expenditure. Fernández-Rodríguez 
et al. (2004) find a positive reaction from the stock market to the announcement made by 
Spanish firms of compliance with the corporate governance code. Del Brio et al. (2006) conclude 
that the degree of compliance with the code in Spanish firms increases a firm’s value. Alves and 
Mendes (2004), examine the level of compliance with code issued by the Portuguese Security 
Market Commission and the equity return. They concluded that there is a positive relationship 
between compliance and equity market return among Portuguese companies. Attiya and Robina 
(2007) investigate the relationships between firm level corporate governance and firm economic 
value of companies listed on the Karachi stock exchange as measured by Tobin’s Q. They find 
that board composition and shareholding enhance a firm’s value.  
However, many other studies have showed either inconsistent or negative relationships between 
code compliance and firm performance. For example, Weir and Laing (2000) have showed that a 
complete compliance with Cadbury recommendations does not appear to result in better 
performance when compared with partial or non-compliance. Park and Shin (2004) do not find 
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that compliance with the Toronto Stock Exchange’s corporate governance guidelines improves 
governance practices and reduces abnormal accruals. Krambia‐Kapardis and Psaros (2006) 
mention that one of the reasons for non-compliance was that company executives do not see the 
immediate benefits of compliance because they are not convinced that international investors are 
interested in developing economies like Cyprus due to the small size of the economy. 
Mukherjee-Reed (2002) argues that the development impact of the Anglo-American nature of 
reforms in India is not very promising. Other studies found no link between having independent 
directors on the board of directors and improved firm performance (Bhagat and Black, 2001, 
Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008).  
The institutional theory-based researches have tried to explain firms’ compliance through the 
legitimacy perspective. Organisations are embedded in their institutional environment that is 
characterised by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual organisations 
must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy (Scott and Meyer, 1983). Uddin and 
Choudhury’s (2008) study of corporate governance practices in a traditional family controlled 
culture of Bangladesh found that economic pressure and coercive behaviour fostered Anglo-
American model adoptions, but dominant familial culture promoted the continuation of existing 
practices, in which management is more accountable to family members than external minority 
shareholders.  
Kogut and Zander (1992) reveal that local institutions play an important role in determining 
corporate behaviour. Several organisational level factors might explain the organisational 
compliance behaviour such as ownership structure (Claessens et al., 2002, Barontini and Caprio, 
2006, Villalonga and Amit, 2006), inherited control (Pérez-González, 2006), family ownership 
(Barth et al., 2005, Maury, 2006, Miller et al., 2007), and lone founder ownership (Miller et al., 
2011). Ansari and Bell (1991) examine the influence of societal and cultural factors on 
accounting and control practices in Internal Foods, a holding corporation for a group of 
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companies located in Pakistan. This study discovers that traditional theories of control, such as 
the technical-rational or collectivist, did not fully explain or capture the existence of certain 
practices and the dynamics of events in family-controlled firms. They argue that acceptance of a 
control system rests not on how rational it is, but on how well it reflects the value system of its 
participants and the belief system with which it operates. The International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) conducted a survey to identify the reasons for reforms to CG regulations in publicly listed 
companies in Pakistan. This study reveals that more than 90% of the sample companies in 
Pakistan are complying with the code due to the regulatory requirements.  
In summary, the relationship between compliance and firm performance is not very well 
established. Thus, the taken-for-granted assumptions about the economic benefits of the 
shareholder-centric CG model do not hold true in different institutional settings. The legitimacy 
perspective of institutional theory, that organisations are complying to gain legitimacy, is not 
enough to explain CG practices at the organisational level. The various institutional and cultural 
factors motivate and constrain firm strategy and behaviour in today’s global environment. This 
study argues that the efficiency and legitimacy perspective alone is not enough to explain the CG 
practices at the organisational level. The next section follows this debate.  
2.5.2 CG research at the organisational level: the limitations 
Corporate governance corpus at the firm level endows insightful knowledge about the influence 
of corporate governance reforms at the organisational level; however, such work is not without 
limitations.  
Prior research mostly focused on the impact of CG codes through the relationship between a 
firm’s compliance and its performance. These studies mostly measure compliance through 
information available in the annual reports, i.e. in the form of a tick-box. There is a lack of field 
research in examining the process of how CG mechanisms are in operation at the organisational 
36 
 
level. There is a dearth of research on how codes of governance affects the routine process of 
governance within the organisation (Teerooven and Sheik-Ellahi, 2008). This study argues that 
relying on data available in annual reports, such as the number of independent directors on 
board, statements of compliance, and the separation of the CEO and chairman, are not sufficient 
to measure the true impact of CG codes on organisational practices. The knowledge about how 
CG mechanisms are operating at the organisational level is still embryonic. For example, how is 
the board of directors performing their fiduciary duties? How are decisions made within the 
board meetings? What is the role of independent directors? To what extent are firms able to 
protect the shareholders’ rights? How are board committees operating and how effective are 
they? Overall, to what extent have firms incorporated CG mechanisms described in the CG codes 
into actual organisational routine practices and processes? For example, Uddin and Choudhury 
(2008) studied internal corporate governance processes and found a good deal of non-
compliance with the regulations. There are lots of unanswered questions regarding the actual 
governance practices within the organisations, which require researchers to knock on the doors 
of organisations.  
Prior researches followed the top-down impact of corporate governance regulations on 
organisational practices. These studies only focused on the influence of institutional 
environments on the organisations and ignore the influence organisations can put on the 
institutional environment. These studies assume a submissive role of organisations where they 
passively adhere to enacted CG codes. They shed little light on how organisational practices can 
affect and shape the contents of the codes or laws. In addition, prior CG studies analysed 
countries as the unit of analysis or treat organisations as the unit of analysis. There is a lack of 
research on multiple level studies in the field of corporate governance. The corporate governance 
is a complex process and involves interaction between firms and their institutional environment. 
Yoshikawa et al. (2007), in their multi-level analysis, showed that diffusion of practices at firm’s 
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and institutional levels is far from linear and straightforward. This study shows that how 
opposition from well-regarded firms against the institutionalisation of corporate governance 
reforms in line with the Anglo-American shareholder-centric model forced the Ministry of 
Justice to revise the Commercial Code to legitimise different system of corporate governance. 
This study suggested analysis at multiple levels to examine how social, economic and political 
contexts interact with the organisational context.  
The prior research also sheds little light on institutional and organisational change and 
decoupling. Institutions are also subject to change due to internal and external pressures (Scott, 
2001). Institutional change is a process that entails change in the formal and informal rules of 
human interaction and in the enforcement mechanisms of such rules (North, 1990), or the 
deinstitutionalisation of existing institutional form, which may be followed by the emergence of 
new forms, norms and practices (Scott, 2001).  For example, in terms of corporate governance, 
efficiency or function pressures (performance downturn or shareholder pressures) call into 
question the existing practices and beliefs. Social pressure stems from changing social 
expectations of beliefs and practices within a society. Nevertheless, the process of institutional 
change is complex because competing logic often coexists. Thus, to understand the complex 
process of institutional change, we need to analyse not only external pressures, but also the 
responses of locally embedded actors. The major process that brings about the contentious 
coexistence of institutional continuity and change is that of decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977), which is often complemented by the process of local tailoring (Westney, 1993). For 
example to encounter external pressure for change, organisations may import foreign models but 
decouple them from their original institutional contexts and modify them to fit their own 
institutional context. Very few studies focused on how firms engaged in decoupling (Fiss and 
Zajac, 2004, Yoshikawa et al., 2007).  Fiss and Zajac (2004) found that many German firms that 
adopted governance practices did not actually implement them. Focusing on Japanese firms, 
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Yoshikawa et al. (2007) provide a cross-level analysis of a firm-led corporate governance 
change. They show that firms in Japan adopted some elements of the US corporate governance 
practices but implemented them differently.  
2.6 Family capitalism and corporate governance 
This study is looking into the emergence and development of CG in Pakistan. Few political and 
business families dominate the socio-political and economic context of Pakistan. It is considered 
important to look into the accounting studies focused on family businesses. This section 
discusses accounting research in family businesses and highlights the importance of putting this 
study into a family dominant context.     
Family businesses are a global phenomenon and play a significant role in the global economy. 
According to Family Firm Institute (2008), family businesses are annually generating 
approximately 70-90% of global GDP. In many countries most of the wealth lies with family-
owned businesses. In North America, 80-90% of all enterprises are family firms. Approximately 
35% of S&P 500 and 46% of S&P 1,500 are categorised as family firms (Anderson et al., 2003, 
Breton‐Miller et al., 2004, Miller et al., 2013). In Europe, family businesses are also significant 
in number. For example, 83% of businesses in France, 79% in Germany, and 73% in Italy firms 
are family-owned. In Asian countries, the majority of the wealth lies with only a few families. 
According to Claessens et al. (2000), in many Asian economies a few financially strong  families 
control most of the corporate assets, e.g. Philippines 52.2%, Indonesia 57.7%, Thailand 46.2% 
and Hong Kong 32.1%. Other studies also highlighted the predominance of family-owned firms 
around the world (La Porta et al., 1999, Claessens et al., 2000, Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000, 
Kabbach and Crespi-Cladera, 2012). 
It is very difficult to find one acceptable definition of a family firm. The common characteristics 
of a family firm, regardless of where they are located, is that they have a high level of ownership 
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concentration and are usually managed by multiple family members from multiple generations 
(Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2012, Astrachan and Shanker, 2003, Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
Miller et al. (2007) analysed how various studies around the world defined family firms and 
identified great variations in the definitions. For example, family firms are those where the 
founder or a member of the founding family run the company (McConaughy et al., 1998), the 
founding family or founding individual own and serve on the board (Anderson et al., 2003, La 
Porta et al., 1999, Barth et al., 2005), multiple members of same family are involved in owning 
or managing (Villalonga and Amit, 2006), and a blood relative of the founder or major owner 
worked as the CEO (Pérez-González, 2006). This study is using the broad definition of Miller et 
al. (2007, p 836) who consider that  “family firms are those in which multiple members of the 
same family are involved as major owners or managers, either contemporaneously or over 
time”. This definition covers a number of variations such as the level of ownership, voting 
rights, managerial role, multiple members, and family generations.  
There is a constellation of governance topics that have been introduced in family business 
research, such as family ownership and compliance (Kabbach and Crespi-Cladera, 2012), family 
ownership vs. non-family ownership (Schulze et al., 2002, Young et al., 2008), performance of 
family firms compared to non-family firms (Barontini and Caprio, 2006, Maury, 2006, Miller et 
al., 2007, Tsamenyi et al., 2008, Villalonga and Amit, 2006), and succession (Schulze et al., 
2002, Lubatkin et al., 2005, Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2012, Breton‐Miller et al., 2004). 
Within the governance literature, family ownership preferences and how to relate it to other non-
family owners have received much attention.  
Prior studies on accounting in family firms show that agency theory, institutional theory and 
stewardship theory are the main employed theoretical approaches (Salvato and Moores, 2010). 
Agency theory asserts that family control can lead to conflict of interest due to the existence of 
private benefits of control (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Agency theory proponents advocate that 
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family firms are more prone to agency problems due to the concentration of ownership in the 
hands of a few controlling families (Claessens et al., 2002, Claessens et al., 2000, Mueller, 
2006). Founding families want to retain and sustain firm control; the simplest way is through 
ownership and/or through having a significant number of shares. This trait allows them to control 
firm management with the intent of retaining ownership and control throughout the generations. 
This leads to the suspicion that founding families are using firms and their resources to provide 
benefits to the controlling families at an economic cost (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011, Cennamo 
et al., 2012). In doing so, founding families may hide actual financial performance to conceal 
wealth expropriation from others stakeholders (Claessens et al., 2002). Le Breton-Miller et al. 
(2011), using data from fortune 1,000 firms, argued that agency behaviour is more likely to 
occur in a family firm with a greater number of family directors, officers, generations and votes. 
Thus, family firms may be apt at non-compliance with the CG model that is designed to protect 
outsider minority shareholders. Some critics on family businesses hypothesised that due to 
managerial nepotism, entrenchment, or incompetence, family businesses will lag behind true 
industry practices (Schulze et al., 2002, Bertrand and Schoar, 2006, Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). 
The agency theory perspective maintains that founding family member may underinvest, avoid 
risk and extract resources in order to protect family interests. These critics argued that modern 
forms of organisations with clear separation between ownership and control are more efficient 
than family businesses bank-led groups and conglomerates (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, 
Mueller, 2006).  
Fama and Jensen (1983, p 306) disagreed with the agency theory conception about family 
business and believe that due to the concentration of ownership in the hands of a few founding 
family members, the chances of the agency problem is minimal. In family firms, because owners 
and managers are the same people, this provides advantages in monitoring and disciplining. 
Since ownership of family firms are concentrated in the hands of a few people, the risk of free 
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riding also diminishes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera (2012) contend 
that current literature does not provide sufficient evidence that agency-related issues are more 
prevalent in family businesses. They assert that actions that maximise benefits of family owners 
might also maximise the benefits of minority shareholders in family firms. In contrast to the 
agency theory perspective, some scholars maintain that family firms are free from short-term 
commitment to shareholders and can invest in long-term projects (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 
2012). Thus, the economic perspective of agency theory alone may significantly limit the chance 
to interpret the multifaceted realities inherent in family firms. 
The institutional theory legitimacy perspective contends that, because the outside stakeholders 
view family firms with suspicion due to socioemotional wealth, family firms are associated with 
a greater quest for legitimacy and compliance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Miller et al. (2013) 
contend that family businesses are subject to unusually powerful motivations to comply with 
regulations because of their pursuit of Socio Emotional Wealth (SEW) objectives. According to 
Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007), noneconomic factors play a more prominent role in explaining the 
family business persuasion on organisational goals and interests. The family firm’s 
socioemotional wealth, such as the ability to exercise authority, love, loyalty, needs of 
belongingness, intimacy, the perpetuation of family values through business, the preservation of 
the family dynasty, altruism, obligation based on blood ties, and jealousy tend to influence the 
business decisions (Schulze et al., 2002, Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). The institutional scholars 
argue that external stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, lenders, and government are likely 
to deal with the same management for a long time, which makes it critical for the family firms to 
protect their long-lasting economic effect on the business (Anderson et al., 2003). The advocates 
of family business hypothesised that family firms’ interests in long-term investments and 
concerns over the family and firm’s reputation, lessened the agency problem due to its enhanced 
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monitoring which is linked to higher performance, greater compliance and better planning (Le 
Breton-Miller et al., 2011, Miller et al., 2011, Miller et al., 2007, Prencipe et al., 2014). 
The literature on accounting research in family businesses to date provided limited insights on 
whether or not family firms comply with the regulations. For example, according to Cennamo et 
al. (2012), family firms, in order to protect their socioemotional wealth, comply with 
environment regulations. However, Uddin and Choudhury (2008) examined CG practices in 
family businesses in the context of Bangladesh and found a great deal of non-compliance with 
the CG regulations.     
The research methods employed in the accounting research in family firms are restricted to 
quantitative research (Salvato and Moores, 2010, Prencipe et al., 2014). Salvato and Moores 
(2010) analysed the accounting research in family firms and selected 47 articles for analysis. 
They found that all studies were empirical based on quantitative research. None of the reviewed 
articles were based on qualitative research. Similarly, Prencipe et al. (2014) identified that two 
types of data appeared to dominate accounting research in family businesses, i.e. archival data 
and survey data. Accounting studies based on field studies are very rare. Salvato and Moores 
(2010) focus on understanding why and how certain accounting phenomenon occur and unfold 
over time, which cannot be easily addressed through the traditional quantitative methods. Rather, 
researchers should conduct rich, in-depth, and longitudinal field studies to better understand the 
accounting phenomenon.  
In a number of countries such as Pakistan, the controlling interests of public firms often reside 
with the founding family (Bari et al., 2003). This study maintains that the family-controlled 
listed companies offer a particularly intriguing context to study corporate governance issues. 
Overall, the studies on accounting in family firms has been growing, and accounting in family 
firms appears to still be emerging as a field of inquiry. Prencipe et al. (2014) suggest that future 
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research on accounting in family firms should emphasise “a broader coverage of accounting 
topics, an extension of theoretical frameworks, an extension of methodological approaches, an 
explicit focus on the difference between family ownership and concentrated ownership, and an 
explicit focus on family-specific determinants of accounting choices by family firms”. With the 
wave of liberalisation and globalisation processes, family businesses are entered into the new 
competitive field, where in general they performed well and hold themselves quite well. The 
study of corporate governance practices in such public listed companies will be a valuable 
contribution in the field of corporate governance. Therefore, this study considers that research on 
CG in a family dominant context and in family-controlled public listed companies using multiple 
lenses and complementary methodological approaches is important.   
This study aims to fill these gaps by setting its second and third objectives to identify 
organisational field level and organisational level factors that may affect the institutionalisation 
of corporate governance codes in family-controlled public listed companies in Pakistan. While 
achieving this objective, this study aims to find the answer to second main research question: To 
what extent did the institutionalisation of corporate governance codes occur in the family-
controlled listed companies? 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a discussion on the key literature in the field of diffusion in general and of 
CG codes in particular. The analysis helps in identifying venues for unexplored areas in the field 
of corporate governance in developing countries and in family-controlled businesses. The way 
corporate governance is defined plays an important role in understanding the diffusion of CG 
regulations around the world. The analysis highlighted that existing literature is undertheorised 
and focuses on convergence and divergence of CG codes towards the Anglo-American model 
and their causes. The shareholder-centric efficiency perspective and institutional theory 
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legitimacy perspective is dominated at the both the country level and firm level in explaining 
corporate governance adoption and practices. This study considers that corporate governance 
itself is made up of diverse elements, and that uncovering those requires complex conjunctions 
of factors and explanations. The understanding of political, economic, and socio-cultural factors 
and actor’s micro-processes will provide an important opportunity for theoretical development 
and empirical insight, and a new direction of institutional analysis will help pave the way for 
multi-level research. Factors such as economic interdependence, understanding of contextual 
factors, and historical analysis that facilitates or inhibits diffusion can provide more insights than 
the more simplistic empirical search for finding reasons for diffusion. 
The prior institutional research mostly focused on isomorphism and tried to identify causal 
institutional factors of adoption and diffusion of corporate governance practices across the globe. 
A narrow use of institutional theory has focused on institutionalisation as an outcome rather than 
a process. The studies at the country level do not pay sufficient attention to the processes that 
lead to such adoption. Thus, it ignores the process of emergence and development of CG 
regulations and the role of national actor’s power and interests. A more complete approach to 
corporate governance regulations and practices that account for institutional processes requires 
attention to the broader cultural framework that is created and changed by field-level actors, as 
well as the lower-level activities of organisations and other actors who work within those 
frameworks. The process of institutionalising, transpositioning, establishing and 
deinstitutionalizing practices have received little attention in the corporate governance literature. 




Chapter 3: Analytical framework for understanding 
institutional dynamics 
3.1 Introduction 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, this paper aims to examine the process of the emergence 
and development of CG reforms in the context of Pakistan. Given that this study seeks to 
understand the process of institutionalisation, transposition, and deinstitutionalisation of CG 
regulations at both the societal level and organisational level, an analytical framework which 
offers insights into both the macro and micro levels as well as the interactions between these 
levels, is considered valuable. Thus, in order to overcome the research limitations highlighted in 
the previous chapter and to better understand the emergence of the institutionalisation process of 
CG regulations, this study has developed a multi-level analytical framework. This study 
constructs a conceptual framework by incorporating institutional theory with structuration theory 
and draws upon Weber’s conception of axes of tension to better understand the dynamic social 
context which in turn enables a multi-level analysis of CG practices and change processes.  
The analytical framework facilitates understanding of the process of institutionalisation, 
transposition, and deinstitutionalisation at various societal levels. This framework enables 
exploration of how Socio-Political and Economic (SPE) level factors influence the emergence 
and development of CG regulations in the context of Pakistan. Additionally, this framework also 
facilitates identification of organisational fields, where at this level criteria are established at the 
SPE level which are then translated into organisational level criteria and practices. At the 
organisational level, factors may affect the implementation process of CG regulations. The 
framework recognises the institutionalisation process as political, reflecting the role of power 
and agency.  
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The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 critically analyses the two widely used theoretical 
lenses within the diffusion studies, i.e. agency theory and institutional theory. This section 
presents why these two theoretical lenses stand-alone and are inadequate in achieving the 
research objectives set out in the introduction chapter. The next section integrates structuration 
theory’s duality of structure with institutional theory to recognise the non-deterministic 
relationship between structure and agency and to theorise change. Section 3.4 presents Weber’s 
axes of tension in specifying the social context within which the process of institutionalisation, 
transposition, and deinstitutionalisation occur. The following section, 3.5, outlines an analytical 
framework that is constructed to analyse how institutional social practices create, embed, 
discard, and change over time through various societal levels. The following section, 3.6, 
provides rationale for developing a multi-level, multi-theory analytical framework to analyse 
institutions, accounting practices, and change processes. The chapter ends with conclusions.  
3.2 Contemporary analytical frameworks of CG and their limitations 
The research to date has witnessed a range of micro/macro theoretical frameworks which shape 
the construction of knowledge using their own laws of development (Blair and Stout, 1999). This 
section provides a critical analysis of two widely used theoretical lenses within accounting 
literature and their deficiency for this study.  
3.2.1 Agency theory 
Many economists use Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory-based principal-agent (PA) 
CG model synonyms with governance theory and a supra-national lens to analyse all CG related 
issues (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001). The PA 
model assumes agents (managers) are self-interested and opportunistic, and solely driven by a 
single-minded desire to maximise wealth. Moreover, information asymmetry arises due to the 
separation of principal from day-to-day activities, making it difficult for principals to control 
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agents. Lubatkin et al. (2007) argued that the PA model is under-socialised as it reduces firms’ 
social relationships to simple dyad relationships between self-interested and economically 
motivated actors. The under-socialised view of human behaviour means each actor is considered 
economically rational and marginally influenced by the social context. Actor behaviour, either in 
a self-serving or opportunistic manner, is influenced by the organisation’s social context 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Corporate governance regulations and practices are embedded in 
the broader institutional environment (Aoki, 2002, Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). In this 
regards, it appears to be incapable of uncovering how CG can be mediated by the diversity of 
institutional arrangements. Using agency theory, it was not necessary to recognise the impact of 
the broader social, political, and economic institutions that are necessary to understand the CG 
regulations and practices diversity in the different institutional arrangements. 
This study examines the development and implementation process of CG regulations and 
practices in the context of Pakistan, which is dominated by the family businesses that dispel the 
notion of clear separation between ownership and control. Fama and Jensen (1983) recognised 
that in family businesses, agency problems are minimal due to the fact that the shares are in the 
hands of  
“…agents whose special relations with other decision agents allow agency problems 
to be controlled without separation of the management and control decisions. For 
example, family members…therefore have advantages in monitoring and disciplining 
related decision agents (p, 306).”  
 
The concentration of ownership in the hands of the controlling family also diminishes free riding 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance principles should represent nationwide 
preferences and these preferences vary from one nation to another (Lubatkin et al., 2007). For 
example, Eisenhardt (1989) recommended researchers to complement agency theory with other 
theoretical lenses as agency theory only provides a limited view of the world and ignores a 
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significant part of the complexity of an organisation. Combining agency theory with other 
theoretical lenses can help in greater understanding of an organisation’s complexities. Similarly, 
this study also considered that agency theory is not an appropriate theoretical lens to answers the 
research questions set out in this study.  
3.2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory has developed gradually since 1970s. Freeman (1984) proposed a general 
theory of firm, including corporate accountability to a broad range of stakeholders. The impact 
of companies on employees, the environment, local communities and shareholders has received 
increasing attention over time and becoming focus of debate (Solomon, 2007). Basically, the 
stakeholder approach views the firm as a set of interrelated, explicit or implicit connections 
between individuals and/or groups of individuals (Rowley, 1997). Stakeholders are generally 
perceived as individuals or groups with a legal, economic, moral, and/or self-perceived 
opportunity to claim ownership, rights, or interests in a firm and its past, present, or future 
activities or in parts hereof (Ulhøi, 2007).  Freeman (1984) definition of stakeholders is to 
acknowledge their involvement in an ‘exchange’ relationship. Stakeholders are not only affected 
by companies but they in turn affect companies in some way. They hold a ‘stake’ rather than a 
‘share’ in companies. Creating value for stakeholders may be synonymous with creating 
financial value for shareholders. Using the analytical framework of stakeholder theory, the 
general public may be considered as corporate stakeholders because they are taxpayers, thereby 
providing companies with a national infrastructure in which to operate. In exchange they expect 
companies as ‘corporate citizen’ to enhance, not degrade, their quality of life (Hill and Jones, 
1992). Similarly, management may receive funds from shareholders, but they depend on 
employees to fulfil strategic intentions. Stakeholders with joint interests, claims or rights can be 
classified into different categories, for example, employees, shareholders, customers, suppliers, 
regulators, and NGOs, etc.  
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The proponents of stakeholder theory argue that organizations are very large in size and their 
impact on society are so enveloping that they should not only accountable to their shareholder 
but society as a whole. This theory argues that corporations should be regarded not as bundles of 
asset that belong to shareholders but rather as institutional arrangement for governing the 
relationship between all of the parties that contribute firm-specific assets. So the job of 
management is to maximize the total wealth created by the enterprise rather than just the value of 
shareholders stake. Social and environmental lobby groups have collected information on 
business activities and have targeted companies that have treated their stakeholders in an 
unethical manner. The most extreme proponents of stakeholder theory suggest that environment, 
animal species and future generations should be considered as stakeholders.  
An interesting feature of stakeholders from a managerial point of view, however, is that no 
organization has any control over, or possibility for choosing, their stakeholders (stakeholders 
choose ‘their’ organizations). Addressing stakeholder issues from a management perspective is 
about handling multiple and often conflicting interests within dynamic and complex relationships  
that surrounds any company. The critical strategic issue here is that interactions, coalitions, 
differences in behaviour, attitudes, and preferences within and across the various group of 
stakeholders are not static, but in a constant state of flux. The individual groups of stakeholders 
have various means of exerting influence, including the media, rhetoric, ethics, regulation, 
formal control mechanisms, and market mechanisms.  
Shankman (1999) discussed the difference between agency theory and stakeholder theory. He 
described stakeholder theory as normative in orientation instead of agency theory and argued that 
theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of these two theories are different. He argued that 
agency theory may be subset of general stakeholder model of companies as agency theory is a 
narrow form of stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory is more of a broad research tradition, 
incorporating philosophy, economics, law, political theory and organizational social science than 
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a single formal unified theory (Wheeler et al., 2003). Interest in stakeholder approach is growing 
across the world but at the same time concern with shareholder value has never been greater 
(Clarke, 1998b). 
3.2.3 Institutional theory  
Institutional theory emerged as one of the most important frameworks in accounting research in 
general, and in corporate governance in particular. Institutional theory has acquired many 
designations, for example, new institutional economics, old institutional economics, and 
sociology-based institutional theory. However, this study is primarily concerned with sociology-
based institutional theory (NIS) (Scott, 2001). Institutional theory overcomes the limitation of 
agency theory, i.e. its failure to recognise the impact of broader social, economic and political 
environments on organisational activities. Institutional theory is primarily concerned with the 
organisation’s interaction with its institutional environment, the effects of social expectations 
and incorporation of these expectations in the organisational practices and characteristics 
(Martinez and Dacin, 1999).  
Scott (2001, p48) defines institutions as “social structures that have attained a high degree of 
resilience”. These established social structures comprising of regulative, normative, and cultural-
cognitive elements constrain organisational activities. For organisations to survive and gain 
legitimacy and resources, they must interact with their institutional environment in a way that is 
perceived as legitimate by the various stakeholders in the society (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, 
Scott, 2001). Institutional theory is a way of thinking about these social structures and the nature 
of the historically grounded processes whereby these social structures develop (Dillard et al., 
2004). Institutionalisation is the process whereby the socially accepted structure and practices are 
developed and learned in various settings (Scott, 2001).  
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Scott (2008) identified three sources of socially accepted structures and processes, i.e. regulative, 
normative and the cognitive-cultural pillars. The Regulative pillar emphasises the rules and 
regulations imposed by regulatory institutions or states. Regulatory institutions establish laws 
and regulations and monitor regulatees’ compliance. These regulatory institutions also set reward 
and punishment criteria to control future behaviour. The Normative pillar emphasises the values 
and norms that establish prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory aspects of social life. Values 
conceptualise the formation of preferable or desirable standards to which existing organisations’ 
activities can be compared and assessed. Norms define the way things should be done, the 
legitimate means to achieve value ends. A Normative system defines goals or objectives but also 
defines the legitimate ways to pursue them. The Cultural-cognitive pillar emphasises the focal 
role played by the shared conception of social reality that frames the common beliefs and logic 
of action. The cultural-cognitive aspect of institutions is the main distinguishing feature of NIS. 
An organisation’s institutional environment is characterised by rules, regulation, values, norms 
and cultural-cognitive requirements, to which the organisation must conform to in order to 
receive support and legitimacy (Scott and Meyer, 1983).  
Powell and DiMaggio (1991, p 66) argued that “organisations compete not just for resources 
and customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as 
economic fitness”. A highly institutionalised environment puts considerable pressure on 
organisations to adopt institutionalised practices. Thus, organisations consciously adopt and 
maintain institutionalised practices in order to manage legitimacy in the eyes of external 
constituents. Continuous production of these institutional beliefs gives them a rule-like status and 
compliance becomes a necessity for an organisation to survive, and gain legitimacy and 
resources. 
In an effort to reinforce the continuity of the established structure and practices, organisations 
become similar to each other. When organisations are encountered with a similar set of 
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environmental conditions, they tend to become more similar without necessarily becoming more 
efficient (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Hawley defines an isomorphism as a “constraining 
process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of 
environmental conditions” (cited in DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p149). Three isomorphic 
pressures that relate to adopted institutionalised practices are coercive, mimetic and normative.  
Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressure exerted on organisations 
by powerful bodies upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations of the society 
within which it operates (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). For example, Siddiqui (2010) argued that 
International Financial Agencies (IFAs) forced many emerging economies to follow 
internationally accepted corporate governance practices in order to gain loans.  
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when organisational technologies are poorly understood, goals are 
ambiguous and when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty. In such a situation, an 
organisation may follow another successful organisation in order to prevent their activities from 
being questioned. In the context of this study, regulators in many countries mimic the Anglo-
American model of CG, given that the organisations in the West adopted this model.  
Normative isomorphism primarily stems from professionalisation. Powell and DiMaggio (1991, 
p 152) described professionalisation as the joint effort from the members of an occupation to 
define the conditions and methods of work, to control the production of the producers. As in this 
context, agency theory, which is considered synonymous with governance theory, requires that 
the organisations should be governed to make sure that they are operating in the best interest of 
their shareholders. Thus, this normative status has become part of the CG reforms agenda in 
most parts of the world.   
The theory of institutional isomorphism helps in explaining that organisations are becoming 
more homogeneous than heterogeneous. Organisations not only need material and technical 
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resources, but they also need social acceptability and credibility (Scott, 2001). In summary, 
institutions provide a framework for social interaction, and make social order possible by 
reducing uncertainty. 
3.2.4 Critiques / limitations of institutional theory 
The use of institutional theory as a framework is not without its limitations. One of the biggest 
critiques of the development of institutional theory is that it has focused on institutionalisation as 
an outcome rather than a process and, as a result, neglects inter-organisational factors, role of 
power and group interests (Englund and Gerdin, 2014). The deterministic nature of institutional 
theory is limited in scope to understand reproduction of successfully institutionalised 
organisational structure and practices. It assumes organisational practices are beyond the reach of 
interests and politics (Dillard et al., 2004, DiMaggio, 1988). Without the theory of interest and 
agency, it is difficult to understand institutional change, the origin of change, and the 
reproduction and deinstitutionalisation of institutions. Institutionalisation is the product of 
political actors and what becomes institutionalised depends on the power of organisational actors 
who support, oppose or otherwise strive to influence (Clegg, 1989).  
Institutions promote stability and reduce uncertainty and are also subject to change due to  
internal or external pressures (Greenwood et al., 2002, Scott, 2001). The change process involves 
deinstitutionalisation
6
 of existing formal and informal rules and their enforcement mechanisms, 
which may lead to the emergence of new rules of social practices (North, 1990, Czarniawska and 
Sevón, 1996). Deinstitutionalisation is a process by which existing institutions weaken and 
dematerialise (Scott, 2001, 182). Oliver (1992) characterises three sources of institutional 
change, which are functional, political and social. In the context of corporate governance, 
functional pressures may emerge due to the failure of existing rules and regulations in addressing 
                                                 
6
 Deinstitutionalisation takes place as it is realized that the practices are no longer useful, or are not as useful as 
others are, for attaining the privileged goals and values. 
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capital market issues. Political pressures may arise due to the shift in power structure often 
because laws and regulations reflect the interests of the most influential forces in society 
(Fligstein, 1996). Social pressures usually evolve through changes in societal expectations.  
Institutional changes may threaten individuals’ sense of security, disrupt routines, increase 
information processing costs and render behaviour less predictable (Zucker, 1988). The process 
of institutionalisation change is complex because competing pressurising constituents often 
coexist (Shapiro and Matson, 2008). As discussed in the previous chapter, the debate amongst 
the institutional scholars oscillates between convergence and divergence of CG practices. For 
example, Reed (2002) argued that in most developing countries, CG reforms were converged to 
the Anglo-American model due to economic pressures, and the coercive, mimetic and normative 
institutional behaviour. This has merit, but also it treats the local actors and organisations as 
passive entities that only strive for legitimacy. The deinstitutionalisation process does not 
necessarily lead to convergence or divergence to a particular model of CG and its outcomes 
depend on the interactions between powerful actors (Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013). Thus, to 
understand the complexity involved in institutionalisation change process, we need to analyse 
not only external pressures, but also the roles and powers of local powerful actors.  
Institutional theory is more structured-centre and provides more of a macro level perspective. 
However, Zucker (1988) points out that a solely macro level of analysis often muddles 
institutionalisation with resource dependence. In prior research, the analysis at the macro level 
has focused on reasons for diffusion in explaining why many developing countries adopt an 
Anglo-American model of CG to gain legitimacy. DiMaggio’s (1988) orienting propositions led 
to a crescendo of research on institutional isomorphism. However, a limited focus on these 
studies seldom portrays processes associated with creating, adopting and discarding institutional 
practices. Without micro level analysis, it is difficult to determine whether the practices are 
institutionalised at the organisational level, and if so, how this is done. Organisations may adopt 
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institutional practices due to the pressures from external constituents so as to gain legitimacy. 
However, these practices are often irrelevant or inconsistent with organisational goals leading to 
a situation of decoupling. According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), decoupling is the situation in 
which formal organisational structure and practice are different and distinct from organisational 
actual practice. In other words, adopted practices are not integrated into actual organisational 
managerial and operational processes. For example, Uddin and Choudhury (2008) studied CG 
practices in a traditional family dominant society and found that family companies were 
symbolically complying with mechanisms of CG prescribed in the CG regulations. 
The overall limitations of institutional theory research includes: the continuation of the status 
quo and its overemphasis on the constraining nature of established beliefs and values; the 
neglected role of knowledgeable actors, power, special interests and the political nature of 
organisations; and the predicted nature of organisational actions. That is why institutional theory 
cannot be used in understanding the process of institutionalisation of CG regulations in Pakistan.  
3.3 Structuration theory 
The objectives of this study are not only to analyse the way the CG regulations emerged and 
developed but also to understand the process of institutionalisation, transposition, and 
deinstitutionalisation of CG in the context of Pakistan. Institutional theory as a standalone 
analytical framework appeared to be inadequate. In order to understand the dynamics associated 
with the emergence and development of the CG reforms process, the role of agency, power, and 
organised interests, this study also used structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) in conjunction with 
institutional theory. The two theories complement each other (Conrad and Guven Uslu, 2012) by 
offering a way of understanding the non-deterministic relationship between structure and human 
agency (Englund and Gerdin, 2014). This section first explains the key concepts of structuration 
theory and later provides rationale for integrating it with NIS.   
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Structuration theory, as a sensitizing device, postulates a dynamic interrelationship between 
structure and agency whereby the continuity and transformation of social structures and the 
production and reproduction of social systems take place (Giddens, 1979, 1984). Structuration 
theory distinguishes between system and structure. Social systems are the established social 
practices that are reproduced over time and space by reflexive, knowledgeable human agents, 
whilst, structures are rules and resources implicated in the production and reproduction of social 
systems (Giddens, 1979, 1984, Macintosh and Scapens, 1990). The main component of 
structuration theory is the duality of the structure, which portrays, “…the constitution of both 
agent and structure are not two independent phenomenon…structural properties of social 
systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise” (Giddens, 
1984). Giddens identified that social systems comprise of three distinct but interrelated structural 
types: signification, legitimation and domination.  
For signification structure, Giddens (1984) explained that the actor draws upon ‘interpretive 
schemes’ to sustain communication. The interpretive schemes are modes of coding incorporated 
in the actor’s stock of knowledge, applied recursively in making sense of what others say and do. 
Within the context of this study, the language of CG regulations comprises a signification 
structure drawn upon by the regulators and regulatees to make sense of activities.  
Legitimation structures are the normative rules and moral constitutions of a social system 
(Giddens, 1984). The intersection between interpretive schemes and norms is very important. To 
be accountable, one should not only provide the reasons but also the normative grounds whereby 
the activities may be justified. Legitimation structure constitutes the shared set of values and 
norms about what is legitimate and should be reproduced in social systems (Macintosh and 
Scapens, 1990). In the context of this study, the legitimation structure may be seen to comply 
with the corporate governance mechanisms introduced by the regulator as an appropriate way for 
protecting minority shareholders, such as inclusion of an independent director in the company 
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board, internal audit committees, etc. Regulators may hold regulatees accountable if they failed 
to implement these mechanisms, and apply implement sanctions and rewards as required.   
Domination structure means power, exercise, which depends on command over allocative 
resources (objects, goods and material phenomenon), and authoritative resources (the capability 
to organise and coordinate the activities of social actors) (Giddens, 1979, 1984). The power 
works to control individuals as well as to gain their cooperation (Macintosh and Scapens, 1990). 
In the context of this study, IFAs forced many developing countries to adopt internationally 
accepted CG practice as a prerequisite for obtaining loans.   
The role of human agency in the structuration process is the production and reproduction of 
social systems. Agency and power are interrelated in a sense that agency can cause people to act 
differently, to be able to intervene or to refrain from intervening (Macintosh and Scapens, 1990). 
This is the power of human agency, i.e. domination or the capacity to secure outcomes. 
According to Giddens (1984), all social relations involve power, however the exercise of power 
is never a unidirectional social process. All social relations involve autonomy and independence. 
Even the most obedient subordinates hold some resources which they can use to influence. The 
‘dialectic of control’, which is the consequence of contradictions, means how those who are less 
powerful manage resources in order to put pressure or to control on those who are more powerful 
(Giddens, 1984). In this context, the regulated may use power and resources to control or 
influence the regulators, creating structural contradictions (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005, Conrad, 
2005).  
The dialectic of control entails social system contradictions which is its basic constitutive 
feature. Unintended consequences and contradictions emerge where the modalities of 
structuration have contradictory rules (Boland, 1993). The social contradictions mean that 
“structural principles operate in terms of one another but yet also contravene each other” 
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(Giddens, 1984, p 193). Giddens argues that some of the contradictions are primary as they are 
essential to the production of social systems. Some are secondary, produced because of the 
primary contradiction, such as dialectic of control. These social contradictions are indispensable 
in the social theory. In the context of this study, regulatees employ different strategies by 
mobilizing their resources and powers to challenge the transformative authority of regulators 
which results in social contradiction and unintended consequences.  
3.3.1 Rationale for integrating structuration theory with NIS 
Structuration theory is a useful way of making sense of the social processes whereby accounting 
practices are established, modified, and discarded. The prior studies demonstrated that 
structuration theory enables analysis of social systems in a specific context of interactions in 
terms of individuals drawing upon and reproducing social structures of signification, legitimation 
and domination. The language of social systems provides structure of meanings for interactions. 
Moreover, the social systems also embody a moral order since they define rights and obligations. 
The role of power constituting domination structures relates to control and monitoring of social 
practices. Structuration theory as a sensitising device helps to analyse the changes taking place at 
a wider societal level or at the organisational level, which has led to the emergence of new social 
systems. It highlights the way significant structures are inextricably linked to legitimation and 
domination structures. Giddens argued that in crisis situations, existing social structures or 
practices may be abandoned in favour of new ones with agency taking overt control to reshape 
existing social structures. Structuration theory offers many useful concepts such as role of power, 
duality of structure, unintended consequences of human actions and dialectic of control to enable 
analysis of the dynamics of change. 
The incorporation of Giddens’ structuration theory with institutional theory is not a new concept. 
Many scholars in prior studies incorporate the agency into more structure-oriented theoretical 
perspectives (see, for example, Conrad, 2005, Conrad and Guven Uslu, 2012, Barley and 
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Tolbert, 1997, Granlund, 2003, Yuthas and Dillard, 1998) Giddens’ concept of structure and the 
dynamics associated with human agency surrounding them relate to the constructs of 
institutional theory (Dillard et al., 2004). Barley and Tolbert (1997) suggest that when 
structuration theory incorporates into institutional theory, it offers significant advantages in 
overcoming inherent inertia and isomorphic forces built into institutional theory. (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000) also incorporated structuration theory with institutional theory to understand 
management accounting change at the organisational level. They combine Old Institutional 
Economics (OIE) with structuration theory, but this study incorporates a more inclusive social 
context, which is more in line with sociology-based institutional theory (NIS). Structuration 
theory (Giddens, 1979,1984) incorporates the structure (the main element of institutional theory) 
with the agency (the main element of the notion of human influence). The conception of 
knowledgeable, reflexive agents when combined with institutional theory results in an important 
element (Yuthas and Dillard, 1998). The combination of structuration theory and institutional 
theory offers a more expansive perspective and better understanding of the complex processes in 
which social practices reproduce, while at other times they may undergo radical change (Conrad, 
2005). Conrad and Guven Uslu (2012) argued that institutional theory offers a macro-level 
perspective while structuration theory offers better potential for a micro level analysis. They 
demonstrated that in order to better understand the behaviour of organisational actors in different 
contexts in response to institutional pressures, a framework which combines both the NIS and ST 
offers insight to both macro and micro level analysis and the interaction between them.  
Institutional analysis is the social analysis that suspends the skills and awareness of actors. 
Structuration theory theorises the interrelationships and interactions between agency and 
structure, thereby providing an opportunity to theorise the influence of the actors’ skills and 
awareness in the process of institutionalisation at the various levels. Dillard et al. (2004) 
postulate that to establish a connection between structuration theory and institutional theory, 
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institutions can be seen as mutually reinforcing, signification and legitimation structures. 
Institutions are reproduced over time by the allocation of resources associated with their 
enactment by agents. Symbolic representations and/or norms and values not associated with 
resource acquisition and allocation are ultimately abandoned. For institutional practices to exist, 
there must be an ongoing reproductive interaction of rules and resources as the two are mutually 
reinforcing. If one is lost over time, then deinstitutionalisation takes place. This ongoing 
reproductive interaction is the result of knowledgeable, reflexive human action. Thus, 
structuration theory provides a theoretically grounded explanation of the primary dynamics of 
institutionalisation, transposition and deinstitutionalisation in institutional theory. Structuration 
theory also focuses on the issue of decoupling by realizing that structures are socially 
constructed, and not essentially demanding justifications based on formal rationality for all 
actions. In sum, within Giddens’ formation of structuration theory, rules/schemas and 
activities/resources interact to produce and reproduce structures over time but these structures 
are always subject to change. Institutional structures are mediums and outcomes as they shape 
and are shaped by the succeeding interpretations and activities.  
3.4 Weber’s axes of tension 
This section discusses Weber’s conceptions of representation, rationality, and power to 
circumscribe the context within which the institutionalisation, transposition, and 
deinstitutionalisation of social structures and social practices take place. Weber’s notions of 
power, rationality and representation offer an explanation of why social structures and practices 
produced and reproduced in one context are abandoned in the other settings. Weber recognises 
the important role of social, political, historical and cultural factors in shaping any form of 
society (Colignon and Covaleski, 1991). Weber recognises that the structural conditions, socio-
political, cultural, and economic context varied from one setting to another. In the context of this 
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study, Weber’s axes of tension are useful in specifying the existing context within which CG 
regulations establish, embed, and deinstitutionalise.   
3.4.1 Representation 
Representation relates to how reality is framed and symbolically defined. According to Weber, 
representational context (role of ideas, meanings, and interpretation) is central in legitimating 
social action. The representations can be categorised in terms of subjective or objective reality. 
Subjective representations are socially constructed where the legitimate process for action is 
social following from the interaction between individuals and collectives (Dillard et al., 2004). 
The subjective rules, meanings and interpretations are not expected to be very concrete and 
quantitative elements or outcomes, but rather collective goals and values would be considered 
important elements to follow. On the other hand, objective representations are more logical and 
analytical where a legitimate process for action is technical and based on formal logic and 
scientific calculus. Representational context is not only important in specifying the norms and 
values but also articulates the social processes that attain the goals.  
3.4.2 Rationality 
Weber recognises the role of ideas, meanings and interpretations in legitimating social action; 
however the question that arises here is how these symbolic structures motivate legitimate and 
illegitimate actions within the societies. The societal context provides a basis for the appropriate 
nature and direction for competing ideas and practices. For Weber, the foremost contextual 
factor is rationality, which provides the legitimating conditions for evaluating criteria and 
practices. Colignon and Covaleski (1991), referring to Weber’s work, argue that there are two 
types of rationalities; formal (which is calculation) and substantive (which is values-oriented), 
which are set forth as the opposing organizing principles for social action. The formal rationality 
is a scientific-technical sphere of life and refers to the capacity to control the world through 
calculations. The formal rationality is value neutral and is a consequence of empirical 
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knowledge, its mathematical form and its presumed universal application (Colignon and 
Covaleski, 1991). An inherently evaluative concept of substantive rationality is denoting the 
degree to which the economic system (capitalist markets, rational enterprises, accounting 
practices) provides for the needs, ends or values of a specific social group (Brubaker, 1984). It is 
the rationality of “ultimate ends” (Weber, 1968, p. 499). This form of rationality addresses the 
values, ends and needs of those social groups who promote them. Thus, economic action is 
substantively rational if it address the needs, values and ends of a specific social group, 
otherwise, it is an irrational economic action (Colignon and Covaleski, 1991). Individual or 
collective actions within a society may be justified either by formal rationality, substantive 
rationality or by both. Tension normally exists between the two types of rationality as a form of 
knowledge and therefore justification for actions. Such tension can result in conflicts at the 
societal level, organisational field or organisational level because of divergence in various 
groups’ interests. 
3.4.3 Power 
The third dimension of Weber’s axes of tension is power, which is conceptualised as the degree 
of control over human and material resources (Colignon and Covaleski, 1991). For Weber 
(1968), every sphere of social action is influenced by the structure of dominancy. According to 
Clegg (1989), what becomes institutionalised either depends on the translation of powerful actors 
in the society or follows dominant ideology. Thus, control could be achieved either through 
applying a formal hierarchical structure or through social consensus. Weber (1968) considered 
formal authority as a form of power where the given command is expected to be obeyed by a 
given group of persons. At the one extreme, formal context is the logic of the structure and there 
is a duty to obey, which specifies the context for action. At the other extreme, the social structure 
endows control through processes that facilitate communication and consensus among the actors. 
The logic of personal choice and continuous social interaction endows the context of action.  
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Weber’s conception of axes of tension (representation, rationality and power) are helpful in 
understanding the establishment, embedding and deinstitutionalisation of social practices within 
larger societal and institutional contexts (Dillard et al., 2004). Weber argues that in the Western 
cultures, economic efficiency has become a dominant criterion used to justify actions and 
evaluate ends. Thus, all other substantive rationalities are collapsed into one value or criteria of 
economic efficiency. When this occurs, the only social practices within the social context that 
are reproduced are those that are in line with the modern socio-economic ideology. Weber 
(1984) argues that analysis of formal rationality alone tells us nothing about the direction or 
outcome of the organisation. Organisations can serve the interests of social, political, or 
economic elites, the community or a combination of the two. For example Uddin (2009) argues 
that Weber’s work is useful in understanding why managers in limited liability companies within 
traditional societies express their loyalty to owner-managers instead of general shareholders. 
According to Colignon and Covaleski (1991), multiple rationalities are characteristics of the 
modern organisation and are the basis of conflicts that make the formal and substantive 
rationality distinction important in their application to issues of corporate governance practices. 
Unanticipated consequences may follow in traditional society from the tension between the 
formal rationality of corporate governance reforms and the substantive rationality of satisfying 
family needs and wants. 
These three dimensions are also useful in understanding deinstitutionalisation and in identifying 
the social practices prone to decoupling. The social practices that provide a competitive 
advantage, facilitate or are facilitated by established norms and values, serve the interests of 
dominant actors where symbolic representation will then receive acceptance. Social practices are 
symbolic or decoupled if not integrated into the actual organisational practices.  
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3.5 An analytical framework of institutional dynamics  
This study incorporates institutional theory, structuration theory, and Weber’s conceptions of 
rationality and power to fully articulate the institutionalisation process across multiple levels. A 
multi-level representation of the dynamics associated with the institutionalisation process helps 
to examine the emergence and development of CG regulations in light of conflicting institutional 
pressures for continuity and change. The framework represents continual, dynamic change and 
the significant influence of historical, social, and political factors in the institutionalisation, 
transposition, and deinstitutionalisation of practices. Structuration theory, which is a general 
framework of social action, when combined with NIS puts an emphasis on the central role of 
agency to perform the social analysis.  
This study conceptualises that institutions can be created and modified through the actions of 
“individuals, groups, organisations or even higher collectives” at all three societal levels (Barley 
and Tolbert, 1997, p 97). The iterative institutionalisation process means that institutions and 
human actions are mutually linked and that institutional characteristics are motivated by the 
socio-historical context emulated in rules based on signification and legitimation structures 
(Dillard et al., 2004). Resources are allocated based on accepted dominant structures which in 
turn fortify the current structures. These structures then reinforce the existing rules and resource 
allocation structures and so on. Thus, this iterative institutionalisation process produces a 
significant degree of institutional stability and enables and constrains human action. This value-
driven iterative institutionalisation process, the institutionalised taken-for-granted shared norms 
and values, are ingrained in all social actions and practices (ibid). Moreover, the 
institutionalisation process is history-dependent as the current actions are based on existing 
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An analytical framework (Figure 3-1) illustrates that the process of institutionalisation, 
transposition, and deinstitutionalisation of social systems is continual, dynamic and recursively 
occurring through three societal levels, i.e. the Socio-Political and Economic (SPE) level, 
organisational field level, and organisational level, which involve actors, powers and interests. 
The analytical framework postulates that there is a hierarchy of institutional influence where the 
SPE level provides criteria and practices for the organisational field level, and the organisational 
field level provides the institutional context for the organisational level (Dillard et al., 2004). The 
top societal level represents the national context of social, political and economic systems, within 
which societal norms or practices are established and disseminated to the organisational field 
level and organisational level. What becomes institutionalised at this level is highly influenced 
by powerful coalitions (Habermas, 1984, 1987) and represents a macro-level context for resource 
allocation (Dillard et al., 2004). The primary actors at the SPE level may consist of government 
officials, transnational actors, regulators, legislators, etc. The organisational field level translates 
norms and values established at the top level into more legitimate forms to evaluate 
organisational level activities. Dominant industry leaders, trade/labour unions, professional 
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institutes and consultants may influence the organisational field level. What is institutionalised at 
this level is influenced by norms and practices institutionalised at both the top level and the 
organisational level. The lowest level is the organisational level where managers, directors, 
owners, and workers may influence the institutionalisation process. The central role of agency is 
maintained at each level, however, the role of actors in the institutionalisation process depends 
on their command over allocative and authoritative resources (Dillard et al., 2004). 
The analytical framework constructed for this study recognises the link between the three 
societal levels. Existing studies based on structuration theory have given primacy to structures 
and there is a need to focus on the interaction between structures and agents over time (Coad and 
Glyptis, 2014). The framework recognises and elaborates the processes as the broader SPE 
context influences the organisational field level and organisation level in a cascading manner. 
However, the dualistic nature of the institutionalisation process involves and elaborates the 
processes as the actions taken by the reflexive, knowledgeable actors at the organisation level 
rise up through the three societal levels and influence the organisational field level and SPE 
level.  
At the SPE level, the recursive nature of the institutionalisation process can be analysed in terms 
of interpretive schemes used in articulating and instituting legitimate norms and practices. 
Powerful actors and their command over allocative and authoritative resources influence the 
legitimate norms and practices at this level. In the context of this study, CG laws and regulations 
enacted by regulators or legislators represent the properties of the prevailing institutionalised 
rules, norms, values and beliefs.  
The institutionalised rules, norms and beliefs at the SPE level enable and constrain norms and 
practices at the organisational field level. The legitimate action at the organisational field level 
predicate the evaluative criteria set at the top level. Regulators, legislators, industrial leaders and 
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accounting professions at the organisational field level establish the regulations for an industry 
built upon norms and practices situated in the SPE context. 
The legitimate practices at the organisational field level provide the legitimate and regulative 
base for actions at the organisational level. At this level, organisations develop an organisational 
process following legitimate criteria set at both the organisational field level and SPE level. The 
recursive institutionalisation process can be seen at this level in terms of organisational 
compliance with the socially accepted norms and practices. The resources are allocated on the 
basis of accepted rules. This recursive process in turn reinforces the extant practices. The 
iterative institutionalisation process in the framework recognises that actions at the organisation 
level may also influence the institutional context at the organisational field level or the societal 
level.  
The institutionalisation of norms and practices at all societal levels is far from being linear and 
straightforward. Actors or organisations at each level may resist the institutionalisation process. 
The conflicts or contradictions between extant norms, values and beliefs may arise because not 
all organisations accept or follow the same set of values, beliefs and norms. This study maintains 
the central role of human agency in the process of institutionalisation, transposition and 
deinstitutionalisation of practices. What becomes institutionalised at each level of framework 
depends precisely on the power of organisational actors, where organised interests mobilise 
around them and societal expectations (Clegg, 1989). Here, the difference arises and the 
potential for contradictions and thus subsequent change increases. This is true for all three 
societal levels. At this point of friction and conflict the change is highly likely to be initiated. 
The institutionalisation process promotes continuity, while the contradictions motivate change. 
This institutionalisation process is looping upward and downward through the three levels as the 
acceptable social actions and practices for organisations are unfolding over time and space. The 
new practices may reinforce, revise or eliminate existing acceptable norms and practices. This 
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change may be a small evolutionary one or may involve larger or even occasionally 
revolutionary changes. This study opines that meaningful change can be motivated or initiated 
through social action at any level of social order. The iterative process is the key to 
understanding both institutionalisation and change since established norms, values and beliefs 
may be continually revised at all three levels of analytical framework (Dillard et al., 2004).  
This study also recognises that actors and organisations may be confronted with conflicting 
institutional requirements at each level of the framework. For example, Uddin and Choudhury 
(2008), in their study of the state of corporate governance in Bangladesh, revealed that 
traditional culture and a rationalist/legal framework are in conflict with each other and managers 
in limited liabilities companies express their loyalties more towards controlling families instead 
of general shareholders. Thus, this study is also not expecting homogeneous and uniform 
responses from family-controlled listed companies towards compliance with corporate 
governance regulations. Oliver (1991) argues that institutional theorists mostly focused on 
conformity rather than resistance, passivity rather than activeness, and preconscious acceptance 
rather than political manipulations to various institutional pressures. He suggests that 
organisational responses can be varied, from passive to active, from conformity to resistant, from 
impotent to influential, from preconscious to controlling and from habitual to opportunistic, 
depending on institutional pressures exerted on organisations. Organisations are often exposed to 
multiple competing and conflicting institutional demands (Friedland and Alford, 1991, Kraatz 
and Block, 2008, Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and this make compliance impossible to achieve, 
because satisfying one demand requires defying others (Pache and Santos, 2010). Institutional 
researchers recognise that the presence of antagonistic demands challenges the taken-for-granted 
assumptions of institutional arrangements and allows organisational members to find alternative 
courses of action and requires them to prioritise demand, i.e. which one is to satisfy, alter or 
neglect, in order to legitimise organisational actions and ensure survival (Friedland and Alford, 
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1991, Whittington, 1992, Pache and Santos, 2010). The existence of conflicting institutional 
demands leads to strategic choice; necessity is not optional because more than one action is 
considered appropriate (Whittington, 1992). Oliver (1991, p.151) argues that “institutional 
theorists, by virtue of their focus, has tended to limit their attention to the effects of the 
institutional environment on structural conformity and isomorphism and has tended to overlook 
the role of active agency and resistance in organisation-environment relations”. Contrary to 
institutional theorists’ central tenet, that agents conform to normative, coercive or mimetic 
pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), Oliver (1991) suggests that they may adopt a broad 
range of strategic responses to protect their vested interests when faced with conflicting 
institutional requirements. Depending on the nature of the regulation and the power of the 
institutions, agents’ strategic responses may vary “from conforming to resistant, passive to 
active, from preconscious to controlling, from impotent to influential, and from habitual to 
opportunistic” (Oliver, 1991, p. 151).  
3.6 Rationale for developing an analytical framework 
This section discusses the rationale for developing an analytical framework for this study. The 
idea of combining institutional theory with structuration theory is well-established (see, for 
example, Conrad, 2005, Conrad and Guven Uslu, 2012, Barley and Tolbert, 1997, Granlund, 
2003, Yuthas and Dillard, 1998). The two theories complement each other (Conrad and Guven 
Uslu, 2012). Dillard et al. (2004) also proposed a similar analytical framework by incorporating 
institutional theory with structuration theory and Weber’s conception of axes of tension. The 
proposed multilevel framework outlines the dynamic social context within which the processes 
of institutionalisation, transposition and deinstitutionalisation take place and within which 
institutional change can be addressed. The prior studies, which combine NIS with structuration 
theory, motivate and encourage the author to construct a multi-level, multi-theory framework to 
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understand the institutionalisation process of CG regulations in Pakistan (Hopper and Major, 
2007, Conrad and Guven Uslu, 2012, Moore, 2013).  
As such, the framework formulation of Dillard et al. (2004) is not inconsistent with formulation 
of analytical framework developed for this study. Their framework is similar to the framework 
constructed in this study which argues that the institutionalisation processes proceed in a 
recursively cascading manner through the three levels. Prior studies highlighted some 
weaknesses in Dillard’s framework. Hopper and Major (2007) argued that Dillard’s framework 
at the organisational level is not sufficient to explain the process of institutionalisation, 
transposition and deinstitutionalisation. This study identifies the following issues within 
Dillard’s formulation of an analytical framework. Firstly, Dillard’s categorisation of 
organisations as innovators and late adopters restricts the scope of analysis at the organisational 
level. Innovators develop new organisational practices within the norms and practices set at the 
organisational field level and SEP level. Late adopters copy innovator’s practices to gain 
legitimation. Organisations often exposed to multiple conflicting institutional demands (Scott 
and Meyer, 1983) and their responses are far from uniform and homogeneous (Oliver, 1991).  
Second, Dillard’s framework argues that innovators develop new practices and late adopters by 
implementing the new practices institutionalised in them, and thus ignore small or even larger 
changes in extant norms and practice. Third, Dillard’s framework expects that change is initiated 
at the organisation level by the knowledgeable reflective agents. The newly developed practices 
move laterally and upwards and modify extant norms, practices and resource allocation criteria 
at the organisational field level and societal level. This study argues that due to the presence of 
agency at each societal level, change can be initiated at any level. For example, in most of the 
developing countries, CG reforms initiated at the societal level are a response to pressures from 
international donor agencies (Reed, 2002). Fourth, this study argues that Dillard’s framework’s 
mathematical description about the process of institutionalisation, transposition and 
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deinstitutionalisation at each level is inappropriate (See figure 3-2). Analysing social 
phenomenon in the form of mathematical equations is inadmissible. For example, Dillard’s 
framework argues that practices at the organisation field level (POF) is equal to the function of 
organisational field criteria (COF) i.e. POF = f(COF) and COF of the organisational field level is 
equal to the function of criteria of the societal level (CPE) i.e. COF = f(CPE). During the change 
process, the criteria of the organisational field (COF) can be modified by the newly developed 
practices at the organisation level. This study argues that mathematical representation is 
inappropriate for analysing social phenomenon where considering something equal to another is 
unsuitable. The organisational practices are prone to multiple institutional requirements, and 
presenting them in a hardcore mathematical formulation is awkward. In addition, changes in 
norms and values may arise from various sources (Zucker, 1988). This study opines that the 
meaningful change can initiated by motivated actors at any level of social order.  
Figure 3-2: Institutional dynamics Source Dillard et al. (2004) 
 
The first objective of this research was to explore the socio-economic and political environment 
in which corporate governance reforms emerged and developed. In addition, the second and third 
objectives were to identify the organisational field level and organisational level factors which 
may affect the institutionalisation process of corporate governance practices within Pakistan. 
This study seeks to understand the factors at both the macro and micro institutional levels and 
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the interaction between them. Thus, a framework which offers insights into both the macro and 
micro institutional levels and helps in understanding the interactions between them, was 
considered valuable. In order to achieve the objectives of this study, a multiple-level, multi-
theory framework was constructed to enhance a complex and dynamic analysis. 
In prior institutional research, the unit of analysis was mostly highly aggregated and produced 
the strongest support for isomorphism  (Suárez et al., 2009, Weber et al., 2009). The highly 
aggregated institutional analysis assumes that organisation are already rationalised. On the other 
hand, some institutional researchers did not consider links between organisational practices and 
the organisational field or the influence of the wider societal level (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
The spread between the analysis at the societal level and organisation level requires researchers 
to establish a link between various societal levels (Conrad, 2014). Thus, the recursive model for 
institutionalisation was constructed to address not only the influence of societal and field levels 
on organisational actions, but also how actions at the organisational level may influence the 
institutional context at the field and societal levels.  
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the conceptual framework of the research has been discussed. A multi-level 
conceptual framework which combines institutional theory with Weber’s axes of tension and 
structuration theory is considered appropriate for this study to better understand the process of 
institutionalisation, transposition, deinstitutionalisation and decoupling. The conceptual 
framework envisaged that agents act and influence outcomes at each of the three context levels. 
The role of human agency at each societal level is crucial as agency and power are interrelated. 
Identifying and understanding the role of influential actors at each societal level enables better 
understanding of how and why CG regulations under investigation emerged and developed at the 
societal level and were implemented at the field and organisational levels. Agents can act 
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differently or intervene in the production and reproduction of social systems. Institutional theory 
enables researchers to analyse how CG codes are institutionalised, transposed and implemented 
in a top-down manner from the societal level through the field and organisational levels. The use 
of structuration theory in conjunction with institutional theory gives insight into the bottom-up 
perspective as agents interact with the imposed CG codes. The role of agents interacting with 
structures of legitimation, signification, and domination at each level highlights the potential for 
conflict, crises, unintended consequences, and possibilities for institutional change. The rules 
(legitimation and signification structures) guide resource allocation (domination structure) in the 
production and reproduction of social systems. Under routine situations, agents may produce 
structures, but under crises or conflict situations, agents can act differently or intervene in the 
production and reproduction of social systems (Giddens, 1984). Weber’s axes of tension 
(representation, rationality, power) outlines a dynamic social context within which the process of 
institutionalisation, transposition, and deinstitutionalisation take place and within which 
institutional change can be addressed. The incorporation of axes of tension enables researchers to 
identify competing structures which explain conflict, crises, decoupling and unintended 
consequences. The conceptual framework adopted in this study is used to understand both the 
context and process of institutionalisation, transposition, implementation, and 




Chapter 4: Research methodology and methods 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous three chapters considered the introduction, background, and analytical framework 
of this study. This chapter is dedicated to explaining the research procedures and methods 
applied in carrying out the empirical work described in chapters five and six. The discussion in 
this chapter is important in order for the reader to understand the philosophical assumptions, 
methods, data collection and procedures used in the present study to analyse the empirical data.  
The main objective of this research is to explore the wider socio-political and economic 
environment in relation to the emergence and development of corporate governance reforms in 
Pakistan. In particular, this study tries to identify the organisational level issues that may enable 
or constrain the institutionalisation process of corporate governance practices in family-
controlled public listed companies.  
The previous chapter presented a discussion on the conceptual framework required to understand 
the socio-political and economic context, organisational field context, and organisational level 
context of Pakistan that may affect the emergence and development of corporate governance 
reforms and practices. A multi-level social theory-based conceptual framework was developed to 
understand the emergence and development of corporate governance reforms and practices in 
Pakistan. The analytical framework incorporates institutional theory, structuration theory and the 
work of Max Weber to understand the dynamic social context within which the processes of 
institutionalisation, transposition and deinstitutionalisation take place and within which change 
in an organisation can be addressed. In relation to this, this study considers that critical approach 
philosophical assumptions are suitable due to their strength in providing empirical contextual 
detail and richness from a theoretically informed perspective.  
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This chapter is organised into two parts. The first part will provide a discussion on the overview 
of the philosophical assumptions underlying the empirical examination of the institutionalisation 
of CG codes in Pakistan. The second part outlines the research methodology which is informed 
by the philosophical standpoint considered suitable for this study. A detailed description of the 
research method used in this study is also discussed. The discussion is focused on the rationale 
for semi-structured interviews and document analysis, the data analysis process, and issues 
relating to reliability and validity. This section also highlights some of the difficulties 
encountered during the course of this research. This chapter ends with conclusions.  
4.2 Philosophical assumptions 
Research is a systematic inquiry to find solutions or answers to a problem (Cooper and 
Schindler, 2003). It is important for every researcher to be informed about the philosophical 
assumptions about the nature of the social world and the way in which it might be investigated. 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), researchers, whether they are aware of it or not, take a 
stand on philosophical assumptions that underlie their studies. The philosophical assumptions 
indicate the way a researcher considers the development of knowledge that consequently affects 
the research method (Saunders et al., 2009). Easterby-Smith et al. (2002, p27) state that 
philosophical issues are central to the notion of the research design and there are at least three 
reasons why this is useful: 
“First, since it can help to clarify research designs. This not only involves 
considering what kind of evidence is required and how it is to be gathered and 
interpreted, but also how this will provide good answers to the basic questions being 
investigated in the research. Second, knowledge of philosophy can help the 
researcher to recognise which designs will work and, which will not. It should enable 
a researcher to avoid going up too many blind alleys and should indicate the 
limitations of particular approaches. Third, knowledge of philosophy can help the 
researcher identify, and even create, designs that may be outside his or her past 
experience. And it may also suggest how to adapt research designs according to the 
constraints of different subjects of knowledge structures.” 
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In pursuit of knowledge, every researcher is confronted with two fundamental issues which are: 
“how do we know what we know,” and following on from that, “how do we acquire 
knowledge”? (Goles and Hirschheim, 2000). The researcher needs to decide which assumptions 
are related to ontology, epistemology, human nature, methodology, and nature of society prior to 
undertaking any empirical research (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, Laughlin, 1995).  
Ontology 
Ontology is concerned with the phenomenon under study. Hallebone and Priest (2009, p26) 
define ontology as “the set of explicitly stated axiomatic assumptions that define the way a 
reality is conceived and perceived.” According to Burrell and Morgan (1979, p5), social theorists 
are faced with basic ontological questions of whether reality is external to the individual, is the 
product of individual consciousness, is the objective or product of individual cognition, or if it is 
given ‘out there’ in the external world or creation of one’s mind. The realist ontology assumes 
reality is objective and exists independently out there from individual consciousness (Hallebone 
and Priest, 2009). The constructionist ontology assumes it is a product of individual cognition 
informed by experience and language (Hallebone and Priest, 2009, Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
Epistemology  
Epistemology is set of assumptions concerned about “the way knowledge about a particular view 
of reality is to be generated, represented, understood and used” (Hallebone and Priest, 2009, p 
27). Epistemology “answer’s questions about how one can be a ‘knower’; what tests beliefs must 
pass in order to be legitimated as knowledge; and what kinds of things can be known” (Harding, 
1987, p 3). According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), epistemology is about how one might 
understand the world and communicate this knowledge to other individuals. The choice of 
research methods, to some extent, depends on the epistemological stance adopted (Crotty, 1998). 
The social science literature represents a range of epistemological stances, which include 
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positivist, interpretivist, realist (Hallebone and Priest, 2009), positivism, anti-positivism (Burrell 
and Morgan, 2005), objectivism, constructionism and subjectivism (Bryman, 1988). Ontology is 
the ‘reality’ that the researcher investigates and epistemology is the relationship between the 
researcher and reality (Healy and Perry, 2000). 
Human nature 
The third philosophical assumption is about human nature that concerns the relationship between 
human beings and their environment. Burrell and Morgan (2005) identified two extreme 
assumptions regarding human nature: determinism and voluntarism. At one extreme, a 
deterministic view of human beings regards individuals and her/his activities as being 
completely determined by the environment or situation in which he/she lives. This view regards 
human beings and their experiences as a product of and conditioned by their external 
environment. At the other extreme, voluntarism views human being as autonomous, free-willed, 
and a creator of his/her environment.  
Researcher stance 
The researcher stance is also an essential part of accounting research. The researcher stance is 
expressed in terms of his/her relationship with “the process and substance of generating, 
assembling and analysing data, determining and validating the study’s findings, and reporting the 
study’s conduct and results” (Hallebone and Priest, 2009, p28). An etic (objective outsider) 
stance is when a researcher operates as an objective and dispassionate observer, and is 
subjectively disengaged from influence on the process of selection of data, interpretation, 
analysis and its representation. In this case, there is an implicit assumption that the researcher is 
largely irrelevant in the process and his/her subjectivity and biases play no role throughout the 
process. In contrast, the emic (subjective insider) stance is where the researcher operates as an 
engaged participant and is deliberately and consciously involved in the process of the selection 
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of data, interpretation, analysis and its representation. In this stance, researchers are permitted 
and encouraged to be free and are involved during the research process.  
Methodology 
The philosophical assumptions discussed above have direct implications on the methodological 
nature of the research (Burrell and Morgan, 2005). The terms ‘method’ and ‘methodology’ have 
been used differently. For example, Crotty (1998) considers methods as techniques and means 
used to collect and analyse data to find an answer to a research question. On the other hand, 
methodology refers to the overall approach to the research design from a theoretical 
underpinning to the data collection and analysis (Collis and Hussey, 2007, Otley and Berry, 
1994).  
The different assumptions about ontology, epistemology, human nature, and the researcher 
stance have inclined researchers towards different methodologies (Burrell and Morgan, 2005). 
The possible range of methodological choices is quite large; however, they can broadly be 
categorised into subjective or objective approaches to social sciences. The objective approach 
treats the social world like the natural world as hard, external, and with an objective reality and 
looks for universal laws which explain and govern the object which is being studied (Burrell and 
Morgan, 2005). The focus here is upon analysis of relationships and regularities between 
elements. In contrast, the subjective approach treats the social world as a more personal, softer 
and subjective reality and focuses on the way individuals create, modify and interpret the social 
world in which they are situated (ibid). The emphasis here is more about what is important and 
unique rather than what is general and universal.  
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The main philosophical paradigms
7
 which inform accounting research are presented next. They 
consist of positivist, interpretivist, and critical approaches. The discussion, consequently, helps 
in providing a rationale for why a particular research approach was selected in this research.  
4.2.1 The positivist approach to accounting research 
The ontological position adopted by the positivists is realist. Therefore, assume a material world 
consists of given, immutable objects, and structures that exist on their own, distinctly from 
human projections and biases (Goles and Hirschheim, 2000, Bryman, 2004, Baxter and Chua, 
2003). According to Burrell and Morgan (2005), it is an epistemology which tries to predict and 
explain phenomenon by searching regularities and causal relationships between its constituent 
elements. In the positivist approach, the researcher has an etic role, and therefore becomes 
independent from the research and objectively acquires knowledge by observing the subject 
using appropriate tools or by oneself (Chua, 1986). The positivists view human beings as objects 
of scientific inquiry (Foucault, 1970) who can be studied empirically as are animals (Berlin, 
1997). The positivist paradigm considers human beings as deterministic, rational and a product 
of her/his environment whereby it is perceived that human actors will display uniform behaviour 
at all times and in different organisational contexts (Humphrey and Olson, 1995). Under these 
philosophical assumptions, accounting researchers can use scientific methods for knowledge 
acquisition for all forms of inquiry whether the domain of study is animate or inanimate, plant or 
human, etc. (Goles and Hirschheim, 2000). It means that relationships and regularities can be 
observed through hypothesis formulation and tested by experiments. Consequently, laws can be 
developed and could be applicable from one region to another or from one context to another 
(Chua, 1986). For example, under the same line of reasoning, CG regulations could be designed 
with an intent to control or direct human behaviour to conform to the acceptable social order. 
                                                 
7
 The different research studies interpreted the term “paradigm” quite differently. For example, according to Kuhn (1970, p viii), paradigms are 
“universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners''. Burrell 
and Morgan (2005, p 23) considered a paradigm as a “commonality of perspective which binds the work of a group of theorists together”. This 
study uses a broader definition of that of Burrell and Morgan.  
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Similarly, CG regulations developed in one social context are applicable to other social contexts, 
regardless if whether these contexts are similar or dissimilar.  
According to Goles and Hirschheim (2000), positivism has enjoyed great success. Chua (1986) 
named the positivist approach as mainstream to accounting research and argued that the 
positivist approach helps people to believe in neutral empirical knowledge and escape from 
superstition. Its insisted emphasis on rigor, validity and objectivity led to the development of 
useful generalizable knowledge, which can be universily applied to predict and control empirical 
phenomenon (ibid). However, the underpinning research objectives of this research could not be 
achieved within the philosophical assumptions of the positivist approach. For example, the first 
objective of this research is to explore the wider socio-political and economic environment in 
relation to the emergence and development of corporate governance regulations in Pakistan. 
Positivism assumes that reality is given and exists independently and ignores contextual factors, 
which could influence the research phenomenon. Kuhn (1970) argued that knowledge is not 
infallible but conditional and is relative to both time and space. Prior studies demonstrated that 
socio-political and economic contextual arrangements significantly influence the research 
phenomenon under study (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005, Uddin and Choudhury, 2008, Arnold, 
2005). The positivist paradigm assumes human beings are a product of her/his environment and 
ignore the role of agency in the production and reproduction of environment in which he/she is 
situated. What becomes institutionalised depends upon the role and power of actors who support, 
oppose or otherwise strive to influence their environment (Clegg, 1989). The extensive use of 
natural science tools in the social research ignores the understanding of meanings attached to the 
phenomenon under study (Tinker and Neimark, 1987). Therefore, the research objectives could 
not be achieved within the confines of the positivist paradigm.  
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4.2.2 The interpretive approach to accounting research 
Interpretive approach is completely opposite to the positivist approach. Interpretivists are more 
interested in understanding the subjectively created social world ‘as it is’ in terms of an ongoing 
process (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). According to Chua (1986), instead of understanding human 
action through rigorous artificial models, much more can be gained by taking accounting into the 
life-world of actors.  
The interpretive research paradigm assumes reality is subjectively created, socially constructed, 
and is a collection of subjective meanings, spirit, and ideas which are accumulated through social 
actions and a stream of lived experience (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, Chua, 1986, Rutherford, 
2003). According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), the social world experienced by individuals 
is socially constructed by an endless loop of inter-personal interaction. Through this process, 
meanings and norms become externalised and objectified and confront the individual in a 
manner similar to the natural world (Chua, 1986).  Although this social knowledge is subject to 
modification and refinement, there are some temporarily sets of knowledge structures that 
individuals subjectively maintain and reproduce (Rutherford, 2003, Giddens, 1984). Individuals 
use these socially constructed structures not only in interpreting their own actions, but also those 
of others with whom they interact, and vice versa (Chua, 1986).  
The epistemology of a social researcher who subscribes to the interpretive paradigm is anti-
positivist (voluntarist) (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and is interested in understanding issues such 
as how social order produces and reproduces in everyday life, understanding subjective 
meanings and rules, and what motivates social action (Chua, 1986). This means that interpretive 
theorists seek to make sense of human action by considering them as a purposeful set of 
individuals who follow non-universal laws (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000, Roberts and Scapens, 
1985, Chua, 1986). The subjective nature of human beings in the interpretive approach ruled out 
the utility and relevance of natural sciences models and methods. As there in no objective, i.e. 
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the neutral world of facts which can completely explain the social world, the adequacy of theory 
is assessed via to what extent individuals accept the explanations the theory offers (Chua, 1986). 
As this approach emphasises observation, awareness of linguistic cues, norms, and values, the 
role of the researcher in the interpretive paradigm is an emic by becoming part of the social 
phenomenon under study and being an active participant in the investigation (Hallebone and 
Priest, 2009, Chua, 1986, Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  
CG is a contextual phenomenon (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008, Siddiqui, 2010, Arnold, 2012). 
Nonetheless, as the interpretive paradigm seeks to study the phenomenon within the context 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985), the objectives of this research cannot completely be achieved within 
the assumptions put forward by the interpretive paradigm.  Even though this study is examining 
the role of actors and their understanding in the institutionalisation of CG regulations across 
three societal levels, the interpretive paradigm is not suitable for this study due to the following 
reasons. According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), the ontological assumptions of the interpretive 
approach ruled out any interest in issues involved in the order-conflict debate. The standpoint of 
the interpretive theorist is that the human world is cohesive, ordered, and integrated, which is 
free from conflict, contradiction, domination, and change. However, the intent of this study is to 
understand the individual interpretations of their actions and consequently, to identify the 
conflict, contradiction, domination and avenues for change. The issues of conflict, 
contradictions, and dominations are situated in the contextual forces such as power, politics, 
culture and many more. In addition, the interpretive paradigm does not try to question the status 
quo (Chua, 1986, Alvesson and Deetz, 2000), but rather the focus is more on the understanding 
of individual’s meanings attached to the social structure. The underlying assumption that actors 
are the creators of their environment does not allow for the unveiling of how the structures 
enable or constrain individual’s actions. The conceptual framework comprised of institutional 
theory, structuration theory and Weber’s axis of tension used in this study not only 
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acknowledges how actors produce and reproduce social structures, but also the constraining and 
enabling features of social structures on the individual’s actions. The conflict, crises and 
contradiction as a result of competing structures may result in unintended consequences, which 
are at the blind side of the interpretive paradigm.  
4.2.3 The critical approach to accounting research 
The ontological assumption of the critical paradigm view of social reality is socially constructed 
and objectively real (Chua, 1986, Bhaskar, 1979, Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Both the individual 
and society possesses historically grounded potentialities that are unfulfilled (Chua, 1986). The 
critical approach considers human beings as universal and free beings, who recognise, grasp and 
extend the possibilities. However, at the same time, prevailing domination structures restrict 
human being potentialities and self-realisation (ibid). The critical approach emphasises the 
totality of relations, which means both the individual and society can only be understood in 
relation to each other. As Bhaskar (1979) argued,  society does not exist independent to human 
action and at the same time is not solely a product of human action. Rather, society provides a 
necessary condition for social action and at the same time social action is a necessary condition 
for social structure. The critical theorist accepts that the standards to assess the adequacy of the 
explanation are temporal and context-bound (Chua, 1986). There is no theory independent of fact 
or process by which reality may be assessed (Hallebone and Priest, 2009). Contrary to the 
interpretive approach (where there is a consensus between the researcher and what is being 
researched), the critical approach denies use of any concrete criteria to assess the truth. This 
approach is remarkably different from high levels of prior theorisation (positivist) where the 
empirical detail is seen only as a way to confirm or falsify the theory, and low levels of prior 
theorisation (interpretive) where everything is independent, unique, and original. Within the 
confines of the critical approach, the research is conducted in the organisations and their societal 
environment and excludes mathematical and statistical modelling (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, 
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Goles and Hirschheim, 2000, Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). More emphasis is given to detailed 
historical analysis.  
The role of a researcher in the critical approach is to examine and critique the dominant forces, 
contradictions, exploitation of labour and capital and also the effect of social structure on 
organisations (Chua, 1986). Thus, similar to interpretive theorists, critical researchers need to 
learn and understand the language, meanings, and values of their object/subject. However, the 
critical approach argues that social reality is not symbolic but is shaped and mediated by material 
structure (Heiner, 2002). The critical paradigm emphasises critique of ideology because conflicts 
and contradictions exist in every society and are temporary, context-bound and institutionalised 
via cultural and organisational forms (Habermas, 1984, Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). However, 
the current status quo should continue when the current situation is suitable for research and 
open towards change when change brings better results.  
4.2.4 Rationale for adopting the critical approach  
This study is relying on the critical philosophical standpoint for carrying out research endeavors 
in the social science stream, particularly in the field of accounting. Choices for research 
approaches are important in empirical research as Laughlin (2004, p275) stated that making 
these choices are important due to two reasons. First, there is not one way to understand the 
world. Second, choices from ontology to data collection help to provide rigor and transparency 
in our discovery process. The researcher needs to justify his philosophical assumptions and be 
equally prepared for criticism. This study uses the critical approach due to several following 
reasons.  
The two extreme philosophical strands discussed above pose some weaknesses that hinder being 
able to fully understand the social world. The main criticism of the interpretive paradigm is that 
using individual agreements for judging adequacy as an explanation is very weak (Chua, 1986). 
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How one can differentiate between alternative explanations? Also, the interpretive approach 
lacks an evaluation dimension, and restricts the researcher from being able to critically evaluate 
social life. Therefore, it is unable to analyse the domination structure within the context that 
restricts actors from knowing their true interests (ibid). On the other hand, that positivist’s 
assumption that single objective reality exists ignores that our social world is a historical product 
(Weber, 1978). Hence, the philosophical assumptions underpinning two extreme paradigms, the 
positivist and interpretive, alone are not sufficient enough to unveil the social reality. Laughlin 
(1995) accepted that there are no comprehensive approaches to understand the empirical world. 
He makes it clear that there is “… the inevitable truth that all empirical research is partial and 
incomplete” (1995, 65). He posits that both schools of thought discussed above are untenable and 
impractical in the real world for understanding the truth. These difficulties have resulted in an 
effort to transcend the problems of both positivist and interpretive paradigms (Habermas, 1984, 
Habermas, 1987, Foucault, 1970). The critical approach is one of them.  
In line with the objectives of this research which seek to understand the present complexities 
embedded in the social context within which CG regulations situate, the critical approach is 
considered suitable. This study is looking into the process of the emergence and development of 
CG regulations in the context of Pakistan. Pakistan presents a suitable context for critical 
research, as the trail of historical and cultural antecedents may be the basis for current social 
structures, which may help in identifying avenues for change. The historical and cultural context 
enables a researcher to understand current structural regularities and irregularities that link with 
the institutionalisation of CG regulations. The critical approach connects the past to the present 
(Cooper et al., 2008) and unveils the structures which resulted in current norms, values and 
practices (Chua, 1986).  The corporate governance is not just merely a technical matter, but 
rather it is part of the social elements, and therefore, its emergence is subject to the interplay of 
these social elements or context (Arnold, 2005, Arnold, 2012, Siddiqui, 2010). At the 
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organisational level, CG regulations influence or are influenced by the routine practices and 
processes (Burns and Scapens, 2000). For example, Uddin and Choudhury (2008) demonstrated 
how traditional familiar culture mediates implementation of the rationalist/legalist framework of 
corporate governance in Bangladesh.  
This study uses the multi-level conceptual framework that is comprised of institutional theory, 
structuration theory and Weber’s conception of axis of tension. Institutional theory enables the 
researcher to analyse how CG codes are institutionalised, transposed and implemented in a top-
down manner from the societal level to the field and organisational level. The use of 
structuration theory in conjunction with institutional theory gives insight into the bottom-up 
perspective as the agent interacts with the imposed CG codes. The positivist and interpretive 
approaches were not considered suitable because the former neglects micro level analysis and the 
latter neglects macro level analysis. The critical approach emphasises the totality of relations that 
encourage studies that integrate both macro and micro levels of analysis (Chua, 1986). Hence, 
the critical approach enables a researcher to analyse the influence of CG codes developed at the 
societal level on an organisation’s routine practices and processes. At the same, this approach 
helps in analysing that dominant structure at the societal level that is affected by organisational 
practices (Habermas, 1984, Habermas, 1987, Foucault, 1977).  
One of the objectives of this study is to critique the adoption of the Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance practices within a context that is dominated by powerful families at both 
the socio-political and economic, and organisational levels. The critical paradigm focuses on the 
critique that engenders new interests in the structural analysis neglected by positivists and 
interpretive accounting research (Chua, 1986). The critique of historical and cultural contexts 
and identification of complexities, conflicts, tensions, and contradictions provide better 
understanding of the current situation.  
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In summary, the critical philosophical approach is considered suitable for this study. The study 
assumes that the emergence and development of corporate governance reforms are not only 
technical issues, but are also social phenomenon. A multi-level conceptual framework is used to 
understand the process of institutionalisation, deinstitutionalisation, and decoupling. The role of 
the researcher is important in the research process, but at the same time empirical evidences are 
also important.  
4.3 Research methods 
The last section discussed the underlying philosophical assumptions of this research. The 
ontological, epistemological and researcher stances, human nature and methodological approach 
of this study were outlined. To address the research objectives of this study, a critical approach is 
considered suitable because it emphasises the totality of the relations which means that both the 
individual and society can only be understood in relation to each other. The social world is 
socially constructed and becomes real by an endless loop of inter-personal interactions (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). Corporate governance, as a social construction, considers human beings as 
free and who construct the social world in which they operate. However, at the same time, the 
prevailing domination structure restricts human beings’ potentialities and self-realisation. The 
underlying philosophical assumptions of this study have implications for the research methods.  
The research method is basically a mode or framework for engaging with the empirical world 
(Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). Methods not only connect the theoretical framework with the 
production and productive use of the empirical world, but also involve systematic consideration 
of what the empirical world may tell us (ibid). Thus, the research method not only deals with 
data management, but is a reflexive activity where empirical material requires careful 
interpretation. The research methods can be thought of as design, control, procedure, validity, 
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and reliability, where research results are produced in systematic order. Fontana and Frey argued 
that:  
“But anyone who has engaged in fieldwork knows better; no matter how organised 
the researcher may be, he or she slowly becomes buried under a growing mountain of 
field notes, transcripts, newspaper clippings, and tape recordings. Traditionally, 
readers were presented with the researcher's interpretation of the data, cleaned and 
streamlined and collapsed in rational, non-contradictory accounts. More recently, 
sociologists have come to grips with the reflexive, problematic, and, at times, 
contradictory nature of data and with the tremendous, if unspoken, influence of the 
researcher as an author (1994, p372).” 
The next section will provide a discussion on the research approach adopted for this study.  
4.3.1 Qualitative research approach 
The early 1980’s show an increased use of qualitative research methods and the need to 
investigate accounting in their very own institutional arrangements (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
1997, Laughlin, 1987, Boland Jr and Pondy, 1983, Parker, 2014). The dominance of the agency 
theory framework in the field of corporate governance has affected the methodological approach 
adopted by researchers, and it is probably accurate to say that the dominant approach to study 
corporate governance has involved adopting quantitative, positive methodology, including the 
application of econometrics’ techniques (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). However, critics of 
agency theory have pointed out its ‘under-contextualised’ characteristic and its inability to explain 
the diversity of corporate governance arrangements across different institutional contexts (Aguilera 
and Jackson, 2003, Filatotchev et al., 2008). Thus, the research on CG should focus on different CG 
arrangements and to understand how CG practices are mediated by a situational variable, i.e. context 
arising in diverse institutional environments (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, Uddin and Choudhury, 
2008, Teerooven and Sheik-Ellahi, 2008). According to Brennan and Solomon (2008), the 
methodological approach and application of research techniques are broadening in CG research 
as researchers are using more interpretative methodological approaches involving interviews 
(Uddin and Choudhury, 2008), case studies (Matthews, 2005) , longitudinal in-depth participant 
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observation field studies (Collier, 2008), and historical analysis (Jones, 2008, Prem, 2008). 
However, in comparison to quantitative methodological approaches, the number of researchers 
who employ the qualitative approach is still much smaller due to the complexities involved 
(Humphrey, 2014). 
Much of the debate on the choice of the research approach has revolved around the choice 
between the quantitative and qualitative approaches (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). The research 
objectives of this study require researchers to move away from the research focus on the 
organisational outcomes to a greater focus on organisational processes and functions. This study 
seeks to understand the process of emergence and development of CG regulations in the context 
of Pakistan. This study analyses the structural conditions and the role of different actors in the 
institutionalisation, transposition and deinstitutionalisation of CG codes across three societal 
levels. In order to study the richness, complexity, and contextual setting, the qualitative research 
approach was considered suitable. As Swanborn (2010, p13) said: 
“Social phenomenon carried out within the boundaries of one social system (the 
case), or within the boundaries of few social systems (the cases), such as people, 
organisations, groups, individuals, local communities, or nation-states in which the 
phenomenon to be studied enrolls.... In which the researcher focuses on process-
tracing: the description and explanation of social processes that unfold between 
persons participating in the process, people with their values, expectations, opinions, 
perceptions, resources, controversies, decisions, mutual relations and behaviour, or 
the description and explanation of processes within and between the social 
institutions.” 
The main purpose of this study is to understand the process of institutionalisation, 
deinstitutionalisation, and decoupling in the familial context of Pakistan. The qualitative research 
approach is suitable to understand the contemporary phenomenon in depth and within the context 
(Yin, 2014, Swanborn, 2010). In addition, scholars recommend use of a qualitative approach to 
develop the theoretical explanation of accounting practices (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996, 
Hopper and Powell, 1985, Hopwood, 1983, Scapens, 1990, Otley and Berry, 1994). For 
example, Yoshikawa et al. (2007) used a multi-level, multiple case study approach to study 
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corporate governance reforms and institutional innovation within the context of Japan. The trend 
of using a qualitative approach such as case studies to explain the process of corporate 
governance practices and issues is increasing (Yoshikawa et al., 2007, Alves and Mendes, 2004, 
Lambert and Sponem, 2005, Wearing, 2005, Gill, 2008, Matthews, 2005). 
At the organisational level, this study only focuses on family-controlled listed companies. This 
study examines to what extent CG codes institutionalised in family-controlled listed companies. 
The main rationale for focusing on the role of families is because few political and business 
families dominate both the political and corporate sectors in Pakistan. The business groups in 
Pakistan are informal combinations of legally independent business entities run by families 
(Ghani and Ashraf, 2005). Family-controlled public listed companies consist of more than 80% 
of total listed companies in all three stock exchanges (Attiya and Robina, 2010). The family 
patriarch is the dominant shareholder and manager whereas the immediate and distant family 
members help operate various firms within the group. It is quite common that the family 
members of one group hold director seats in firms affiliated with other groups (known as 
interlocking directorates).  
The adopted research approach has implications for the data collection techniques. Data 
collection techniques cannot be divorced from the data narrative which in turn is guided by 
underlying philosophical assumptions. Data collection methods depend upon the nature of 
narrative demands, as questionnaires are primarily used in a positivist/realist research approach 
and are rarely used in an interpretive approach due to their failure in capturing the depth of detail 
required in interpretive persuasion. Documents are generally used by all approaches. Due to the 
different narrative requirements, the nature and use of the data collection methods, i.e. 
questionnaires, interviews, documents, and observations, will differ. For example, a researcher 
can use the semi-structured questionnaire to guide interviews; however, s/he may modify the 
questionnaires to capture more insights.  
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The first CG code was implemented in Pakistan in 2002, and a revised version was implemented 
a decade later in 2012. In order to address the research objectives set out in this study, two data 
collection techniques have been employed; semi-structured interviews and document analysis. 
The use of multiple data sources increases the quality of collected data (Hartley, 2004), and also 
supports the findings (Farquhar, 2012). For instance, Uddin and Choudhury (2008), in order to 
provide an account of corporate governance practices in traditional settings of Bangladesh, used 
a combination of semi-structured interviews, documentary evidence, and participant observation 
as data collection methods. Khadaroo (2008) also used multiple data sources in order to examine 
how PFI bids are actually evaluated.  
4.3.2 Interviews 
This study has used semi-structured interviews as the primary data collection method to 
understand the role of actors in the process of development and implementation of corporate 
governance reforms at three societal levels. Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to 
follow the interview guide but keep him/herself flexible for contextual adaptation. Interviewing 
is often described as ‘in-depth’ with questions designed to encourage participants to talk freely 
(Swanborn, 2010) in order to understand the complexity involved in corporate governance 
reform processes. Lorsch and Young (1990), drawing from their experience, including 
interviews with 1,000 directors, assessed the strength of interviews and argue that, in interviews, 
respondents can explain central relationships, can explore issues interactively and can focus on 
decision dynamics. Semi-structured interviews resemble guided conversations rather than 
structured queries (Yin, 2014), and actual streams of questions are likely to be fluid rather than 
rigid (Rubin and Rubin, 2012). Malseed (1987) argues that if you want factual information then 
go for structured interviews, and if you want interpretive details adopt an unstructured interview 
approach. However, Pawson (1996, p6) considered semi-structured interviews as a ‘pluralist 
midway compromise’ in which respondents have more chances to elaborate their fixed choice 
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answers and where rich, meaningful, and comparable data can ensue. While conducting 
interviews, participants were allowed to talk freely to gain an opinion on issues being 
questioned, while at the same time being focused on the main subject matter. This study has 
adopted a ‘localist’ (Alvesson, 2003) or ‘informal interview’ approach (Adhikari and Mellemvik, 
2011). Such an approach involves a free-flowing discussion between the interviewer and 
interviewee (Mir and Rahaman, 2005). It has been argued that a localist approach to interviewing 
people is more effective when the research setting is of a political nature, and the interviewees 
are rational actors attempting to reflect on the situation rather than on ascertaining the truth 
(Silverman, 2009). Government representatives, particularly those in developing nations, are 
usually perceived as being politically-oriented individuals who engage in rational activities 
(Adhikari and Mellemvik, 2011). Due to the political nature of the subject matter, this study 
conducted interviews by allowing interviewees to focus on whatever aspect(s) within the 
research topic they perceive are important and interesting.  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted at three societal levels: the socio-political and 
economic level, the organisational field level and the organisational level. In total, 41 interviews 
were conducted between 2011 and 2014 with people who were considered knowledgeable about 
CG issues and were also involved in the process of development and implementation of CG 
regulations in Pakistan. Ten interviews were conducted at socio-political and economic level, six 
interviews were at the organisational field level, and twenty-five interviews were at the 
organisational level. At the organisational level, three interviews were first conducted in July 
2011 before the revision of the CG code – amongst them two were interviewed again in the main 
data collection process in 2013. The interviews lasted 50 minutes to 2 hours. Table 4-1 shows the 
details of various participants interviewed at three levels.  
The interviewees at the socio-political and economic level were officials from SECP and Stock 
exchanges being regulators. Senior officials from SECP including a/the commissioner, executive 
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director from the strategy, development and external relation department, and a/the director from 
the policy, regulation and development department were interviewed. These interviewees were 
selected because they were involved during the development process of the code of corporate 
governance in Pakistan. Two officials from SECP from the regional office were interviewed 
because they are in direct contact with listed companies in that region. The senior officials from 
two stock exchanges, i.e. Karachi stock exchange and Islamabad stock exchange were 
interviewed to obtain information on the role of corporate governance reforms and its effects on 
capital markets.  
The interviewees at the organisational field level were officials from the Pakistan Institute of 
Corporate Governance (PICG), the Institute of Chartered Accountant of Pakistan (ICAP), 
corporate managers from leading banks and external auditors. At the organisational field level, 
industrial groups or professional institutions translate taken-for-granted norms established at the 
socio-political and economic level into more tangible practices and legitimate criteria to evaluate 
the practices at the organisational level. Officials from PICG were selected because this 
institution was not only involved in the revision of the code of corporate governance but also 
runs the Director Training Programme (DTP) for listed companies. Corporate managers were 
selected because they may evaluate listed companies on the basis of compliance with the CG 
codes before issuing loans. The role of the external auditor is to evaluate the compliance with 
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At the organisational level, the sources of information were particularly acute. As it may be 
difficult to talk with the chairmen or CEOs, unless they are very confident, there are other 
sources, who may be approached including company secretaries, finance directors, non-
executive directors, and institutional shareholder analysts (Clarke, 1998a). At the organisational 
level, the chairmen, CEOs, executive and non-executive directors, CFOs and company 
secretaries were interviewed. The chairmen, CEOs and directors were selected because they are 
directly involved in the implementation process of code of corporate governance in the listed 
companies. As stated above, where the chairmen, CEOs and directors were not available or were 
not confident, interviews with the CFOs and company secretaries were conducted. In one 
interview, the director asked the company CFO to assist him in an interview. One director from a 
recently delisted family-controlled company was selected to find out the role of CG reforms in 
delisting decisions, if any. One director from a private family listed company was selected to 
find out if this company had any plans to list in stock exchange and expected any role of CG 
reforms on this decision. The director from a significant national group was selected to evaluate 
the effect of corporate governance reforms on non-family listed companies for comparison 
purposes. The main objective of this study was not to provide the comparison about the effect of 
corporate governance reforms on family and non-family listed companies; here interviews were 
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conducted to provide support for the arguments and evidences collected from family-controlled 
listed public listed companies.  
Prior to the interview session, an appointment was firstly sought either through a phone call, an 
email or direct personal arrangement (appendix D). Due to the sensitive nature of the research 
questions, secrecy could be a major problem in gaining access to important business documents 
and interviewees (Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999). According to Millar et al. (2005), personal 
contacts are very important in relational based societies like Pakistan. Being an academic in one 
of the big business schools in Pakistan, the author used his contacts to gain access to the 
directors and owners of the family businesses, otherwise gaining access would have been very 
difficult. An interview questionnaire and cover letter were sent out to the respondents detailing 
issues relating to the process of the emergence and development of corporate governance 
reforms that the author would like to discuss with them. The interview questionnaire was tailored 
according to the level of analysis and job title of the participants and was used to guide the 
interview (see Appendix E). This initial process is also fruitful based on the fact that the author 
had an opportunity to explain the idea behind the interview which gives interviewees time to 
prepare themselves before the actual interview session. All the interview sessions were 
electronically recorded with prior consent from the interviewees except one in which the 
questionnaire was sent to the participant and later filled out. All the interview sessions at the 
socio-political and economic level were in English; however, the organisational field and 
organisational level interview sessions were conducted in English and Urdu. 
Discussions about ethical principles in business research, and perhaps more specifically 
transgressions of them, tended to revolve around certain issues that recur in different guises. 
Diner and Crandall (cited in, Bryman and Bell, 2011), identify four main areas: 
 Whether there is harm to participants. 
 Whether there is a lack of informed consent. 
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 Whether there is an invasion of privacy. 
 Whether deception is involved. 
 
In this study, proper considerations have been given to all of these issues. The author provided 
complete assurance about maintaining the anonymity of the respondent and company and offered 
to make available the findings of this study to the benefit of their organisations.  
One of the general concerns about the interview-based research is its apparent inability to 
generalise findings (Yin, 2003) and the answer to this inability is not very simple (Kennedy, 
1979). In qualitative research based on semi-structured interviews, pre-selected theory normally 
guides the researcher to understand and explain the phenomenon, rather than producing 
generalisations. As Scapens (1990) noted, in comparison with traditional research methods, 
qualitative studies are concerned with the explanation rather than the prediction. However, the 
author assumes that as this study is focusing on family-controlled public listed companies at the 
organisational level which is very common in Asia (La Porta et al., 1999, Claessens et al., 2000), 
to some extent, findings of this study may be generalised to the family-controlled companies in 
other developing countries with care.  
4.3.3 Documentary analysis 
Another important concern about interview-based research is access to respondents (Lorsch and 
Young, 1990). Daily et al. (2003) noted that directors’ resistance to invite researchers into the 
‘black box’ of the boardroom is understandable as they fear that opening up boardroom activity 
to external scrutiny may increase the risk of being subject to shareholder lawsuits. In addition, 
secrecy is also an important concern in traditional settings regarding validating evidences 
(Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999, Uddin and Hopper, 2001) like family-controlled public listed 
companies. This is why the majority of corporate governance research relies on archival data 
gathering techniques. This study also used documentary evidences as a secondary data source. 




Document Title Issue Date  
    
Companies Ordinance, 1984 October, 1984 
Code of CG 2002 March , 2002 
Asian Development Report on Financial (non-bank) market and governance 
program report (RRP: PAK 33271) 
November, 2002 
Impact assessment of the code of corporate governance 2002 September, 2003 
IFC survey on CG practices in Pakistan 2007 
Code of CG 2012 and Implementation guidelines of code of CG 2012    
Karachi Stock Exchange Listing Regulations January , 2014 
World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 2013 
Report on the observation of standard of codes  (ROSC): Corporate Governance 
country assessment Pakistan 
June, 2005 
SECP annaul reports (2001-2014)   
KSE annaul reports (2001-2014)   
SECP Act 1997 December, 1997 
Doing business report    
    
 
The documentation examined consisted mainly of the company act 1984, code of corporate 
governance 2002 and 2012, country assessment reports from the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, IMF, and other IFAs, companies’ annual reports, their websites, institution’s 
websites, legal documents, official notifications from regulators and newspaper reports. These 
documentary evidences enable authors to form interview questions that also validate 
interviewees’ responses. Documentary evidences and interviews corroborate and complement 
one another to gain a wider understanding of the emergence and development process of 
corporate governance reforms in Pakistan.  
4.3.4 Data validity 
Qualitative research based on interviews has received a great deal of criticism in establishing its 
credibility and hence undervalues any contribution this approach makes to knowledge and 
theory. Reviewers mostly used the term ‘rigor’ in evaluating research, which is generally 
understood as being meticulous or with precision (Farquhar, 2012). Table 4-2 demonstrates the 
range of approaches that can be used to ensure that the research that is conveyed to its readers 
meet the criteria of quality and rigor.  
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Table 4-2: Quality criteria in qualitative research 
Golden-Biddle and Locke 
(1993) 
Authenticity, Plausibility, Criticality 
Guba and Lincoln (1982) Dependability, Credibility, Confirm 
ability, Transferability 
Criteria adapted from 
positivism 
Reliability, Internal validity, 
Objectivity, Generalizability  
Authenticity is concerned with whether the reader is being presented with an authentic portrait of 
what is being studied (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Golden-Biddle and Locke (1993) argue that 
the authenticity can be demonstrated through portraying that the researcher was there and had 
sufficient experience of a case(s). Plausibility is concerned with connecting the findings or world 
of study with the readers’ experience, so the question relating to this criterion is ‘does it make 
sense to me?’ (ibid). Researchers can achieve criticality by encouraging the researcher to re-
examine his/her existing ideas and beliefs.  
Dean and Whyte (1958) argue that informant knowledge and understanding might influence the 
researcher’s interpretation of events and therefore is an important issue used to assess the 
validity of respondents’ claims. According to Shenton (2004), for obtaining credible data from 
an informant, an iterative questioning technique  or replication logic across multiple cases can be 
used. The replication logic is the same technique that is used in multiple experiments (Yin, 
2009). In this study, the author used similar types of questions to interview people at same level 
and positions to carry out this type of replication. The findings of interviews were compared to 
see if any rival or unreliable claims were made.  
Given the multiple ways in which informants can make sense of the same event, artefact and 
documentation, it is often expected that this can result in inconsistent or contradictory statements 
(Schwartz-Shea, 2006). To obtain good quality of information, this study uses data triangulation 
to corroborate information gathered in the interviewing process with the documentary evidences 
(Blaxter et al., 2010), which is an important way to ensure the reliability and validity of the 
interview data (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Evidences from newspaper reports, 
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companies’ annual reports, and governments’ and regulators’ official documents and 
notifications provided helpful guidance while analysing data. Presentation of findings to various 
audiences (academic and professional, in various settings) helps in eliminating misinterpretation 
and inconsistencies, enhances internal and external validity and improves arguments (Patton, 
2002, Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). In order to improve internal and external validity of the 
findings, the author discussed any contradictory evidences with the respondents, the academic 
community and policy makers (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
4.3.5 Data analysis and report writing process 
A key difference between quantitative and qualitative analysis is that in latter approach data 
analysis can start parallel to the data collection process as a researcher starts reflecting on what 
the informants have said and sometimes not said (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). This 
preliminary data analysis can influence the subsequent data collection process by revising the 
research guide or instrument.  
The quality of the research findings depends on the traceability (e.g. from where data come from, 
who said what, when, which organisation, etc.), reliability (e.g. the quality of data recording 
devices, etc.), and completeness (e.g. the complete list of notes, recordings, transcripts, etc.). An 
interview guide was used to maintain better focus and consistency during the interviews. A range 
of issues was explored during the interviews including, who were involved, what role each actor 
played, and how different actors interact with each other. However, the discussion was mainly 
centered on CG regulations development and the implementation process at the SPE and field 
level and compliance issues at the organisational level. Brief notes were also made during each 
interview to record the general impression, to determine the basis of the analytical decision made 
to inform future informants and further interview questions. All of the recorded interviews were 
then transcribed and were sent back to the participant to make sure that both the researcher and 
the interviewees have the same understanding of the meaning conveyed during the interviews. It 
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means intuitive data processing was conducted in parallel to data collection (Gomm, 2004). 
Based on the lead from transcribed data, several interviewees were interviewed again via email 
or Skype. Thus, interviews were iterative in nature. 
A thematic approach to data analysis was adopted, informed by the conceptual framework with 
an objective to understand the processes of institutionalisation, deinstitutionalisation and 
decoupling of corporate governance reforms and practices at SPE, the organisational field and at 
organisational levels. Based on responses from semi-structured interviews, a number of themes, 
such as institutional pressures, familial culture, routine, and resistance/decoupling at three levels 
of analysis were developed. The data representing the themes were then clustered, and attempts 
were made to match them with the evidences gathered through the literature search. At the final 
stage of the analysis, the author established a link between these so as to create narratives. For 
example, the following quote from the senior official from the Security and Exchange 
Commissions of Pakistan (SECP) helped in identifying the coercive pressures from IFA’s on 
government of Pakistan in the establishment of independent oversight regulatory body against 
the loan.  
“…the ADB told the government that we are ready to pay you a certain sum, but that 
amount should be utilised for the establishment of an independent institution, i.e. 
SECP. In response, government passed the Securities and Exchange Act 1997.” 
At the same time, inconsistencies observed in the interview responses and document settings 
were identified and shared with respondents for elimination. In fact, inconsistencies between 
interviewee responses and findings in the literature are not unusual in a research setting 
comprising politically-oriented actors, such as, for instance, aid providers, government officers, 
and public sector accountants (Tsamenyi et al., 2006, Potter and Wetherell, 1995).  
The analysis is divided into two parts. The first part covers the first and second research 
objectives. This part analyses the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions regarding the emergence and 
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development of CG regulations in Pakistan. The second part analyses the institutionalisation of 
CG codes at the organisational level in the family-controlled listed companies. The analysis of 
emergence and development of CG codes is divided into two parts. The first section discusses 
the emergence and development process of the first codes of CG introduced in 2002. The second 
section presents the development process of the second codes of CG introduced in 2012. The 
institutional reasons and process of introduction of both the codes are substantially different from 
each other. The focus, while discussing the institutionalisation and transposition process, 
revolves around the incentives which drive CG initiatives in Pakistan and key players and their 
roles in shaping CG regulations. Lastly the key features of CG codes introduced in Pakistan are 
highlighted. The chronologies of major configuring events related to institutionalisation and 
transposition of CG regulation in Pakistan are also identified (see table 5-7). The second part 
analyses to what extent the CG Codes (2002, 2012) are institutionalised and then subsequently 
decoupled in the family-controlled listed companies and its unintended consequences. In doing 
so, the state of CG mechanisms such as BOD, audit committees, AGM, dividend, financial and 
CG disclosure in the family-controlled listed companies are evaluated. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has shed light on the research methodology and methods used in this study. The 
first part highlighted the philosophical assumptions of this research. The underlying ontological, 
epistemological, researcher stance, human nature and methodological assumptions have been 
discussed. The research perspective has been positioned in the critical paradigm. On the basis of 
philosophical assumptions, a qualitative research approach was considered suitable for this 
study. The multi-level multi-theory framework developed in this study guides the data collection, 
analysis and write up process. The appropriate research methods, including semi-structured 
interviews and documentary analysis have been discussed. The next chapter presents the first 
empirical part of this study.   
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Chapter 5: The socio-political, economic and legal context 
of Pakistan 
This chapter is concerned with the socio-political, economic and legal, organisational field and 
organisational levels context of Pakistan within which the CG regulations have emerged and 
developed.  
It is important to highlight the research objectives again, and how these are empirically 
addressed in this chapter. As discussed in the introduction chapter, this research has three 
objectives. The first is to explore the wider socio-economic and political environment in relation 
to the emergence and development of corporate governance regulations in Pakistan. The second 
objective is to identify factors that may affect the process of adoption of CG codes in the 
traditional familial context of Pakistan. The third objective is to identify organisational level 
factors that may affect the process of the adoption of corporate governance practices in family-
controlled public listed companies in Pakistan. This chapter addresses the first objective and 
provides analysis of socio-political, economic and legal context of Pakistan in relation to the 
emergence and development of corporate governance regulations.  
The laws and regulations which emerge and develop in any country are decreed by powerful 
actors and represent the characteristics of the prevailing social system. This chapter discusses the 
socio-political, economic and legal context of Pakistan. This chapter will shed light on existing 
taken-for-granted norms and values, dominant actors and coalitions that are available at the 
macro-level context. The identification of structural types (signification, legitimation, and 
domination) and influential actors will help in understanding the political process of the 
emergence and development of CG codes and consequently conflicts, crises and unintended 
consequences in Pakistan. A number of social, political, economic and legal aspects seem 




The chapter is organised as follows. The first part, 5.1, discusses and analyses the socio-political 
and historical context of Pakistan. The following section 5.2 presents the analysis of economic 
context of Pakistan. Section 5.3 highlights the regulatory environment prevailing in Pakistan. 
The discussion in the chapter will set the scene of the institutional context within which the 
process of institutionalisation and transposition of CG regulations take place.  The chapter ends 
with concluding remarks.  
5.1 Socio-political and historical context – a sorry state of instability, 
dictatorship and a kinship regime 
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan gained independence from the British Empire on 14 August 
1947. Pakistan is a Muslim-majority country with approximately 96% of its total population 
being Muslim. It is one of the most populated countries in the world with the current population 
of about 188.2 million.
8
 The national language of Pakistan is Urdu, but English is its official 
business language.  
With more than 65 years of independence, Pakistan has had an unstable political history. Since 
its independence, Pakistan has been in an unsettled relationship with its neighbouring countries, 
especially with India about a dispute over Kashmir. These two countries have already fought 
three wars in 1948, 1965 and 1971. The situation on western borders with Afghanistan is also not 
very stable, especially after 9/11. The ongoing turbulence with neighbouring countries has badly 
impacted the economic condition of Pakistan, as a large part of the budget is spent on defence. 
This situation paves way for the military to have an intervening role in the political affairs of 
Pakistan.   





Table 5-1: Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14  
Selected Socio-economic Indicators 
      
  Indicators Score 
People     
  Population (in million) 188.02 
  Population growth (annual %) 1.95 
  Life Expectancy at birth (years) 64.9 (Male), 66.9 (Female) 
  Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live 
births) 
66.1 
  Urban Population (million) 72.5 
  Rural Population (million) 115.5 
  Literacy Rate 60% 
Economy     
  Per capita Income 1356$ 
  GDP growth for 2013-14 4.1% 
  Foreign Direct Investment (in 
million) 
750.9 
  Inflation Rate 8.7% 
  National Savings (% of GDP) 12.9 
Labour     
  Total Labour Force (in million) 59.7 
  Labour in Agriculture (% of total 
labour) 
43.7% 
  Labour in Manufacturing 14.1% 
  Unemployment Rate 6.2% 
  Minimum Wage rate 9000 Rs. 
 
Since its independence, the democracy-development nexus has been faltering in Pakistan. The 
political instability in Pakistan started immediately after the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the 
founder of Pakistan in 1948. One of the reasons was the weakness of an existing political 
organisation, Muslim League, which failed to assert its control over state power. The authority 
further weakened due the death of M. A. Jinnah and his second in command, Prime Minister 
Liaqat Ali Khan. In last 65 years, Pakistan has seen twenty-six governments, including sixteen 
elected or appointed prime ministers, six interim governments and approximately thirty-three 
years of military dictatorship under four different leaders. The average life span of a politically 
elected government has been approximately two years. The army, which has ruled for much of 
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Pakistan’s existence through the dismissal or overthrowing of civilian governments, continues to 
be the country’s most important political force. 
Since the 1990’s, government of Pakistan has oscillated between two main parties; Pakistan 
Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Group (PMLN). Each party is 
associated with a particular wealthy clan and successive governments have acted as vehicles for 
amassing wealth and power for the ruling families. Major political parties in Pakistan, which 
favour democracy in the country, lack inner-party democracy because leadership tends to be 
inherited from parents to child. Both political parties have already declared their future leaders 
from within the family clan. These young family politicians may have the potential to become 
national leaders, but the way they are being foisted upon the nation is questionable.  
This instable political and historical era has serious implications on the emergence and 
development of any law and regulation. The frequent changes in government followed by the 
reversal of previous government decisions resulted in an environment of uncertainty and lack of 
predictability. Failure to follow successive plans and agreements resulted in the loss of 
credibility in the eyes of international investors. In addition to this, transfer of power from one 
government to another is always very difficult in Pakistan, causing a slowdown in economic 
activities, an increase in inflation and unemployment, and the adoption of a wait-and-see policy 
by investors (Husain, 2009). This political instability resulted in unstable laws and regulations, 
as incoming governments or military dictators introduced new laws in their favour and 
abandoned old ones. It is important to understand the socio-political context and the close link 
between economic and political elites in Pakistan.  
5.2 The economic context of Pakistan   
Pakistan is primarily an agriculture country. Wheat, cotton, sugarcane, rice and maize are major 
crops and agriculture is still contributing more than 25% of GDP and employing most of the 
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workforce. The cotton and textile industry is the backbone of Pakistan’s economy. It 
accommodates 38% of the industrial labour force and is the largest source of foreign exchange 
earnings.
9
 Primary imports of Pakistan include petroleum products, chemicals, food items, and 
machinery and transport equipment. The World Bank considers Pakistan a low-income country 
with a GDP around $166 billion at the official exchange rate. The country has continuously 
experienced a huge trade deficit, year after year since 1951, which is quite typical of 
underdeveloped countries (Ashraf and Ghani, 2005b). This section sheds light on the key players 
and their power and control in the business and economic context of Pakistan within which codes 
of CG have emerged and developed. The entrepreneurial role of government, the power and 
control of family businesses, the role of transnational actors and the function and duties of newly 
emerged regulators (SECP) are discussed here.  
5.2.1 Government: the entrepreneurial role of the military and political parties 
In Pakistan, the independent capitalist class has never been able to emerge due to the state’s 
entrepreneurial role. The power structure traditionally seen in Pakistan has been dominated by 
both the military regime and political families. Both the military regime and the civilian 
government have been involved in entrepreneurial roles by acquiring large holdings in big 
businesses and industries (Jalal, 1995). The military establishment owns, directs and controls the 
economy of the country. The key government institutions are controlled by the army, either 
directly or indirectly. In the last military dictatorship era of Musharraf, he appointed some 500 
officers to different positions as CEOs, chairmen, directors, agency heads and commissioners in 
key economic institutions. Upon taking office of prime minister twice, Benazir Bhutto’s family 
was involved in the mismanagement of billions of dollar through illegal appointments, bank 
borrowing, kickbacks, evasion of customs duties and issuance of import licenses to close friends 
(Baker, 2005, Business Recorder, 2000). Nawaz Sharif, who held an industrial background, rose 
                                                 
9 Federal Bureau of Statistics www.statpak.gov.pk  
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to the political arena due to his close connection with military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq 
(Gardezi and Mumtaz, 2004). Mr. Sharif, the father of Nawaz Sharif, established the Ittefaq 
Foundry in 1939. When Nawaz Sharif came into power, first as a chief minister of the most 
populous province and then as a prime minister of the country, the Ittefaq Foundry grew from its 
single unit to 30 businesses producing steel, sugar, paper and textile with a combined revenue of 
$400 million, making it one of the biggest industrial groups in Pakistan (Baker, 2005).  
Both the military and politicians are fully aware that both collective and individual rewards are 
higher if they cooperate with each other. As an appointing authority, government exercises 
control on regulatory institutions.
10
 The military and political government, due to their 
entrepreneurial role, avoid establishing independent and powerful regulators in the country. The 
ruling class controls the regulatory institutions through appointment of loyal persons in key 
positions. From the last ten years, government has adopted an ‘ad hocism’ rule.
11
 One newspaper 
report pointed out that the current Sharif government inherited this ‘acting’ rule from their 
predecessor to keep regulatory and autonomous institutions under firm control by fairly legal 
means - putting people at the head of such institutions as “acting” (Dawn, 2014). Currently, the 
three regulatory bodies, SECP, SBP, and the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP), are 
having an ‘acting’ chairman or governor. A former SECP chairman said:  
“…the ‘acting’ regulators are in effect toothless and lack motivation. All the 
appointments made as “until further orders’ is without considering the transparency 
and merit. Thus, government can hide its mala fide intentions (Dawn, 2014).” 
The head of regulatory institutions, which are politically connected and appointed by 
government, safeguard the interests of family businesses. The acting head must follow the 
dictates of government to save his job. The former prime minister removed the then-SECP 
chairman after the man dared to criticise government’s alleged role in the stock market crises. 
                                                 
10
 Government is an appointing authority of the head of many regulatory institutions including the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), SECP, National 
Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), Oil & Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), and Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) 
11
 Government is appointing heads of institutions on a temporary basis and avoids filling the posts on a permanent basis.  
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The current finance minister had removed the governor of SBP nine months before the 
completion of his three-year term.  
In summary, the government is an important actor in the political and economic context of 
Pakistan with the power and authority to influence any regulatory attempt. How the dual role of 
government as a state and entrepreneur has influenced the development of CG codes’ 
development process will be discussed later in part II of this chapter. 
5.2.2 Family industrial groups – power and control 
Most of the listed companies are controlled by only a few families and institutions (Papanek, 
1967, Rashid, 1976, Cheema, 2003). Starting with no industries at all at the time of partition in 
1947, by the end of the 1960s, the country had achieved a phenomenal industrial growth rate in 
the world (Rashid, 1976). However, this was achieved under the control of only few families’ 
industrial houses. The family industrial groups in Pakistan are informal combinations of legally 
independent business entities run by families (Ghani and Ashraf, 2005). The family patriarch 
dominates companies’ management and shareholdings, and distant family members support 
various firms within the group. Interlocking directorates is very common in Pakistan where close 
family members of one group hold directors’ seats in firms affiliated with other groups.  
The allocation of power to family businesses in Pakistan was the product of history, culture, 
politics and economic forces. In the mid-1950s, the government of Pakistan encouraged 
domestic production of manufacturing goods, especially textiles, in preference to other 
agriculture products, e.g. cotton, rice, and wheat as a future economic growth strategy. In 
accordance with this approach, government provided extensive incentives in the forms of tariffs, 
foreign exchange licenses, quotas, and an attractive tax regime. This in turn resulted in industrial 




“…the Ayub Khan era was the 22 families’ heyday. They flourished mightily in that 
era, setting up one industry after another and expanding into sector after sector until 
it seemed that they virtually controlled the economy. Banking, insurance, textiles, 
consumer goods – everything was grist for their mill.” 
According to (Papanek, 1967), in 1959, sixty family industrial groups controlled 60.6% of all 
private industrial assets and 43.5% of all private industrial sales. Out of the sixty, only seven 
groups (Adamjee, Dawood, Saigo, Valika, Colony, Fancy and Bawany) controlled 24.4% of all 
private industrial assets and 15.6% of total private sales of industrial sectors. Rashid (1976) 
compared the industrial concentration in three decades from the 1950s to the 1970s. His results 
show that, in 1970, 41 houses controlled 80% of private domestic assets of both manufacturing 
as well as non-financial companies’ quoted in the KSE (see Table 5-2).  
Table 5-2: Concentration of Wealth between1959-1970  
 Concentration of wealth between 1959-1970 
 % of private assets % of private sales 
 1959 1970 1959 1970 
Top seven families 24.4 22.2 15.6 14.6 
Top sixteen families 38.2 33.6 25.3 22.1 
Top twenty-four families 45.9 39.5 31.9 26.3 
Top thirty-seven families 51.9 45.3 35.9 30.9 
Source: Adapted from Rashid (1976, pp 24) 
 
Rashid (1976) also examined the effect of the loss of the eastern province (Bangladesh) of the 
country and nationalisation by government on industrial concentration. He found that though the 
loss of the eastern province and nationalisation has had substantial effects on family industrial 
houses; however, these family giants continued to enjoy a dominating position over important 
industrial sectors such as cotton, textile, and sugar industries as Bhutto’s government did not 
nationalise these two industries. Controlling families control directly or indirectly approximately 
50% equity in listed textile companies and one third in other sectors (SECP, 2003). This 
concentration of control in the hands of a few families is still prevalent in Pakistan (Attiya and 






Table 5-3: Ownership Concentration of 50 Random Companies in Pakistan (2003-07) 
 Mean Median 
 
Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
% of shares held by three 
shareholders 
52 50.7 2.5 96.8 21 
% of shares held by five 
shareholders 
62.39 64.23 3.5 99 21.17 
Source: Adapted from (Attiya and Robina, 2010) 
Rashid (1976) examined the growth of family industrial houses in Pakistan. He argued that 
favourable economic conditions, their trading experience, wealth, close connections within 
government institutions, and favourable government policies played crucial roles for these 
families to be able to become established as economic giants and control the country’s economic 
context. For example, Pakistan Industrial Development Corporations (PIDC) played an 
important role in establishing and promoting family industrial houses. PIDC, from the very 
beginning, had close links with these industrial houses because four of their board of directors 
were part and parcel of these groups. In addition, the large amount of foreign funding was 
channelled through two institutions; PICIC (Pakistan Industrial Credit Investment Corporations) 
and IDBP (Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan). Six representatives from leading family 
industrial houses sat on the board of directors of PICIC and 70% of the loans sanctioned by 
PICIC were accounted to these family industrial houses.  
Family ties are deeply rooted in Pakistan political and economic history. These families have 
good connections and positions in relevant institutions. The power of family and their friends 
often shapes the economic and political power within Pakistan. Family industries are the next 
most powerful institution in Pakistan, other than the military and political families. The close 
connection between ruling elites and business families has serious implications on the economic 
context of Pakistan. Political families and business families transform the state functions into a 
political club. This political club protects the corrupt, consequently enabling them to accumulate 
wealth. In addition, this political club interferes in state affairs, and this continuous interference 
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renders the state dysfunctional and unaccountable to the people. The overall interference is that 
this club has deeply polarised bureaucracy and has turned professional and autonomous 
institutions into a partisan political organisation (Alavi, 1983). The ruling and business families 
put pressure on public institutions of the state and civil society, which has resulted in 
disorganisation and deinstitutionalisation. For example, when Pakistan was facing gas shortages, 
a powerful businessman who was on the board of directors of Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited 
(SNGPL) ensured an uninterrupted gas supply to his fertiliser plant. In a national newspaper, he 
argued that the government rightly appointed him for the director position and maintained that 
there is no conflict of interest as follows:  
“...Government invited me for the director position and government thinks I am fit 
for the position and can contribute to the company, so I am here…running so many 
businesses and being a director of SNGPL at the same time is not a conflict of 
interest…all the directors of SNGPL get gas from SNGPL, some for commercial 
purposes, some for industrial purposes, and some get natural gas for domestic 
purposes. Even the managing director of SNGPL is getting gas; all employees are 
getting gas; is it a conflict of interest?” (Khan, 2014). 
In summary, the ruling and business elites have the power to shape the country’s political and 
economic policies and reform agendas in their own interests. Thus, the question that arises here 
is: Is it possible to introduce corporate laws in Pakistan without giving concessions to these 
dominant industrial families when they are holding 80% of listed companies, almost 100% of 
private businesses, holding key positions in regulatory bodies, and having political alliances with 
ruling elites? It is important to recognise the powers and interests of these ruling and business 
elites in the process of development and implementation of CG codes in Pakistan. 
5.2.3 Foreign economic assistance – among the top ten biggest recipient 
Since its independence, Pakistan has become a bigger recipient of economic assistance from 
IFAs. At the time of its birth, Pakistan was faced with a number of historically specific 
conditions which made it vulnerable. In the very beginning, the state power shifted from 
politicians to the bureaucratic-military establishment which began to foster Pakistan’s neo-
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colonial ties with the United States (Gardezi, 1998). Industrialisation was perceived as urgent in 
order to avoid any threat from India, thereby explaining why the state initiates and derives 
building industrial capital (Alavi, 1983). Along with this, there was a severe shortage of funds to 
finance the country’s administration, rehabilitate refugees, and conduct other state functions. The 
state had limited options other than to look towards external financial sources including the IMF 
and World Bank. Since the 1950s, international financial institutions have been involved in the 
development of Pakistan’s economy (Islam, 1972). In addition to the IMF and World Bank, 
various donor agencies, e.g. USAID, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and International 
Development Association (IDA), also provided loans to Pakistan under different programmes. 
Starting with a low level of assistance in the early fifties, the rate of flow of foreign assistance 
increased considerably during the latter years, especially from 1988 to 2008 (Gardezi and 
Mumtaz, 2004) (Table 5-4).  
Table 5-4: Foreign Economic Assistance to Pakistan (1950-2008)  
Disbursement of Foreign Economic Assistance 
Year Loans Grants Total 
  (Million US Dollar) 
1951-1960 192 650 842 
1960-1965 1,232 1,162 2,394 
1965-1970 2,324 719 3,043 
1970-1978 5,083 634 5,717 
1978-1983 4,418 1,375 5,793 
1983-1988 5,158 2,025 7,183 
1988-1993 9,540 2,541 12,081 
1993-1998 11,522 1,226 12,748 
1998-2008 20,005 5,511 25,516 
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan 
The great dependency on foreign aid allowed IFAs to interfere in country economic policy. In 
order to get a loan, government needs to implement structural reforms conditioned by IMF and 
the World Bank. The first loan under the Structure Adjustment Programme (SAP) was approved 
in 1982 under the Zia regime (Gardezi and Mumtaz, 2004). When Sharif’s government was 
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successfully launched, the SAP, IMF and World Bank approved $400 million under SAP over a 
period of three years. In the 1990s, Moen Qureshi from the World Bank was brought as interim 
Prime Minister in order to implement the second phase of SAP. The appointment of a prime 
minister from the World Bank is evidence of the powerful role of IFAs in Pakistan. However, 
poor economic conditions, and the threat of default continued to haunt upcoming elected 
governments. The greater need of external funds has forced many developing countries to follow 
IFA’s sponsored globalisation process in order to obtain loans (Siddiqui, 2010). Similarly in 
Pakistan, IFAs conditioned loans to adopt internationally accepted accounting practices, CG 
practices, privatisation programmes, deregulations, introduction of GST, and sales of state 
owned enterprises. The current regime successfully negotiated with the IMF and was approved 
for $5.3 billion under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). One of the conditions of this loan is that 
government will reduce the budget deficit through generating a surplus amount. The Finance 
Minister justified this loan and said: 
“…we are not holding the begging bowl. Since the country is on the verge of default 
because of irrational economic policies of the previous regime, so government has 
decided to seek another IMF loan programme, which would be utilised to retire the 
remaining instalment of the previous loan of $8.5 billion.” (Mustafa, 2013).  
From the above discussion, it is apparent that Pakistan is heavily dependent on foreign economic 
assistance, and such assistance comes in the form of structural adjustment programmes. This 
dependence allows continuous intervention from IFAs into the business affairs of Pakistan. 
Another important aspect is the coordination between these International Donor Agencies. In 
2013, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) conditioned its loan to Pakistan with loan 
sanctioning from IMF.
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5.2.4 Securities and Exchange Commissions of Pakistan (SECP) 
The SECP is a new regulatory body that was established in 1999 by legislative action. In 
accordance with capital market reforms of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), in 1999, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan was formed under the Securities and Exchange 
Act 1997. The SECP Act 1997 defined the structure, powers and functions of SECP in carrying 
out its regulatory and statutory responsibilities as an independent regulator. The Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) holds the authority to appoint the SECP’s chairman and commissioners. The 
SECP succeeded the Corporate Law Authority (CLA), which had been administrating corporate 
laws in the country since 1981. The CLA lacked the autonomy to build a regulatory structure that 
was conducive to the growth of the financial sector due to its typical bureaucratic structure 
(Ashraf and Ghani, 2005b). The SECP is largely an independent body that regulates the 
corporate sector and capital markets. The SECP also regulates non-banking financial institutions. 
The regulatory and supervisory responsibilities of SECP include regulating the securities, stock 
exchanges, security markets, investment funds and schemes, mergers/takeover of companies, 
supervising depositories and clearing houses and registration of brokers and sub-brokers. The 
mission of SECP is to develop a transparent and efficient regulatory framework based on 
internationally accepted practices for the protection of investors. SECP wanted to have a robust 
corporate sector in Pakistan aimed at fostering economic growth. However, the ruling elite 
continuously interfere in the affairs of SECP and make it difficult to introduce capital market 
reforms in Pakistan. For example, a national newspaper reported that the Prime Minister 
removed the SECP chairman because he refused to delay stock market reforms. The SECP 
chairman, in his letter to the Prime Minister, said: 
“…two officials [financial adviser  to PM and state finance minister] were making it 
difficult for him to reform the stock exchanges and maintain direct contact with the 
main players of the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)” (Daily Times, 2006). 
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Instead of giving him full authority, the Prime Minister removed the SECP chairman on the 
grounds that he had not been able to maintain a good relationship with market players. In an 
SECP board meeting, the sacked chairman claimed that: 
“…. [he] had been removed for introducing new regulations phasing out the Badla 
system, introducing forensic auditing, electing a new chairman from outside the 
brokers community, and fining some 100 brokers for the March 2005 market crash” 
(Daily Times, 2006). 
Being an apex regulator, SECP is a key player in the development and implementation of CG 
codes in Pakistan. However, is it possible that newly established regulators can tackle influence 
from multiple powerful actors, both transnational and national, in the socio-political and 
economic context of Pakistan without compromising its independence? 
5.3 Pakistan’s regulatory context 
This brings us to another important dimension the regulatory context of Pakistan. Pakistan has a 
multifaceted corporate governance regime. Laws fall into corporate law, stock exchange listing 
regulations, civil law, criminal law and national accountability ordinance of 1999 for corporate 
fraud and misappropriation. The Companies Ordinance of 1984 governs the corporate sector of 
Pakistan. At the time of independence in 1947, Pakistan adopted the Companies Act of 1913, 
which was passed in British India. In 1959, a company law commission was established to make 
laws in accordance with modern times. In 1984, Pakistan developed its complete law for their 
companies in the form of “Companies Ordinance 1984”. But when it comes to law enforcement, 
Pakistan lags significantly behind other countries (table 5-5). The enforcement of corporate law 
remains the soft underbelly of Pakistan’s legal and corporate governance systems (see, for 
example, (La Porta et al., 1998), (Porta et al., 2006), Doing Business 2012, World Bank 
publication, and the 2011 report of Transparency International). The efficiency of the judicial 
system, enforcement of the regulations in national securities markets and the quality of public 
enforcement is very poor in Pakistan. 
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Islam (2004) identified the traditional practices including strict adherence to hierarchy, 
centralisation, corruption, nepotism and gender differentiation in administrative roles as  major 
attributes of Pakistan’s administrative culture. 
Table 5-5: Law enforcement status in Pakistan 
Criteria Score Source 
Efficiency of Judicial System 154 / 183 Doing Business 2012 
Estimated Time for contract 
enforcement 
976 Days Doing Business 2012 
Number of procedures to follow 10 Doing Business 2012 
Efficiency of Judicial System Index 5 / 10 La Porta et al.  (1998) 
Shareholder Right Index 5 / 6 La Porta et al.  (1998) 
Creditor Rights Index 4 / 4 La Porta et al.  (1998) 
Corruption Ranking 134 Transparency International 
Disclosure Requirement Index 0.58 Porta et al.  (2006) 
Liability Standard 0.39 Porta et al.  (2006) 
Quality of Public Enforcement 0.58 Porta et al.  (2006) 
Red Tape and Regulations 105 Doing Business 2012 
Ease of Starting Business 90 Doing Business 2012 
5.3.1 The capital market of Pakistan 
Stock market development and its role in the country’s economic growth is an important area of 
research in financial economics. Stock markets perform the function of channelling funds from 
savers to investors. Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) is Pakistan’s first and oldest stock exchange 
established on 18 September 1947, while Lahore Stock Exchange (LSE) and Islamabad Stock 
Exchange (ISE) are two other stock exchanges of Pakistan. KSE is the biggest and most liquid 
exchange in Pakistan where approximately 85% of the turnover occurs with 14% at LSE and 1% 
at ISE. For this reason, the subsequent discussion is focused on KSE only. 
At present, a total of 559 companies are listed in KSE with an average daily turnover of 236 
million shares and market capitalisation of US $7,116.0 billion (table 5-7). Pakistan’s equity 
market is the second largest in the region after India, both in absolute terms and as a percentage 
of the GDP. The trading in all three stock exchanges is fully automated, and these exchanges are 
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also linked with the Central Depository System (CDS)
14
. Pakistan liberalised its stock market by 
allowing foreign portfolio investment in February 1991. Market liberalisation reduces the cost of 
equity for liberalising a country by risk sharing between domestic and foreign investments 
(Henry, 2002). These liberalisation reforms were expected to have an increase in physical 
investment and subsequent economic growth. But empirical evidence does not support the 
beneficial effect of liberalisation for Pakistan. According to Bekaert and Harvey (2003), 
Pakistan’s real GDP growth declined after liberalisation. Pakistan was the only emerging 
economy whose stock market vitality increased after liberalisation (Bekaert and Harvey, 1997).  
Table 5-6: Profile of Karachi Stock Exchange.  























00-01 747 12 4 3.6   29.2     
01-02 712 24 4 15.2   29.1     
02-03 702 8 2 23.8   53.1     
03-04 668 18 16 70.7 374.1 97 386.7 1357.5 
04-05 659 14 15 54 438.5 88.3 351.9 2068.2 
05-06 658 5 14 41.4 496 79.5 348.5 2801.2 
06-07 658 6 16 49.7 631.1 54 262.5 4019.4 
07-08 652 7 7 62.9 706.4 63.3 238.2 3777.7 
08-09 651 2 8 44.9 781.8 28.2 115.6 2143.2 
09-10 652 10 8 111.83 909.8 42.9 172.53 2732.3 
10-11 639 7 1 31.04 943.7 28.1 111.63 3288.6 
11-12 591 68 3 115.1 1069.8 38.1 150 3492.5 
12-13 569 17 4 29.5 1116 54.3 221 5336.4 
13-14 558 5 4 37.5 1153.2 48.4 236 7116 
Source: Karachi Stock Exchange 
According to the recent economic survey, the market capitalisation is approximately 18% of 
GDP for FY 2012. Iqbal (2012) stated that less than one percent of the total population invests in 
the stock markets. In Pakistan, investment is in the form of landholdings, gold, cash holdings, 
and real estate. This may be due to a lack of the general levels of literacy or financial literacy in 
general. Liquid markets enable the role of stock markets in routing savings to investment which 
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in turn fosters economic growth. One of the frequently used liquidity measures is the turnover 
ratio and Pakistan’s turnover ratio for FY 2003 was the highest in the world. Between the years 
of 2002-2006, it remained the highest amongst selected countries. Political stability and low-
interest rates were the main reasons for high levels of trading activity. Volatility in Pakistan’s 
stock market is very high which hinders investments and potential growth of stock markets. Iqbal 
(2012) evaluated Pakistan’s stock market performance and pointed out that high volatility and a 
small size of the stock market seems to be the possible cause of the weak role of the stock market 
in the country’s economic growth. She also posed that high trading activity in Pakistan’s stock 
market is not driven by economic fundamentals, rather it appears to be caused by speculators and 
noise traders.  
Pakistan’s stock market operates as a typical developing market with high levels of returns and 
volatility, high concentration and the inability to mobilise new investment. The market is not 
correlated with other markets, which makes it relatively segmented and safer from international 
shocks and can be a potential source of international diversification (Iqbal, 2012). The codes of 
corporate governance are part of the listing regulations, which makes the stock market a key 
player in the implementation of the CG codes.  
5.3.2 Auditors – lacking independence 
SECP, through listing regulations, made it compulsory for listed companies to appoint a 
chartered accountant as their external auditor who has been given a satisfactory Quality Control 
Review (QCR) rating by the Institute of Chartered Accountant of Pakistan (ICAP).
15
 The ICAP 
is set up under The Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 as a self-regulatory body, and it 
operates under the CA Bylaws, 1983. ICAP runs the QCR programme to develop and maintain 
compliance of professional standards amongst firms engaged in the audit of listed entities. In 
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Pakistan, the number of registered audit firms is 593; however, firms having a satisfactory QCR 
rating (as of July 2014) are only 101. The audit fee in Pakistan is very low. In addition, the 
family dominance in businesses is a serious threat to the independence of auditors. Ashraf and 
Ghani (2005, p19) reported comments of one of the partners of the top four auditing firms in 
Pakistan: 
“…this factor severely hampers the quality of audit because at the end of the day we 
are in the business of selling audit services and low revenue will mean low cost and 
resultantly poor quality staff and review.”  
He further added: 
 “…it is very difficult to stand against the aspirations of management, if they own 
more than seventy percent of voting rights” (Ashraf and Ghani, 2005a, p192). 
Overall, the state of the auditing profession in Pakistan is dismal and lacking in independence.  
5.3.3 Banking sector – political connections and default culture 
The SBP is Pakistan’s central bank and is responsible for regulating the country’s banking and 
finance sector. Banks account for 95% of the financial sector of Pakistan (Husain, 2005). 
Ownership structure of banks in Pakistan is not different from ownership structure of the 
industrial sector. More than half of the Pakistani banks have concentrated control (Chaudary et 
al., 2005). Husain (2005) described the banking sector of Pakistan and noted that most of the 
banks in Pakistan serve government interests. Government use bank’s deposits to cover fiscal 
deficits (Figure 5-1). He described that the banking sector is characterised by low levels of 
competition, unnecessary bureaucracy, overstaffing, loss-making branches, and poor customer 
service. Pakistan’s economy is mostly reliant on the banking system, whereas the capital market 
has developed slowly.  
Over the years, the significance of the debt market has been realised. However, according to a 
study conducted by the State Bank of Pakistan (2004), one of the major problems that the 
Pakistani banking sector encountered was the huge stock of non-performing loans (NPLs), 
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particularly in the public sector banks. According to the study, these NPLs were eroding the 
banking sector’s profits. Family owned-firms mostly financed their companies through debt 
financing (Ghani and Ashraf, 2005). Khwaja and Mian (2005) argued that these controlling 
families have close links with politicians and enjoy cheap loans from banks which are often 
never paid back.  
Figure 5-1: Government Borrowing from Banks 
 
Banks loans in Pakistan are granted on the basis of political connections and status. In her first 
term, Benazir Bhutto and Zardari gave instructions to issue billions of rupees of unsecured 
government loans to 50 projects (Cristopher, 1990). Zardari stated “such loans are very normal 
in the Third World to encourage industrialization” (Evans, 1990). Under Nawaz Sharif’s regime, 
unpaid bank loans are one of the favourite ways to get rich. After dismissing Sharif’s 
government on corruption charges, the following government issued a list of 322 of the largest 
loan defaulters, representing $3 billion out of $4 billion owed to banks. Of this, Sharif and his 
family owed $60 million.  
5.3.4 Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG)  
Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG) was set up under section 42 of the Company 
Ordinance, 1984, to promote good corporate governance practices in Pakistan.
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and insurance institutions, corporate businesses and Non-Bank Financial Institutions, and leading 
business educational institutions are founding members of this institution. The main 
responsibilities of PICG are to provide training and education, create awareness, and publish 
guidelines. It also provides a forum for discussion on corporate governance. PICG, in 
collaboration with relevant members, organises conferences, seminars and roundtables from time 
to time to encourage debate on important issues. The role of PICG is important not only in 
smooth implementation of the codes but also in issuance of the revised version of the CG codes 
2012.  PICG is a key player in the implementation of CG codes in Pakistan. SECP delegated 
tasks to PICG to recommend changes to enhance the efficiency of CG codes 2002, which after 
consultation with key stakeholders recommended CG codes 2012.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The socio-political, economic and legal, organisational field and organisational level contexts of 
Pakistan comprise of multiple influential organisations and actors with different powers, 
resources, and interests (figure 5-2). From the above discussion, it is apparent that the socio-
political and economic context in Pakistan is characterised by a lack of economic and political 
stability and dominated by few families at both the political and business realms. The socio-
political and economic context of Pakistan is far from the institutional features of developed 
economies including independent regulators, bureaucratic governments, and strong and efficient 
capital markets. In addition, high ownership concentration, weak and volatile capital market, 
high reliance on banking finance, default culture, poor law enforcement, lack of high quality and 
independent accounting professional institutions, and the entrepreneurial role of government are 
the key features of the socio-political and economic context. Pakistan has been heavily reliant on 
foreign economic assistance since its independence. Prior researches [see, for example, 
(Ahunwan, 2002) in Nigeria, (Siddiqui, 2010) in Bangladesh, (Rwegasira, 2000) in Africa] 
report similar conditions of concentrated ownership, inefficient capital market, political and 
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economic instability, and the influential role of IFAs in the name of structural adjustment 
programmes in other developing countries.  
Figure 5-2: Key Institutions and Actors at the three societal levels of analysis 
Socio-Political and Economic Level
Organisational Field Level
Organisational Level (Family-Listed 
Companies)
IMF, World Bank, ADB, Government, SECP, 
Political and Business Families
Stock Exchanges, PICG, ICAP, SBP, Auditors, 
Business Families
Family (Chairman, CEO, Directors), CFO, 
Auditor (Internal / External), Shareholders 
 
All these issues are discussed in the next chapter, where the process of emergence and 
development of CG codes in Pakistan has been presented. The discussion above identified IFAs, 
business and political families, family industrial groups, government, and regulators as key 
influential actors with different powers and resources in Pakistan, principally in the realm of CG 
regulations in Pakistan. The recognition of multiple actors, their powers, resources, and interests 
will help in understanding the role of different actors in the CG regulation emergence and 
development process. This will also aid in understanding how influential actors interact and use 
their powers, resources, and connections in promoting, shaping, and resisting CG regulatory 




Chapter 6: The development process of CG regulations in 
Pakistan 
This chapter provides a longitudinal analysis of the emergence and development process of the 
CG regulations in Pakistani context. The Chapter empirically addresses the first research 
question: why and how CG regulations have emerged and developed in Pakistan. Chapter five 
showed that Pakistan’s socio-political economic and legal context is characterised by a 
concentration of power in the hands of few political and business families, a weak capital 
market, poor law enforcement and a huge reliance on foreign economic assistance. This chapter 
discusses the process of institutionalisation and transposition of corporate governance 
regulations in Pakistan using data from interviews and document analysis. 
The analysis of the process of institutionalisation and transposition of CG regulations is divided 
into two parts. The first part discusses the emergence and development process of the first codes 
of CG introduced in 2002. The second part presents the development process of the second codes 
of CG issued in 2012. The political process of institutionalisation of 2002 and 2012 CG 
regulations and the dynamics between the different actors across three societal (i.e. Socio-
Political and Economic (SPE), field and organisational) levels are substantially different from 
each other. The main focus, while discussing the institutionalisation and transposition process, 
revolves around what incentives drive CG initiatives in Pakistan, key players and their roles in 
shaping CG regulations. Lastly, the key features of CG codes introduced in Pakistan will be 
highlighted. The table 6-1 provides a chronological summary of the important events related to 
the emergence and development of 2002 and 2012 CG codes in the period 1995-2014.  These 
events will be explained while discussing the process of institutionalisation of 2002 and 2012 
CG codes later in this chapter.  
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Table 6-1: Chronology of major configuring events related to institutionlisation and transposition 
of CG regulation in Pakistan 
Year Month Events 
1995  Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved $865,000 Technical 
Assistance (TA) for capital market development; a $250,000,000 
loan for Capital Market Development Programme (CMDP) and, 
$5,000,000 TA for enhancing capital market. 
1997 December Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act 1997 was 
approved.  
1999 January SECP regulator came into being. 
 March Parliamentary Senate Committee approved changes proposed by 
SECP to the Companies Ordinance 1984. 
2000  ADB approved $150,000 TA for enhancing capital market. 
2001  SECP issues Listed Companies (Prohibition of Insider Trading) 
Guidelines to restore investor confidence in the stock market. ADB 
approved $600,000 TA for enhancing capital market and for 
developing CG Codes. 
2002 March SECP developed CG Codes and a guide for investors. Stock 
Exchanges were directed to incorporate the CG codes in their listing 
regulations for listed companies to comply.  
 August SECP launched a project on CG in collaboration with Pakistan’s 
Economic Affairs Division and the United Nation Development 
Programme (UNDP) to improve the Codes 2002. 
2003 January SECP developed a manual on CG to facilitate compliance and 
promote good CG.  
 May SECP organised a seminar series and invited international speakers 
to train regulatory organisations. SECP and Lahore University of 
Management Sciences (LUMS) organised a conference on CG.  
 July Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) signed by International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) and SECP to establish Pakistan Institute 
of Corporate Governance (PICG).  
2004 December PICG was established under section 42 of the Companies Ordinance 
1984 to promote good CG practices in Pakistan.  
2005 January Round table meeting was held between SECP and interested parties 
to discuss whether CG Codes could be extended to state-owned 
public sector companies. 
 August SECP and International Finance Corporation (IFC) signed MOU to 
revise the Codes 2002.   
2006 January SECP delegated the task of revising the Codes 2002 to PICG, as 
suggested by IFC in the MOU signed in August 2005. 
2007 March PICG’s board of directors initiated the process of revising the CG 
Codes 2002.  
 December PICG created a task force to propose changes to the Codes 2002. 
2008  PICG task force conducted 20 meetings in total to discuss proposed 
changes to Codes 2002. 
2009  PICG task force finalised draft recommendations for PICG’s board 
of directors.  
PICG conducted roundtable discussions in Karachi, Islamabad and 
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Year Month Events 
Lahore to invite key interest groups to comment on proposed 
changes. 
2010 June PICG’s board approved recommendations and forwarded them to 
SECP. 
 October SECP started a public consultation process to amend the Codes 
2002 by publishing a draft of new codes on its website. 
2011 January Parliamentary Senate Committee called SECP to provide a briefing 
on the proposed amendments to the Codes 2002, and proposed some 
changes. 
Parliamentary Senate Committee asked SECP to conduct another 
round of consultations, and asked to be briefed again on the 
outcome.  
 May SECP presented the draft of CG codes during the meeting of the 
Asian Network of the OECD on Corporate Governance. 
 July SECP conducted roundtable discussions, as advised by the 
Parliamentary Senate Committee. The first roundtable discussion 
was held in Karachi to discuss issues of concern to family 
businesses, i.e. composition of the board of directors, and the role of 
independent directors. 
 September SECP held a second roundtable discussion in Lahore and a third 
roundtable discussion with Pakistan Business Council (PBC). 
 October SECP held a meeting with the PICG task force to discuss the 
recommendations received from the roundtable discussions and to 
finalise the Codes 2012. 
2012 April SECP launched the Codes 2012.  
 October SECP, in collaboration with Karachi Stock Exchange, conducted an 
awareness session on Codes 2012 to discuss implementation issues.  
 December SECP in collaboration with Lahore Stock Exchange conducted 
another awareness session on Codes 2012 in Lahore.  
2013 January SECP established a task force to protect the interest of minority 
shareholders and investors in general by following international best 
practices.  
 April The Supreme Court removed the chairman of the SECP as his 
appointment was made without due process.  
2014 January SECP amended Codes 2014 and relaxed the criteria for the 
appointment of CFOs, the head of the audit committee, and 
experience requirement of CFOs.  
   
6.1 The process of the emergence and development of CG code (2002) 
SECP introduced the first code of CG (referred to hereinafter as the Code 2002) in March 2002 
as a part of the listing regulations of the stock exchanges. The Code 2002 was an extension of the 
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Company Ordinance 1984. This section presents the emergence and development process of 
Code 2002 in Pakistan.   
6.1.1 Introduction of CG code 2002 – (legitimacy vs. efficiency)  
The establishment of SECP was the foundation stone of capital market reforms in Pakistan. The 
SECP came into being as loan conditionality from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The 
ADB approved $250 million loans for the Capital Market Development Programme (CMDP) 
and conditioned this loan with the establishment of SECP. In order to get this loan, government 
passed the Securities and Exchange Act 1997. The presence of coercive pressure was confirmed 
by a senior official from SECP:  
“…the ADB told the government that we are ready to pay you a certain sum, but that 
amount should be utilised for the establishment of an independent institution, i.e. 
SECP. In response, government passed the Securities and Exchange Act 1997.” 
The SECP formally started its operations in January 1999 and succeeded the Corporate Law 
Authority (CLA), which had been administrating corporate laws in the country since 1981. In 
order to enhance the capacity of SECP as an independent oversight body, ADB in conjunction 




Since its inception, the SECP initiated several capital market reforms in Pakistan as prescribed 
by donor agencies. The SECP and ADB initiated phase (I) of the Financial Market Governance 
Programme (FMGP) as a part of CMDP. Under the FMGP phase (I), SECP introduced 
regualtory reforms including the observations of International Accounting Standards (IAS), 
improvement in governance and risk management of stock exchanges, introduction and 
implementation of the concept of Non-Banking Finance Corporations (NBFCs), and the 
introduction and implementation of the first code of corporate governance. As a part of the 
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donor-funded financial market governance programme, SECP introduced the first CG Code in 
May 2002. Thus, the introduction of the Code 2002 was the result of coercive pressure from the 
ADB on Pakistan’s government.  
The coercive pressures to introduce CG regulations also influenced the nature of CG codes in 
Pakistan. Transnational organisations wanted to promote internationally accepted accounting 
practices to facilitate the efficient allocation of resources in the economy and help broaden and 
deepen the financial sector (Arnold, 2005, Arnold, 2012, Mueller, 2006, Reed, 2002). The ADB 
under the CMDP only promoted capital market reforms but also wanted these reforms in line 
with internationally accepted practices. The CMDP report highlighted the objectives of this 
programme: 
“…the Capital Market Development Programme was designed to develop the 
securities market that would facilitate the efficient allocation of resources in the 
economy and help broaden and deepen the financial sector, besides providing 
alternative sources of funding to the industry, which had traditionally relied on 
Government directed credit. It was in line with ADB's country operational strategy of 
which supporting capital market reform was one.” [ADB CMDP evaluation report]. 
Resource dependence theorists predict that an organisation may not resist when it is dependent 
on pressurising constituents, as donors put pressure on agencies to be accountable for their use of 
donated funds (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). SECP, which is politically and economically 
dependent on donor agencies, mimics internationally accepted the Anglo-American model of CG 
to maintain the appearance of legitimacy (a detailed discussion on CG codes is presented later). 
SECP follows the shareholder centric approach of CG that is prevalent in the West, which 
defines CG as: 
[. . .] the process of supervision and control [. . .] intended to ensure that the 
company’s management acts in accordance with the interests of shareholders 
(Parkinson, 1993,p. 159).  
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SECP, in line with the Anglo-American model of CG, focused on resolving the conflict of 
interest between shareholders and management arising from the separation of ownership and 
control in the listed companies (Berle and Means, 1932). SECP contends that minority 
shareholder rights are in danger in Pakistan especially in family-controlled public listed 
companies. A member of a code development team said:  
“…the family-controlled listed companies want to keep their munshi
18
 as a CFO, 
which is not acceptable to us.” 
An official from the Policy, Regulation, and Development department of the Securities Market 
Division of SECP stated: 
“…the main purpose of the Code 2002 is to look after the interests of minority 
shareholders. In family-controlled listed companies, it is important to protect the 
rights of the minority shareholders.” 
The commissioner of SECP stated; 
“…the company ordinance 1984 was lacking in fulfilling the need of recent times. 
Our corporate sector needs new and improved regulations. Being a regulator we want 
[that] our businesses should be done in a manner that is acceptable to the 
international community and in addition to that our code should meet the 
requirements of different codes.” 
In addition, SECP communicated that to attract new foreign investment and boost investor 
confidence, we have to deinstitutionalise the traditional familial way of doing business. 
According to a report prepared by SECP (2003),  most of the family-controlled companies’ 
shares are illiquid and infrequently traded, which raises the cost of takeovers and protects family 
businesses against dilution of control. An illiquid equity market for family shares increases risks 
to external investors and also adds up to the reliance of family businesses on banks for debt 
financing. As pointed out by a commissioner from the SECP: 
“…we are too dependent on the banking sector, but it provides only short- and 
medium-term financing. Long-term financing, which comes through the capital 
markets, is presently limited to only 200,000 investors.” 
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In order to develop the corporate sector of Pakistan in which minority shareholders feel safe, 
companies should follow the Anglo-American model of CG. An interviewee from SECP stated: 
“…this Code 2002 will boost investor confidence in public listed companies because 
they know that these companies are following international procedures and [a] 
stringent regulator (SECP) is monitoring company’s activities.” 
Regulators believe that the introduction of the Anglo-American model of CG will not only 
attract new foreign investment, but will also provide an opportunity to young firms with 
innovative ideas to attract equity finance. This is a popular stance taken by the promoters of the 
shareholder centric model of CG (see, for example, Mueller, 2006, Hansmann and Kraakman, 
2001). The official from KSE recognises the importance of shareholder protection and said: 
“…export-oriented companies who want to become part of [the] global supply chain 
and want to extend their business require larger capital, as well as longer-term 
capital. In this case equity finance is [a] very good option. Such reforms will provide 
[an] enabling environment and boost the confidence of both companies and investors 
to do business.”  
The existance of normative pressure in the adoption of an internationally accepted CG model 
particulary, the Anglo-American model, was also clearly envisaged by the regulators. Regulators 
are convinced that shareholder centric CG regulations are internationally accepted norms and 
adoption is necessary to boost investor’s confidence. The senior official from KSE stated: 
“… [the Anglo-American] model of corporate governance is a universally accepted 
thing.” 
He also criticised the argument against the Anglo-American model by saying that as it is 
developed in the West, it is not suitable for developing countries: 
“…we should stop saying that what is coming from the West is necessarily bad. Even 
if we take a clean slate and start writing codes based on our own business 
environment and to protect minority shareholders, I am sure that 70% will be similar 
to what is being called best practices prevailing in the West.” 
The member of the code development team is of a point of view that the difference in the 
ownership structure in Asia and the West does not require a different set of codes and argued: 
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“…I am sure people who have done a lot of work on CG codes in the West thought 
about different types of ownership structures. In my point of view, it doesn’t matter 
[if] ownership is concentrated or separate. I can’t understand why we should have 
different code when minority shareholder’s possess similar stakes in every type of 
corporations.”  
The additive advantage of following internationally accepted model is the avoidance of 
development effort. A long serving senior official from SECP explained: 
 “…codes of corporate governance were already prevailing in developed countries 
and these countries have immense experience in code development. So what we 
thought, either we have to re-invent the wheel, or we can buy the same wheel. Thus, 
we followed best international practices.”  
The chairman of PICG also supported the adoption of an Anglo-American model and said: 
“…there is no need to reinvent the wheel; there are lots of people who have already 
done their work, take a look at what they have done. If it has some applicability then 
borrows it completely or customises it to work in the local environment. If there is 
something that they haven’t considered then include it.”  
6.1.2 The transposition of Code 2002- conflict and unintended consequences 
SECP adopted the Anglo-American model of CG for the sake of legitimacy from the donor 
agencies. However, as described in the first part of this chapter, the socio-political and economic 
context of Pakistan is comprised of multiple dominant actors with key resources. The domination 
structure traditionally in Pakistan has been familial, where laws and regulations serve the 
interests of political and business families (Alavi, 1983, Gardezi, 1998, Gardezi and Mumtaz, 
2004). The newly established regulatory body, SECP, witnessed the dialectic of power relations 
among the donor agencies and political and business families.  
The donor agencies wanted to introduce a domination structure in the form of regulatory bodies 
where control is exercised by means of formal CG regulations. For example, Code 2002 required 
that all listed companies should encourage a balanced Board of Directors (BOD) to have both 
executive and non-executive directors, including independent directors and those representing 
minority shareholders with the requisite skills. According to Section 35 (i) (b) of Code 2002, all 
listed companies shall have at least one and preferably one third of the total numbers of the board 
as independent directors. The shareholders at AGM elect directors. The BOD has the 
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responsibility to carry out its fiduciary duties with a sense of objective judgment and 
independence in the best interest of the company.  
The Code 2002 suggested that board composition could be a direct threat to family dominance 
and control of their business empire. The representation of minority shareholders in the board 
could be considered as interference in family business affairs. One founding family director 
criticised the board composition and explained: 
“…in Pakistan, families are holding approximately 80-90% [of] shares. This Code is 
forcing these companies to have one independent director and four non-executive 
directors in the board out of seven. It means 70% of directors are outsiders and not 
involved in business affairs, then how [will] this outsider-dominated board 
effectively work? In our case it is incongruent. We are holding 95%, and you are 
asking us to work for 5%. We won’t let you do it. The domination of outsiders will 
make [the] board useless and dysfunctional [emphasis added].” 
The message from family businesses, “We won’t let you do it”, was also anticipated by the 
SECP. It was clearly visible that the SECP was fully aware of the powers these family businesses 
hold and the kinds of pressure they can exert to curb their enforcement activities. SECP knows 
that the newly enacted CG code would be subject to unforseen resistance and compliance 
difficulties. In order to tackle the dialectic of power, SECP adopted the Anglo-American model 
of CG in order to gain legitimacy from the donor agencies, but  transposed CG codes in a form 
which is more acceptable to family businesses.   
In doing so, SECP offered two concessions to family businesses. Firstly, SECP implemented 
Code 2002 on a “comply or explain” basis and no additional punitive action or fine was 
recommended other than those that were already in place under the Company Ordinance 1984. 
The “comply and explain” basis of the compliance strategy helped SECP to avoid immediate 
resistance from dominant family businesses. Secondly, the SECP kept the inclusion of an 
independent director representing minority shareholders clause as ‘voluntary’ in Code 2002 (see 
Appendix A). The proposed board composition with the inclusion of an independent director was 
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the most important highlight of the Code 2002 and was the key difference from the Company 
Ordinance 1984. The member of the code development committee explained:  
“…we modify this code to fit in the family dominant context of Pakistan. One 
example is, everything in code is not mandatory; some are voluntary.”  
A senior official from SECP further added:  
“…in order to have wider acceptability as well as to avoid immediate resistance, this 
criterion was kept voluntary.” 
In a familial system, the grandfather is the ultimate or final decision maker. The role and 
influence of the grandfather in business affairs will be discussed in the next chapter where 
corporate governance practices in family-controlled listed companies are explored in more depth. 
SECP also legalised the role of the grandfather. An interviewee stated: 
 “…we recognised the power of people running our corporate sectors; that’s why we 
have [a] grandfathering provision in the code.” 
Family businesses acknowledged the SECP efforts of reducing compliance difficulties of the 
Code 2002. A senior CEO of the family-controlled listed companies said: 
“…this code requires us to do this, do that, such as appoint independent directors and 
non-executive directors. As this is not mandatory [thanks to SECP], this code is not 
bothering us. We owned and had [a] majority of the shareholdings; it is not possible 
for us to implement this code.” 
The legitimacy and efficiency reasons of the introduction of CG codes in Pakistan are 
intertwined. SECP had adopted Code 2002 to gain legitimacy from donor agencies, however 
they promoted this code in the name of efficiency and conveyed it as a significant step towards 
investor protection. The existence of multiple conflicting requirements led SECP to dilute CG 
codes. The diluted CG code is perhaps evidence that the socio-political and economic context of 
Pakistan consists of competing criteria. The Code 2002 that was promoted and introduced by the 
SECP was competing with historical dominant family power and control. The newly established 
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regulatory body diluted Code 2002 for its own interests as well as to avoid conflict that 
multiplicity had generated.  
6.2 The process of the development of CG Code (2012)  
Instead of taking stakeholders’ suggestions well before the introduction of the first code of CG, 
SECP took a number of steps to promote and create awareness afterward. In August 2002, 
SECP, UNDP and the Economic Affair Division (EAD) signed a MOU. Under this agreement, 
SECP received technical and financial assistance from UNDP for encouraging good CG 
practices. The main objective of this project on CG was to introduce and encourage compliance 
with the code in order to boost investors’ confidence. Under the project of CG, SECP also 
conducted a study to assess the extent and effects of implementation of the Code 2002 and 
identify the problems in order to refine the code. In addition, SECP, along with aegis of the 
Lahore University of Management Sciences, organised a conference on corporate governance in 
Pakistan. In the light of the findings from the assessment study and awareness sessions, SECP 
recognised the need for enhancement of the Code 2002 in order to improve its acceptability. 
SECP decided to revise Code 2002 and introduced new code of CG (referred to hereinafter as the 
Code 2012). This section discusses the political process of the development and introduction of 
Code 2012, the motivations behind the introduction, the roles of key actors who promote, shape 
and resist, and the nature of interactions and resources enrolled by these actors in the 
development process. 
6.2.1 SECP’s effort to deinstitutionalise family dominance 
Self-regulated, independent regulators free from state interference are important assumption in 
Anglo-American countries (Greenspan, 1998). The SECP Act 1997 defined SECP powers to 
impose regulative pressures over its constituents and to set new regulations. The development 
and implementation process of Code 2002 witnessed that SECP was subject to the influence of 
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interests and powers of multiple actors. SECP can play an active role, but its interventions are 
not free from political influence. Instead of enjoying partial autonomy, SECP wanted to enjoy 
absolute independence from the other players. In the presence of international players, 
intervening government and business families, SECP recognises that getting independence is 
quite difficult. To assert its power over regulatory matters, SECP formed strategic alliances with 
transnational actors to insulate itself and/or mitigate political interferences. This strategy 
provided SECP two advantages; financial support, and insulation from government resistance. 
As explained by a senior official from the SECP: 
“…initially we were part of government’s finance division, and we subsequently 
realised that we can’t develop and grow into an independent regulator unless we 
obtain power and financial independence. We learned from the way we were 
established that to effectively undertake any reform in the market we need to take 
sympathies from international donor agencies, e.g. ADB and the World Bank.” 
Another interviewee from SECP explained the collaboration between SECP and donor agencies: 
“…international donor agencies said to government that we will provide funds 
through SECP.” 
He further added: 
“…donor agencies gave us technical assistance, not loans. Once we comply with all 
the requirements, this technical assistance converted into a grant. They always ask us 
to take a loan, but we always go for technical assistance and [are] able to convert this 
into [a] grant through compliance.” 
To strengthen its role in the eyes of donor agencies, SECP introduced many regulatory reforms 
in Pakistan in collaboration with donor agencies.  The project assessment report of CMDP phase 
(I) stated that, both SECP and ADB gained considerable experience while implementing the first 
phase of CMDP in Pakistan. In order to promote and strengthen the capital market of Pakistan, 
ADB approved phase (II) of CMDP. SECP was one of the implementing agencies and 
responsible for complete implementation of all conditions and programme components.  
SECP, from the findings of the assessment study, recognises that Code 2002 needed revision. 
However from their previous experience of the development process of Code 2002, SECP was 
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anticipating resistance and interference from local actors in the revision process. To counter local 
interferences, SECP approached the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to provide financial 
support and monitor the revision of the Code 2002. In reply, IFC advised SECP to contact PICG 
for the revision in the Code 2002. As explained by the chairman of PICG: 
“…the SECP approached the IFC saying that: the Code 2002 is being redundant for 
quite some time, please assist us in revising it. IFC replied: you already have an 
Institute of CG. Ask this institute. We shall assist and monitor this process. That’s 
how SECP approached us, and we set up a task force to conduct the revisions and 
provide recommendations to the SECP. 
In August 2005, IFC and SECP signed MOU to strengthen CG reforms in Pakistan by working 
with PICG. IFC fully funded this project.
19
 In a press release (SECP, 2005), the IFC’s acting 
director for the Middle East and North Africa region commended this project as follows: 
“…what makes this joint initiative so unique is that it will attempt to turn a short-
term technical assistance project into a sustainable structure that can provide quality 
corporate governance services. It will do so by working with and through the 
recently established PICG.”  
After getting the political and financial support from IFC, SECP delegated the task of 
amendments in the Code 2002 to PICG.  In 2007, PICG board started their discussion and 
formed eleven members task force on 5 December 2007. The task force includes managing 
directors of all three stock exchanges, the CEO of PICG, the director of SBP, the representatives 
from KPMG Pakistan and the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) Pakistan, and 
the CEOs of four big family-listed companies. Representatives from small and medium family 
businesses, which represent the majority of the family-listed businesses, were not included in the 
task force. This task force met on a regular basis and conducted in total 20 meetings. In 2009, the 
PICG task force submitted its final recommendations to the board of PICG for consideration and 
submission to the SECP. In October 2010, SECP published a draft of the changes proposed by 
PICG on its official website for public comments. 
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6.2.2 Family businesses’ resistance and reproduction of family dominance  
Although the task force formed by the PICG includes the representatives from the family 
businesses, family businesses still used their political connections to further shape and influence 
the Code 2012. When SECP was about to launch the new code of CG in 2010, family businesses 
intervened through their political connections to shape the new CG regulations. In January 2011, 
the Senate Standing Committee
20
 called SECP for briefing on the proposed amendments to the 
Code 2002. The committee raised concerns about the board compositions and its stringent 
clauses. One senator said: 
“…proposed amendments were very stringent which will discourage companies from 
listing at the stock market.”
21
  
The Senate committee proposed SECP to reduce the requirement of three independent directors 
on the board of directors to two. An interviewee from SECP secretly revealed: 
“…some of the committee members owned and controlled a listed company, that’s 
why they called us to raise their concerns about proposed amendments and possible 
implementation issues. They asked us to undertake another round of consultations 
with major stakeholders before finalising the new code. [The] committee also 
required another briefing before launching the new code of CG.” 
He further added:  
“…we have already finalised and launched our proposed amendments for public 
opinion. Following the Senate committee orders, we have to start our consultation 
process yet again.”  
The Senate committee forced SECP to conduct roundtable meetings and negotiate with listed 
companies. SECP justified the consultation process as an internationally accepted norm in the 
regulatory establishment process. The official from SECP said holding roundtable meetings 
before the introduction of new laws is an international practice:  
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“…by Law, we are not bound to have a consultation process. This is an international 
practice, that [is] why we adopted to have everybody on board and to have a practice 
that everybody can buy-in.”  
SECP decided to hold two roundtable meetings with external stakeholders in order to finalise the 
amendments in the code of CG. The first meeting was held on 29 July 2011 in Karachi and the 
second meeting on 8 September 2011 in Lahore. The discussion, however, largely focused on 
sensitive issues related to family businesses, including the composition of the board, the role of 
the independent director, the number of dictatorships that the director can hold, disclosure 
requirements for related party transactions, etc.
22
 An official from SECP explained the workings 
of these roundtables and commented: 
“…consultation never means that there should be consensus. We get feedback; 
however, we have our plan. We need to see what is happening internationally, and 
we see what is important for our market. As a regulator, we don’t favor any 
particular segment, e.g. banks, the textile sector, etc. We want to have something that 
is more general and acceptable to many.”   
However, the content of Code 2012 tells a different story. In addition to the intervening role of 
family businesses, the stock exchanges put pressure on SECP to reconsider its strategy to bring 
international best practices into Pakistan. The SECP promoted that the introduction of CG codes 
is part of its effort to enhance the CG landscape in Pakistan and to keep pace with the constantly 
changing globally-set benchmarks. An official from SECP applauded the introduction of codes 
of CG: 
“…the introduction of the CG codes marks an important milestone in the 
development of corporate governance in Pakistan. The CG codes in line with [a] 
globally-set benchmark will contribute to the competitiveness, enable access to 
equity finance, flourish capital market, and incite economic activity.” 
SECP made CG codes part of the listing regulations of the Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad stock 
exchanges and is now applicable to all listed companies. Stock exchanges were directed to 
incorporate the CG code in their listing regulations for listed companies to comply with, which 
makes the stock market a key player in the implementation of the codes. Contrary to SECP claim 
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that the introduction of CG codes in line with internationally accepted practices will flourish the 
capital market, there has been a delisting trend in Pakistan since the introduction of Code 2002 
(see figure 6-1). The majority of companies that were delisted were family-controlled, as they 
found the CG code difficult to implement (Iqbal, 2012, SECP and UNDP, 2003).  
Figure 6-1: Delisting trend in KSE  
 
Source: SECP annual reports 2001-2014 
The delisting trend created tension between the SECP and the stock exchanges. A senior official 
from KSE critically evaluated SECP’s obsession to adopt an internationally accepted CG model: 
“…we have observed a delisting trend all over the world; however, here in Pakistan 
reasons are different. One of the reasons is code of corporate governance that was 
[the] guideline in the beginning, and now it is getting mandatory and it is of very 
high international standards [emphasis added].” 
The combination of pressures from stock exchanges and the family businesses through their 
political connections and negotiations in roundtables forced SECP to change the contents of 
Code 2012. For example, the PICG taskforce proposed that one third of the board should 
comprise of an independent director or recommended that there be three mandatory independent 
directors in a board of seven directors/members. SECP reduced the requirement of the number of 
independent directors on a company board from three to one. The PICG taskforce proposed the 
appointment of three out of seven independent directors on the company board. This is again a 
big discount given to family businesses (why this is a big relief and the concerns of family 
businesses over the proposed board composition and the role of independent directors will be 
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discussed in the next chapter). The struggle between family businesses and the regulators is the 
continuous phenomenon. Recently in January 2014, another big relief to the family-controlled 
listed companies was given when SECP amended the Code 2012 and relaxed the eligibility 
requirements for the CFO and the head of the internal audit committee.
23
 The experience 
requirements for the CFO have been reduced from five years to three years and the mandatory 
requirement of appointing an independent director as chairman of the audit committee has been 
made voluntary to facilitate companies.  
The development project of Code 2012 was fully funded by IFC and PICG was given the 
responsibility to propose amendments. In October 2011, SECP got the PICG task force to 
finalise the Code 2012. The meeting was mainly focused on revisions proposed by the 
stakeholders in two roundtable meetings held as per the Senate committee order. In this meeting, 
the SECP team and the PICGP task force finalised the contents of Code 2012. The new code of 
CG was launched in April 2012 in a formal ceremony organised by SECP in Karachi.  
In summary, the Code’s 2012 development process was initiated by SECP as an effort to 
enhance its power as an independent oversight regulatory body. SECP made alliances with 
transnational actors to gain both political and financial supports. However, local powerful actors, 
by employing their resources, are continuously intervening and challenging the authority and 
power of SECP.  
6.3 The nature of CG codes – an Anglo-American model 
The above discussion presented why and how Code 2002 and Code 2012 have emerged and 
developed in Pakistan. The institutionalisation and transposition process revealed that both 
transnational and national players promote, shape and resist Code 2002 and Code 2012. This 
section presents the key features of Codes 2002 and 2012, and the differences between them. 
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This section primarily discusses the criteria set for the composition, functionality, and 
responsibility of the board of directors, board committees and financial reporting framework in 
Codes 2002 and 2012. The provisions of the Company Ordinance 1984, Code 2002 and Code 
2012 are also compared (see Appendix B).  
In the beginning, SECP adopted a voluntary approach of “comply or explain” to implement Code 
2002. The purpose was to encourage companies to comply in spirit rather than in letter. 
However, a checklist of what is mandatory and what is voluntary makes it easy to identify 
company’s compliance with the Code. Companies need to provide a statement of compliance 
and provide details of non-compliance. However, in the case of Code 2012, SECP made it 
compulsory for all listed companies to comply with all of the requirements except where 
explicitly stated.  
6.3.1 Criteria for Board of Directors 
The Codes (2002, 2012) defined the criteria related to BOD such as its composition, 
responsibilities, powers of directors, board meetings, meeting agendas, directors’ training 
programme, etc.  According to the Codes (2002, 2012), all listed companies shall have a balance 
of executive and non-executive directors, including independent directors and those representing 
minority shareholders with the requisite skills. The Code 2012 made it mandatory to have at least 
one and preferably one-third of total members of the board as an independent director. The 
presence of an independent director clause was voluntary in the Code 2002. The Code 2012 has 
further stringent criteria for independent directors. The Codes required BOD to perform their 
duties with a sense of objective judgment and independence in the best interest of the company. 
The Code 2012 requires that the CEO and chairman should not be the same person, and the 
chairman shall be elected from non-executive directors of a listed company.  
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The Codes require that directors must submit their consent that they are aware of their duties and 
powers under relevant laws. As far as qualification and eligibility of director, the Codes require 
that companies cannot appoint a person as a director who is serving as a director in seven other 
listed companies. The Code 2012 reduced the maximum number of simultaneous directorships 
from ten to seven excluding the directorships in the subsidiaries of the listed company. Every 
director shall have a National Tax number (except if he is a non-resident) and must not have any 
criminal record. The person and his or her spouse engaged in the business of stock brokerage 
cannot be appointed as director by any listed company. The Codes require that the tenure of any 
director shall be three years and in case of a vacancy, the position shall be filled up within 90 
days. The period for the filling of a casual vacancy was 30 days in the Code 2002. The Codes 
requires that the chairman shall preside over board meetings and directs the board of directors to 
meet at least once in every quarter of the financial year. Written notices of meetings shall be 
circulated not less than seven days. The BOD is responsible for the appointment, remuneration 
and terms and conditions of employment of the CFO, company secretary, the head of the internal 
audit committee (which shall not be the chairman) and external auditors. The Codes also makes 
it mandatory for all the directors to have certification under any directors’ training programme 
offered by local or foreign institutions that meet the criteria specified by the SECP. 
6.3.2 Criteria for Board Committees 
The Code 2002 suggests forming only one audit committee. However, the Code 2012 suggests 
another board committee, i.e. a human resources and remuneration committee (HR&R). The 
Code 2012 guideline says that the audit committee shall be comprised of at least three members 
of non-executive directors. The chairman of the audit committee shall be an independent director 
who shall not be chairman of the board. The Code 2012 guideline says listed companies shall 
have HR&R committee comprising the majority of non-executive directors, including preferably, 
an independent director. The CEO may be a member of the committee but shall not participate in 
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the meeting concerning matters that directly relate to his performance and compensation. This 
committee shall be responsible for recommending HRM policies, recommending selection, 
evaluation, compensation and succession of the CEO, CFO, CS and head of internal audit. The 
names of members of the committees shall be disclosed in each annual report.  
Regarding the frequency of meetings, the Code 2012 suggests that the audit committee shall 
meet at least once in every quarter of the financial year. These meetings shall be held prior to the 
board meetings for the approval of interim results and after completion of an external audit. The 
CFO, head of internal audit and representative of external audit shall attend meetings. The Code 
2012 says that listed companies must make sure that at least once a year the audit committee 
shall meet with external auditors without the CFO and head of internal audit. Code 2012 says 
that audit committee of a listed company shall appoint a secretary of the committee, who shall 
either be the company secretary or head of internal audit. However, the CEO shall not be 
appointed as the secretary. The company secretary is responsible for taking meeting notes and 
dissemination of the minutes of audit committee meetings to all members.  
6.3.3 Criteria for External auditors 
The Codes’ (2002, 2012) guidelines suggest that external auditors should be independent, well-
qualified, have satisfactory ratings under the Quality Control Review programme of the ICAP 
and be free from conflicts of interest. The BOD will appoint external auditors on the 
recommendations from the audit committee for five years. No listed company shall engage with 
external auditors other than for audit functions. All listed companies other than financial sectors 
should, at a minimum, rotate external auditors after every five years. No listed company shall 
appoint a CEO, CFO, directors, or internal auditors who were a partner of its external auditors. 
The Code 2012 suggests that every listed company shall require external auditors to furnish a 
Management Letter to the BOD within 45 days (30 days in the Code 2002) of the date of the 
audit report.  
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6.3.4 Criteria for Corporate and Financial Reporting Framework/Director’s Report 
The preparation, presentation and disclosure of financial reporting in Pakistan are influenced by 
the Company Ordinance 1984 (Section 236), Codes (2002, 2012), and guidelines from 
IAS/IFRS. The Codes say that the directors of listed companies shall annex a statement to the 
following effect with the Directors’ Report, prepared under section 236 of the Company 
Ordinance: financial report presents fair state of affairs; accounting book maintained properly; 
appropriate accounting policies applied; IFRS applied; internal control system is sound in design 
and its implementation, etc. Where necessary, the director’s report of a listed company shall also 
annex any ongoing concerns, any significant plans and decisions, etc.  
The Codes (2002, 2012) require that all listed companies should prepare and circulate quarterly 
un-audited financial statements along with the director’s reviews, half-yearly financial 
statements and annual audited financial statements no later than four months from the close of 
the financial year. Codes (2002, 2012) direct all listed companies to disseminate all material 
information that can affect the market price immediately, particularly when the CEO or 
executive of listed companies or their spouses sell, buy or take any position, whether directly or 
indirectly. The listed companies require that a firm’s external auditors or any partner of external 
auditors, and his spouse and children do not purchase, sell or take any position in shares of their 
listed company. All listed companies should adopt formal and transparent procedures for fixing 
executive remuneration packages of individual directors. The company annual report shall 
contain details of the aggregate remuneration including salary/fee, benefits and performance 
linked incentives, etc. A listed company shall circulate its financial statement which is duly 
endorsed by the CEO, CFO and approved by the BOD. 
The criteria set in the Codes (2002, 2012) are consistent with the OECD guidelines (1999, 2004) 
for CG.  The Codes (2002, 2012) suggest a single-tier board structure, where directors are 
elected by the shareholders in the AGM. The presence of an independent director on the board, 
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separation of CEO and chairman, extended role of board committees, and the composition and 
qualification of BOD, CFO, CS, audit committees members, and external auditors are consistent 
with the shareholder centric Anglo-American model prevailing in the West. Codes are also 
similar in the conflict of interest point of view about the auditors providing non-auditing 
services.  
6.4 Conclusion  
This chapter was aimed at analysing the process of CG regulations emergence and development 
in the context of Pakistan. It addressed how and why different institutional conditions affect the 
nature and form of CG codes. This chapter reflected on power relations and political negotiations 
within and between government, IFAs, SECP, and business families at the socio-political and 
economic level. This chapter further revealed that Code 2002 was introduced in response to loan 
conditionalities forced by IFAs. However, SECP introduced Code 2012 to recognise itself as an 
independent oversight regulatory body in the eyes of multiple stakeholders. The nature and 
content of CG codes was an outcome of the struggle, conflict, interests, and dialectic of power 
and control between multiple actors. SECP shaped CG codes consistent with internationally 
accepted CG regulations to gain legitimacy from donor agencies. However, the analysis 
highlighted those powerful national actors, by employing their resources and relationships, 
diluted CG codes in their favour. SECP had to placate powerful interests and gain legitimacy 
from IFAs, but the business and political families’ dominance prevailed in Pakistan. The next 
chapter will explore how much family-controlled companies are complying with the CG 
regulations and identify the conflict, crises, and unintended consequences of CG regulations in 
Pakistan.   
146 
 
Chapter 7: Institutionalisation, contradictions and 
unintended consequences: a state of CG mechanisms in 
family-controlled listed companies in Pakistan 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the institutional context of Pakistan within which the CG 
regulations emerged and developed. In addition, the previous chapter empirically discussed why, 
what and how CG regulations emerged and developed in the institutional context of Pakistan. 
The empirics highlighted that Pakistan adopted an Anglo-American model of CG in response to 
loan conditionality. However, the socio-economic and political context influenced the nature and 
content of CG regulations. This chapter is extending this debate to the organisation level. It is set 
out in the form of research questions to provide a detailed account of intended and actual 
corporate governance mechanisms at the organisational level. This chapter discusses to what 
extent did the CG Codes (2002, 2012) institutionalise and then subsequently decouple in the 
family-controlled listed companies and their unintended consequences. In doing so, this chapter 
illustrates the state of CG mechanisms in family-controlled listed companies and answers simple 
but very important questions. For example, how does a family-dominant board operate? To what 
extent does the Board of Directors (BOD) represent and protect shareholders’ interests, 
particularly outsider minority shareholders in family-controlled listed companies? How do board 
committees (audit, HR, board evaluation) and AGM function in family-listed companies? How 
frequently are family-controlled firms declaring dividends? Overall, to what extent are family-
controlled listed companies complying with CG regulations? To begin, the perceptions of the 
family businesses towards the socio-political and economic environment, regulators, and the 
usefulness of CG regulations will be presented.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section, 7.2, discusses how family businesses perceive 
the socio-political and economic context of Pakistan. The next section discusses the perception 
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of family businesses towards the usefulness of CG regulations. Section 7.4 provides a detailed 
analysis of the state of CG governance practices and processes in family-controlled listed 
companies. The following section 7.5 reviews the unintended consequences of CG regulations at 
the organisational level. The conclusion ends this chapter. 
7.2 Perception of socio-economic and political level 
The last chapter discussed the Socio-Political and Economic (SPE) level and organisational field 
level context for developing CG regulations. The discussion was focused on how and why CG 
regulations emerged and developed at the SPE level and the role of both transnational and 
national level actors in the development process. SECP implemented CG codes through listing 
regulations. The Code 2002 followed a ‘comply or explain’ regime, however, Code 2012 is 
mandatory. Stock exchanges are responsible to make sure that all listed companies comply with 
the CG codes. The Codes (2002, 2012) (hereafter Codes)
24
 established at the SPE level are 
subject to agents’ interpretations at each level. How actors at the organisational level perceived 
SPE and the field level environment, and roles of embedded actors and institutions, influence the 
usefulness of regulations and legislations developed at the SPE level. Consequently, whether 
these codes are seen as legitimate will influence agents’ responses, interpretations, and routine 
practices. This section discusses the perception of actors at the organisational level about the 
SPE and field level and consequently their influence of their perception on the usefulness of CG 
codes. 
The role of the state, regulators and other institutions is to provide an enabling environment in 
which businesses can flourish. However, people at the organisational level criticised the role and 
functionality of the state, regulators and other institutions. As explained by the chairman of a 
family-controlled listed company: 
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“…three things are very important; first, the businessman’s confidence in state, 
regulatory institutions and rule of law; second, education; and third, transparent 
accounting. Here in Pakistan, [the] businessman has no confidence in state, state 
institutions and the rule of law. The lack of confidence resulted in [an] unregistered 
parallel economy that is three to four times bigger than [the] registered economy.” 
As discussed in the last chapter (see section 5.1), the socio-political and economic context in 
Pakistan is characterised by lack of economic and political stability, inconsistent economic 
policies, poor law enforcement, lack of high quality and independent accounting professions, and 
a weak and volatile capital market. Such instability and uncertainty are creating hurdles for 
managers to develop long-term plans. This was affirmed by a young family director who stated 
that: 
“…compliance with the regulations is the last thing in our mind when we come to 
work. We are worried about [a] lot of other things. We are worried about political 
instability; we are worried about [an] electricity shortage; we are worried about 
banks; we are worried about clients, etc. The business environment in Pakistan is 
causing us to run [our] business on [a] day-to-day basis. We can’t make long-term 
plans.”  
An owner-director who criticised the inconsistent policies said: 
“…we have very unstable policies. Regulators lack in vision. Ideally, regulators 
should have [a] road map for 15-20 years, but in Pakistan, you suddenly found new 
laws. A business can survive by adopting a wrong policy but cannot survive by 
adopting [a] changing policy.”  
People at the organisational level criticised the Code 2012 on the same grounds. An experienced 
company secretary of a family business group criticised the Code 2012: 
“…[the] corporate sector in Pakistan was struggling to comply with the first code of 
CG (Code 2002). For family businesses it is a great challenge to comply with [the] 
CG code, somehow, they made their mind and started to implement. Meanwhile, 
SECP introduced a new version with more stringent requirements. Now, family 
businesses are very furious with both the SECP and CG codes.”  
The interviews with the respondents at the organisational level revealed that family-controlled 
listed companies are not happy with the role, functionality and workings of regulators at both the 
SPE and organisational field level. SECP, which aimed at having a strong capital market and 
fostered economic growth through a transparent and efficient regulatory framework based on 
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international best practices, was perceived differently at the organisational level. People 
perceived that instead of providing impetus for fostering economic growth and social economy 
in Pakistan, SECP is more concerned about its own survival and wants to please donor agencies 
through introducing regulations that are more acceptable to them. An owner-director asserted: 
“…the way [SECP] came into being and their financial dependence on donor 
agencies, demands SECP to please...their funding agencies [more] by bringing or 
implementing donor agencies’ prescribed regulations.”  
Another family director argued that: 
“…when institution[s] such as SECP came in, these institutions wanted to have their 
own playing field and wanted to show their performance to their funds’ suppliers. 
The code of corporate governance is one of the efforts to prove their existence.”  
People at the organisational level perceived that this gaming led SECP to ignore ground realities. 
An owner and CEO of a family business group remarked that: 
 “…[the] regulator needs to think about the overall context before bringing any new 
laws and regulations. [A] regulator’s job is not to bring laws by doing cut, copy, and 
paste from other countries; they have to look at the ground realities.” 
There is a common perception amongst the family businesses that the SECP has some serious 
problems with family businesses. A young family director questioned the SECP’s motives for 
promoting capital market reforms in line with the Anglo-American model. He makes a point 
that:  
“…the major problem is SECP’s underlying assumptions behind the capital market 
reforms. SECP and other regulators considered that family business is a bad thing 
and want to fix it through regulations. While doing this, they forget that [the] 
majority of the businesses in the world are family-owned and are contributing well in 
their respective countries. If SECP think[s] [that] family businesses are corrupt and 
dangerous to minority shareholders and [the] country’s economy, just pass a 
regulation and remove all the listed companies from the stock exchange.”  
In addition to the role of SECP, actors at the organisational level also questioned and criticised 
the capability of SECP to be an efficient, transparent and strong regulator. The interviewees 
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revealed that SECP has no mechanism to judge the actual practices of the organisation. One 
owner-director revealed that: 
“…they [SECP] have no mechanism to see what is happening inside. The time 
companies are declaring profit in their annual reports, [is when] SECP is happy. 
SECP only interferes when companies are in [a] loss.”  
He exemplified: 
“…we never received any notice from SECP until one of our companies entered into 
[a] defaulter list two years ago. From that time, SECP is now concerned about [the] 
whole group, and we are now receiving notices from SECP on [a] regular basis.” 
Another company secretary also mentioned the money-making role of SECP. He explained with 
an example that:  
“…at the time of listing, companies need to fill “form 31”.
25
 Five years ago at the 
time of listing our company submitted that form. [A] few months ago, we received a 
letter addressing [the] directors that your company has not submitted form 31, submit 
within a certain time otherwise your company will be fined. We checked [the] 
company’s five-year record to locate that receipt. It was the SECP negligence, but 
they put pressure on us. They always try to snatch money and accumulate their 
wealth.”  
Another company secretary was furious about the poor response policy of SECP and said: 
“…the Code 2012 made it mandatory for companies to upload their documents via 
[an] e-filing system. Since 2008 when they [SECP] initiated this system, I am [as a 
company secretary] trying to create my company’s account but failed to do that. I 
contacted them again and again, but there is no response. Now it is mandatory but 
[the] system is still not working.”  
Similarly, people at the organisational level have a lot of concerns about the role and 
functionalities of the stock exchanges, an important player in the business context of Pakistan. 
An owner-director raised concerns about the dominance of brokers in the operations of the KSE: 
“…why should people list their companies in Pakistan when stock exchanges are 
controlled by only 10-15 people? We meet such people too, who keep on saying that 
if you gave us 5-6 million rupees tomorrow your company’s share will be the market 
leader. In Pakistan [the] free market concept is missing.”  
                                                 
25
 Form-31 contains prescribed particulars of beneficial ownership in the company along with particulars of any 
change in the beneficial ownership under section 222 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. 
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The managing director of KSE accepted this perception and argued that it was a big problem in 
the past. However, he mentioned that stock exchanges have initiated many reforms in order to 
rectify these issues and put a number of checks and balances on brokers. He explained: 
“…since stock exchanges demutualised the whole structure has changed, even before 
that it was changing. Today we [KSE] have independent BOD where 6 out of 10 are 
SECP nominated independent directors and [the] managing director of the stock 
exchange is also approved by the SECP. So, now [the] KSE board has only three 
brokers. So in the presence of [an] independent board the kinds of dirty games are 
not allowed. I [as a managing director] have been here for two years, and all the 
investors’ complaints were up to year 2008 when brokers had free hand and custody 
of the shares.” 
He further added: 
“…now we [KSE] have developed a system at the central depository which enables 
us [KSE] to hold cash and shares for investors. So brokers’ job would only be 
brokering. We are just waiting for approval from SECP to implement it.”  
A young company secretary very angrily criticised the role of the stock exchange and said their 
job is only to put fines on companies. He exemplified this and said:  
“…we submitted annual reports to KSE last year before the deadline. However, due 
to courier company negligence, reports arrived late at KSE. KSE fined us for late 
submission. We provided all the evidences, but KSE refused to withdraw fine.”  
The above discussion indicates that the actors at the organisational level perceived that actors at 
the SPE and field levels are more concerned about their own interests. They perceived that 
instead of providing an enabling business environment, they introduced laws and regulations to 
please their donor agencies. They perceived that in doing so they ignored ground realities. The 
lack of confidence in state and regulatory institutions motivates family businesses to abstain 
from the regulator’s role. Family businesses, by employing their political connections and loyal 
supporters, disrupt the power and authority of the regulatory (see section 5.2).  
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7.3 Perception of usefulness of the CG regulations 
The above section highlighted that actors at the organisational level lack confidence in state and 
regulatory institutions. This section discusses how this perception influences the actor’s 
perception about the usefulness of CG codes and consequently its compliance. The findings 
revealed that there was an outcry from the family-controlled listed companies towards the 
introduction of the Codes. In 2007, International Finance Corporate (IFC) in collaboration with 
SECP, ACCA and PICG conducted a survey to evaluate CG practices in Pakistan. This survey 
reported that SECP introduced Code 2002 to protect minority shareholder’s rights, improve 
decision-making, allow company access to equity finance, and have effective risk management 
and transparency. However, the findings of this survey reported that respondents did not perceive 
any benefits of implementing Code 2002. The family businesses perceived compliance with CG 
regulations as merely a regulatory requirement. A CEO of an old family-listed company stated:  
“…CG is important because it is a legal requirement. We have no other option. Till 
the time we remain listed we have to comply.”  
A chairman of a family-listed company extended this argument and said:  
“…for us money and profitability is important. I don’t see any benefit of this code. 
Rather this code diverts our attention from business issues and increased our cost.”  
A family director remarked: 
“…we have many reservations on the relevance, strictness, suitability, and 
applicability of [the] code of CG.” 
Family businesses perceived that Codes are suitable for the businesses environment that is 
prevalent in the West and not suitable for the local context. An owner and CEO of a family 
business stated:  
“…no one can disagree that minority shareholder interests should be protected, but 
the code we borrowed from societies which are generally progressive and developed 
through [an] evolutionary process (not all of a sudden). This evolutionary process is 
missing in Pakistan.” 
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One young business graduate owner-director extended this argument and said: 
“…I am not saying following world recognised ways of doing business is bad, but 
we have to see their applicability in the context of Pakistan…family dynamics are 
more dominant and will outweigh any kind of rules and regulations you bring.”  
SECP conducted a study to assess the extent to which Code 2002 is being pursued by the 
corporate sector in Pakistan. This assessment study presented that: 
“…it is quite understandable as to why family-dominated corporations are opposed 
to any such reforms. Family-dominated corporations are opposed to reforms that 
affect their control over companies’ operations and increase disclosure requirements. 
…Loss of control and increased disclosure requirements reduce the chances of 
private benefit.” 
The above discussion indicates that family businesses, family CEOs, chairmen, directors and 
even CFOs perceived the Codes to be less useful, and more of a legal requirement. This 
perception led to a lack of interest, knowledge, and commitment to comply with Codes in true 
letter and spirit. The SECP assessment study reported that: 
“The Code is being implemented in letter and spirit by multinational companies, 
financial institutions, and big companies. However, small companies are 
implementing the Code in form only whereas substance is missing.”  
Similarly, this study revealed that business families’ lack of confidence in the codes impinges 
upon the aspect of commitment towards compliance. One owner-director showed a lack of 
interest in compliance with the Codes and said: 
“…we have no time to deal with compliance issues of CG code[s]. We have hired a 
person, whose job is only to deal with CG issues. He is working under [the] CFO and 
company secretary.”  
A company secretary in a family-listed company who was assigned the compliance job 
explained:  
“…our directors have no idea what this code is and transfer all the responsibilities on 
my shoulder…this code made my life more difficult. Now in addition to my regular 
job, I have to take care of all corporate governance codes related issues….I have to 
do communication with SECP and KSE…and I have to make sure that all the 
paperwork is in accordance with the code requirement.”  
154 
 
The lack of interest, awareness, and transfer of the compliance job to the company secretary or 
someone else resulted in an overall symbolic compliance of the code. Instead of making 
implementation of the code as a routine process, family businesses are complying with the code 
merely on paper. A CEO of a family-listed company admitted: 
“…ideally companies should comply with [the] code with true letter and spirit but it 
is all happening on paper, not in practical way.”  
Policymakers also acknowledged the symbolic compliance of the codes from family-controlled 
listed companies. An official from SECP acknowledged:  
“…[a] majority of the companies are owned by the families and they are not very 
keen to follow the code in the true spirit. They want to meet the requirements for the 
sake of meeting the requirements but they don’t want to take [the] benefit out of 
that.” 
In summary, actors at the organisational level lack confidence in state and regulatory institutions. 
The lack of confidence resulted in Codes becoming less useful and a lack of compliance 
commitments. The next section will discuss corporate governance practices and processes in 
family-controlled listed companies.  
7.4 State of CG practices and processes –symbolic compliance and decoupling 
This section provides a detailed account of intended and actual corporate governance practices 
and processes in family-controlled listed companies in Pakistan under five headings, as follows: 
board of directors, board committees, annual general meeting, dividend, and financial reporting.   
7.4.1 Board of directors  
The codes of CG (2002, 2012) define the criteria for board composition, the responsibilities, 
powers and functions of the BOD, board meetings, and skills and knowledge of directors. This 
section discusses the criteria set by the Codes and the routine practices of the BOD in family-
controlled listed companies in Pakistan. 
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7.4.1.1 Board composition –family dominance 
According to the Codes, all listed companies should encourage a balanced Board of Directors 
(BOD). According to section 35 (i) of Code 2012: 
“The board of directors is encouraged to have a balance of executive and non-
executive directors, including independent directors (hereafter ID) and those 
representing minority interests with the requisite skills, competence, knowledge and 
experience so that the board as a group includes core competencies and diversity, 
including gender, considered relevant in the context of the company’s operations.” 
All listed companies shall have at least one and preferably one third of the total numbers of the 
board as IDs.
26
 The requirement of having IDs was voluntary in the Code 2002, but it is 
mandatory in Code 2012. The proposed composition of a seven member’s board by the Code 




Due to the concentration of ownership in most of the listed companies in Pakistan (see section 
5.2.2), boards are dominated by founding families and their close relatives. SECP believed that 
families enjoy and exercise discretion over the use and allocation of investor’s capital.  
“This discretionary power is often exercised to obtain private benefits and engage in 
rent-seeking activities which can take various forms such as political lobbying 
investment, posh cars and offices, provision of expensive personal housing, and 
lavish personal accounts.” (SECP, 2003, p 23). 
In order to protect external investors from family discretion, SECP wants to revitalise the role of 
the BOD in the corporate sector of Pakistan. One of the ways to protect minority shareholders’ 
interests is to strengthen the role of the BOD through inclusion of IDs representing the minority 
shareholders. The chairman of PICG highlighted the importance of IDs on the board. He stated: 
                                                 
26
 Section 35 (i) (b) provides a detailed explanation of who is eligible for becoming an independent director. For 
example one cannot become an independent director if: he is an employee of the company, CEO of subsidiaries or 
associated companies, if the director is a close relative such as a spouse(s), lineal ascendants and descendants and 
siblings, or has already served on the board for more than three consecutive terms.  
27
 Executive directors are the full-time working directors (paid director) of the company. Non-executive directors on 
the other hand are those who are not from among the executive/management team and do not undertake or devote 
their whole working time to the company. The purpose of non-executive directors is to have outside viewpoints in 
the BOD.  
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“…this mechanism [was] created to provide spaces for those voices which are 
against the majority decision. There is no doubt that [for] every decision that comes, 
the majority shareholders want to take that decision in their favour. However, [the] 
BOD being a collective body, there could be someone who says I don’t agree. There 
could be somebody who says I have a different point of view. Thus, you could have 
dissent words that would have been overlooked.”  
However, SECP attempts to give voice to the minority shareholders through ID that are not only 
resisted by all actors at the organisational level but also by stock exchanges. The interview data 
revealed that there is a unanimous conception at the organisational level that proposed that board 
composition is impractical and non-operable in the context of Pakistan. A company secretary of 
one of the stock exchanges criticised the role of SECP and said: 
“…in Pakistan families have …dominated the BOD, who not only hav[e] stakes in 
the company but [are] also very sincere with it, and this system was working very 
fine. However, out of [the] blue SECP realised we need IDs to represent minority 
shareholders, and introduced this clause in the CG Codes without analysing the 
ground situation and ignored very basic questions. For example, how [will] ID be 
elected in these companies? Is it possible to elect ID with [a] one share one vote 
mechanism?” 
A former SECP chairman opined: 
“…though well-intentioned, the regulation has not been activated, because you have 
[to] first to determine how organised the minority shareholders are.” 
Family businesses are failing to recognise the importance and the role independent directors can 
play in their organisation. To counter the argument that independent directors will bring fresh and 
independent opinions about the company’s affairs, an elder owner-CEO of a company said:  
“…there are many types of consultants available in the market, e.g. corporate, 
financial, technical, and electronic, etc. [so] when [the] company need[s] help they 
can hire [a] consultant. So why [do] we need [an] independent director?” 
A family director questioned the practicality of the board and explained: 
“…in Pakistan, families are holding approximately 80-90% [of the] shares. The Code 
2012 is forcing these companies to have one ID and four non-executive directors in 
the board out of seven. It means 70% [of the] directors are outsiders and are not 
involved in day-to-day business affairs, [so] then how [will] this outsider dominated 
board work effectively? In our case it is incongruent. We are holding 95%, and you 
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are asking us to work for 5%...the domination of outsiders will make [the] board 
useless and dysfunctional.”  
A founder CEO of a family-listed company also opposed the board composition and argued: 
“…we have 92% shares in the company and this code is demanding to have 70% 
outsiders in the board to represent [the] remaining 8%. This code is questioning our 
loyalty and interest with our business. I want to ask [the] regulator is it possible to 
run a company in the interest of 8% over the interest of 92%. This is our business 




 are resisting this code due to restrictions on the number of executive 
directors in the board. One executive director of a family-listed company raised the impact of the 
board composition on family succession planning. He stated: 
“…in our company, [the] family holds 80% [of the] shares. Our CEO (the head of the 
family) has two sons, and they both studied abroad and [are] well-qualified. The 
maximum limit of two executive directors created succession planning issues, 
because as per Codes only two out of three [one father and two sons] can sit in [the] 
board…which will result in fights amongst [the] family in the future [in order] to be 
a director of the company due to its symbolic role.” 
Interviews revealed that experiences and long-serving non-family managers were very furious 
about the board composition. One long-serving non-family manager in the family-controlled 
listed company criticised the board composition and said: 
“…this code closed the door for non-family employees to become directors of the 
company. Previously, families used to appoint long-serving employees as directors in 
an appreciation to his services. In Pakistan, large families are very common. In the 
current situation when families themselves are struggling to accommodate their kin, 
how we will get a chance?” 
The dissent with the criteria of board composition from all the actors at the organisational level 
impinges the actual practices in family-controlled listed companies and results in symbolic 
compliance. The controlling families are holding the majority of the board positions in family-
controlled listed companies. In cases where the controlling family does not have enough family 
members, they appoint proxy directors. For example, the field study revealed that two members 
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 A large family means that father has more than two brothers and sisters.  
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of the family (father and son) are controlling two listed companies. The father and son are 
holding the chairman and CEO positions in one company, respectively. This order is reversed in 
the second company. A company secretary explained the symbolic compliance with the Codes: 
“…there is only symbolic compliance with the code for documentation only. For 
example, our company somehow appointed an ID but [to] only mention this in [the] 
annual report.”  
SECP, in their assessment study, reported that families retain their control on listed companies 
through cross shareholding and inter-locking directorships and most of the boards in the family-
controlled listed companies are passive.
29
 A newspaper reported that controlling families 
appointed their cook as a director: 
“…[he] has packed the board of directors with personal employees, including some 
people who do not have the educational or technical qualifications or experience to 
be able to execute their fiduciary responsibilities to the company’s other 
shareholders… As the largest shareholder, [he] does have the right to pick the largest 
number of board members, but he seems to have gone out of his way to pick people 
who would not ask too many questions on behalf of the minority shareholders… For 
instance, a man listed on the board of directors for [the] financial year 2010 appears 
to have only a primary school education and serves as a waiter in [his] residence.” 
(Tribune, 2012). 
A long-serving CFO in a family-controlled listed company explained that: 
“…practically speaking, family-controlled listed companies are private firms, as 
owners and shareholders are the same. In our case public means close relatives of the 
owners. In the law there are some restrictions for close family such as spouse[s] but 
not for relatives. That’s why close relatives own those shares that are entitled to [the] 
public…our company board [is] comprised of these close family members and 
relatives.”  
The World Bank country assessment report of corporate governance also acknowledged the 
dominance of families on company boards: 
“…the Code 2002 strengthens the role of non-executive directors…however, given 
the dominant ownership structure: this does not prevent controlling families from 
having disproportionate representation on the board. In order to make the board more 
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 A board whose members have low understanding of the company’s operations and issues and are precluded from 
influencing the company’s important strategic and policy decisions is called a passive board. 
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professional and accountable to all shareholders, it is necessary for outsiders to play 
a more prominent role on the boards of listed companies.” (World Bank, 2005). 
The shareholders at AGM elect directors (The Ordinance, 1984). The selection of IDs through an 
electoral process in family businesses seems impossible. If they are selected through the consent 
of dominating powerful family owners, there could be a conflict of interest. The head of the 
family and CEO of a family-controlled listed company firmly said:  
“…who will select [the] ID? [The] CG code says shareholders? We are [the] majority 
shareholders, we will not elect, so from where will the ID come? It is impossible to 
have [the] ID in [a] family business and create some space for their effective role.” 
One company secretary exemplified this and said: 
 “…in round table meetings held by SECP, I asked questions to the SECP 
representatives that, how will the ID will be elected in family-controlled listed 
companies when Mian Sb. said “NO” to him? They have no answer for this.” 
For example, family businesses have argued that they could not comply with the code, by citing 
implementation difficulties. The annual report of a family business mentioned that they could not 
appoint an ID because none of the existing directors possessed the criteria for appointment as 
neither the independent director nor any minority shareholders applied for the position: 
“…In the previous election of Directors none of the Directors possessed the criteria 
for appointment as independent Director. Further, no minority shareholder came 
forward to contest the election; hence the shareholders of the company were unable 
to elect an independent director. However, the Management of the Company is fully 
committed and planning to appoint an independent Director in the next Board's 
election.” 
The non-availability of [an] independent director in Pakistan as per the criteria defined by the 
code exacerbates the electoral process of [the] independent director. Most of the family-
controlled listed companies are small- or medium-sized corporations. These companies are 
facing problems in identifying and electing the right person for the post of ID. One founding 
owner-CEO of a family-listed company remarked: 
“…although we can’t see any benefit of [an] ID. Even then if [we] want to comply, 
due to poor corporate culture and weak implementation of law, no one is ready to 
take [the] responsibility of [the] ID in these small- and medium-sized family-
160 
 
controlled listed companies. People are afraid of what will happen in case anything 
goes wrong. Will [the] NAB
30
 or police arrest them?”   
One company secretary highlighted the problems companies are facing in attracting an ID: 
“…the idea of [an] independent director is impractical in Pakistan, especially in 
family-listed companies. How it is possible that an experienced person will be ready 
to accept the director post in these small- and medium-sized companies when there 
are no financial incentives. In addition to this, he knows that he cannot go against or 
change the decisions made by dominate families.” 
One interviewee also indorsed this point and said:  
“…for small companies qualified and experienced professionals are not ready to give 
their time without any benefits.”  
On the other hand, SECP considered that it is the responsibility of listed companies to comply 
with Code 2012 by hook or by crook. When asked about such difficulties, one of the officials 
replied:  
“…as per the current provisions of the law, an independent director can be brought 
on the board through the normal election process or through filling a casual vacancy 
created on the board. It is the responsibility of a listed company to ensure compliance 
with the provisions of the Code.” 
Another official from SECP acknowledged compliance difficulties with board 
composition: 
“…at this moment we are working on improving criteria. In Code 2012, we are able 
to bring best international practices of CG to Pakistan. We know there are 
compliance difficulties due to procedural issues. Currently, the Company Ordinance 
1984 defines the implementation procedure and it is very old. In [the] next step we 
will work on procedural issues to implement this CG code.”  
The regulator linked non-availability of independent directors to poor remuneration packages in 
Pakistan’s corporate sector. In family businesses, most of the directors are executive directors 
and received their compensation through other means, e.g. salary, home allowance, utility 
expenses. etc. Traditionally directors in family-controlled listed companies were getting token 
remuneration. The PICG conducted a survey on compensation policies of directors in relation to 
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 National Accountability Bureau 
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CG in 2008 and indicated that compensation of directors in Pakistan was considerably low. The 
newspaper article reports: 
 “…a majority of companies do not pay their chairperson a higher amount for 
attending board meetings and director liability insurance cover is provided by only a 
few of [the] responding companies,” the PICG report stated. It concluded that none 
of the companies “provide stock options to their non-executive directors.” (Dawn, 
2009). 
The above discussion on criteria and practices highlights the resistance from dominant business 
families towards the board composition and their selection process.  
Code 2002 allowed one person to keep both the chairman of the board and Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) post simultaneously, however Code 2012 eliminated this option. Code 2012 
required that the chairman and CEO shall not be same person:  
“…the chairman and CEO, by whatever name called, shall not be the same person 
except where provided for under any other law. The chairman shall be elected from 
among the non-executive…the chairman shall be responsible for leadership of the 
board and shall ensure that the board plays an effective role…[the] board of director 
shall clearly define the role of chairman and CEO.” (Code 2012, section (vi)). 
An official from SECP advocated a dual leadership structure and explained: 
“…if [the] roles of [the] CEO and chairman are combined into one, it could result in 
agency problems. Unitary leadership may affect monitoring and disciplining of the 
management.”  
Another interviewee from SECP commented: 
“…the dual leadership structure would dilute the family power, which is already very 
concentrated. Keeping the two positions separate would safeguard the interests of 
minority shareholders better.” 
However, the idea of a dual leadership structure received many criticisms from family businesses 
where the head of the family, ‘Abba G’,
31
 makes all of the strategic decisions. Family businesses 
are of the view that dual leadership structure might hamper an effective communication flow 
                                                 
31
 Local linguistic term used as a synonym for ‘father’.  
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between management and the board and thus result in poor and delayed decision-making. One 
family CEO criticised: 
“…I, as the CEO, hold key information about the business and as chairman of the 
board, I will be in a better position to utilise this information. This separation of the 
two positions would result in conflict and finger-pointing.”  
In complying with these regulations, families shared these two positions amongst them. The head 
of the family become chairman and appointed his son as a CEO or vice versa. One director 
stated: 
“… [the] regulator wants these two positions separate. Now in our company my 
father is serving as a chairman and I am a CEO of the company. The code required 
that the chairman and CEO should not be [the] same person, not restricted to be 
relatives.”  
7.4.1.2 Responsibilities, powers, and functions of BOD –loyalty to family 
The Codes
32
 define the responsibilities, power, and functions of the board of directors. The codes 
require that the director-listed company shall exercise its power and carry out fiduciary duties 
with objective judgment in the best interest of the company. The board of directors shall ensure 
that professional standards and corporate values are met, that there is an adequate system of 
controls in place, that the vision/mission statement and overall corporate strategy is prepared and 
adopted, that the system of sound internal control is established, and that decisions on the 
significant material transactions are documented. The board is also responsible for the 
appointment, remuneration and terms and conditions of employment of the CEO.  
However, the board in family-controlled listed companies has failed to exercise its fiduciary 
duties as prescribed in the code due to family dominance. Controlling families appoint directors 
solely to comply with the code. All the powers and decision-making are still in the hands of few 
family members. An executive director of a family-listed company disclosed: 
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“…I don’t know what corporate governance is. What I know is one day Mian Sb. 
(the owner) came to my office and informed me that we have appointed you as a 
director and congratulated me. However, this is on paper only. Sometimes, [the] 
company sectary brings [the] board attendance and minutes register for [my] 
signature, which I blindly sign.” 
One company secretary revealed: 
“…these families don’t want someone to interfere in their business. Most of the 
business decisions are made by families on their own and got approval from puppet 
board comprises of their friends and families.”  
A young company secretary acknowledged the powerful role of family directors in the business 
affairs and said: 
“…if Mian Sahib orders something then workers have to find out the way through 
thick and thin. The board role is very symbolic due to Mian Sahib’s involvement.”  
He further exemplified and said:  
“…company ordinance and this code clearly defined the role of a company secretary; 
however, I am not independent as I am [an] employee in [the] family business and 
[am] doing what they ask me to do.”  
The CFO of one of the companies stated: 
“…the role of these external directors is only to attend stipulated board meetings as 
per requirement of the code.” 
Another company secretary revealed that:  
“…in our company out of seven, only one board member is from a family. However, 
still all the decisions are made by that one person; others directors are just 
performing their friendly or symbolic jobs.”  
7.4.1.3 Board meetings – informal  
The Codes
33
 require that the BODs of a listed company shall meet at least once every quarter of 
the financial year. All listed companies must hold board meetings at least four times a year and 
once every quarter. Written notices including the agenda and dates shall be circulated at least 
seven days prior the meeting and the chairman shall ensure that minutes are appropriately 
recorded. The significant issues including the annual business plan, cash flow projection, 
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forecasts, strategic plan, budget, company operating reports, audit reports, related party 
transaction, etc. should be included for the information, consideration, and decision of the BODs. 
The interview data uncovered that board meetings are just a formality in family-controlled listed 
companies. As depicted by respondents, the average time of board meetings is between 30 
minutes to one hour. One director stated that: 
“…as a director my job is to attend [a] 30 minute's board meeting, enjoy a cup of tea 
and sign already-approved agendas, which everyone normally signs even without 
looking at it.”  
One family director revealed that: 
“…you will find in our annual reports that [the] company board met four times in 
[the] last year and the attendance record of all the directors. However, this disclosure 
is for compliance purposes only. All the seven directors are sitting next to each other 
under one roof. “Abba G” approves all the strategic decisions. The duty of a 
company secretary is to manage all the paperwork for compliance purposes.” 
Another CFO of a family-controlled listed company also disclosed:  
“…practically, we never had formal board meetings. Currently, our company BODs 
consist of all family members and mostly meetings are held in [the] chairman’s 
[father] office to discuss routine matters. [The] company secretary’s job is to prepare 
and maintain [the] board meetings record for SECP and for compliance purposes.” 
During the fieldwork, the researcher managed to view a fabricated board attendance and minutes 
register prepared by the company secretary. This company secretary secretly stated that:  
“…I normally received phone calls or sometimes they called me into the office and 
dictated to me about [the] meeting agenda and minutes. Then they asked me to have 
a signature from all the directors. As our board of directors comprises of family 
spouses, that’s why sometimes I need to go to their home for their signature.”  
A company secretary who had twenty years of experience in different family-listed and private 
companies explained the mind-set of these families and said: 
“…it is a mind-set of families not to disclose business information even in the board 
meetings. The board meetings are only due to compliance reasons. They are of a 
view that we know what is right and what is wrong for us, we don’t need to get [a] 
lesson from SECP about how to run a business efficiently and effectively.” 
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A young business graduate owner director disclosed: 
“…on average, board meetings last for thirty minutes. We normally make decisions 
before the board meetings, these meetings are only for complying with the code.” 
7.4.1.4 Directors’ training program - resistance 
 The Code 2012 required all listed companies to arrange orientation courses for their directors to 
acquaint them with the CG codes, relevant laws, their duties, and responsibilities to enable them 
to perform their role effectively on the behalf of the shareholders. The code requires that until 30 
June 2016, every year a minimum of one director on the board shall acquire certification under 
DTP and thereafter all directors shall obtain it.  
As discussed above, listed companies in Pakistan are struggling to find the right person for the 
post of director, especially independent directors. To overcome this gap, IFC, in partnership with 
PICG, launched a board development series in 2007 to provide directors training on CG issues. 
In the beginning, only PICG was providing DTP in Pakistan. The chairman of PICG highlighted 
the limited capacity his institute has in providing a director training program: 
“…there are 600 listed companies, there are banks also, so let us say in total we have 
700 companies on which [the] CG code is applicable. If the average size of a board is 
7, it means approximately 5,000 directors need DTP. If we eliminate people who are 
on multiple boards and experienced directors, we still need to train more than 4,000 
directors. Currently for PICG it is not possible to train more than 100-125 directors 
each year. Up till now we are able to train 400 directors, still a huge number is left.” 
Keeping in view the big number, SECP allowed other institutions to offer DTP after seeking 
prior approval from the SECP. SECP sets the parameters for the institutions that want to offer 
DTP. The minimum criteria and program outline is provided in the Code 2012. Currently, three 
institutions are offering DTP, excluding PICG.  
Family businesses heavily rely on in-house training from senior family members (Zaidi and 
Aslam, 2006). However, the Code 2012 provides exemptions to the individuals having a 
minimum of 14 years of education and 15 years of experience on the board of the listed 
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company. Still, family businesses have considered DTP a useless activity. A family CEO who 
established a family-listed company a half-century ago angrily said: 
“…now these young people will tell me how to run a business in Pakistan. My 
business experience is more than their age. We don’t need to learn from SECP what 
is right and what is wrong.” 
Business families considered the DTP program as SECP’s effort to underrate their knowledge 
and experience of running a business. One long-serving family director said:  
“…SECP wants to create [a] business environment in which young business 
graduates can be accommodated. However, these young business graduates are 
having far less business sense and knowledge than so-called illiterate family people 
have.” 
Another chairman argued:  
…the code encouraged businesses to have professionals (business graduates), which 
is fine, however, this law actually underrates family directors’ business sense and 
their knowledge. What I think is that they have better sense and knowledge of 
business than any professional and business graduates either from local [or] foreign 
business schools.” 
In summary, the findings revealed that there is substantial difference between intended and 
actual corporate governance practices in family-controlled listed companies. The findings depict 
that dominant families controlled and managed listed companies in Pakistan. Owning large 
shareholdings and positions in the board of directors, these public listed companies are operating 
as privately held family companies. Family listed companies’ boards are protecting family 
interests more than the external minority shareholders. The empirical evidence showed that 
family listed companies are symbolically compliant with the criteria of the board of directors 
prescribed in the Codes and decoupled actual practices from intended practices. The controlling 
families constitute boards only to symbolically comply with the code and the BODs are toothless 
in these family-controlled listed companies.  
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7.4.2 Board Committees – informal and serving the family interests 
The Codes required BODs of all listed companies to establish committees to help them in 
performing their fiduciary responsibilities. This section discusses the intended and actual 
practices and processes of board committees in family-controlled listed companies.  
7.4.2.1 Audit committee – internal audit – external audit 
The Code 2002 required the BODs of all listed companies to voluntarily establish the audit 
committee comprising of not less than three members, including a chairman. The Code 2002
34
 
recommended that audit committees should preferably comprise of non-executive directors. The 
Code 2012 made it mandatory for BODs of all listed companies to establish an audit committee 
and Human Resource & Remuneration committee (HR&R). At the time of introduction, Code 
2012
35
 made it mandatory that the internal audit committee should be chaired by an independent 
director who should not be the chairman of the board. However, in January 2014, a mandatory 
requirement of the independent director as the chairman of an audit committee has been made 
voluntary to facilitate companies to appoint non-executive directors as chairmen of audit 
committees (SECP, 2014) (see section 6.2.2).  BOD ensures that at least one member has 
relevant financial expertise and skills. The audit committee shall meet at least every quarter prior 
to the approval of interim results of the company. The main responsibilities of the internal audit 
committee are to recommend external auditors, inspect financial matters and business operations, 
comply with laws, and develop policies to improve internal control and risk management. BOD 
will appoint external auditors as suggested by the internal audit committee. The head of the 
internal audit shall functionally report to the audit committee and administratively to the CEO. 
All listed companies shall ensure that the internal audit report is provided for the review. The 
main purpose of such an internal control mechanism is to make sure that the business is running 
in an efficient and effective way. As one external auditor said: 
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“…the quality of internal control [audit committee] and processes facilitate 
compliance with regulations and ensure that the business is running in an efficient 
and effective way.”  
The findings revealed that the Codes prescribed for the audit committee, its composition, 
functions, and responsibilities have received great resistance from controlling families. 
Controlling families perceive the internal audit function as unwanted and as a bottleneck in 
running the business efficiently. These family-controlled listed companies are evaluating this 
code as an effort to take control from their hands to external parties. An owner-director angrily 
remarked:  
“…the code wants us to hand over our business to the people who know nothing 
about business, who are not participating in the day-to-day affairs of the business – 
how can these non-participative actors suggest or develop better internal control 
systems?”  
One CFO of a company said:  
“…internal audit, external audit, audit committee – how many audits do we need and 
why do we need them? Is [an] external audit not supposed to audit everything?” (IFC 
et al., 2007, p 76). 
Another owner-director opined:  
“…this code increased our workload. Now we have to do audit meetings, internal 
audit, and external audit – what does the regulator wants from us? If [the] company 
is doing their job honestly, then one external audit is sufficient.”  
The findings revealed that the controlling families perception about the internal audit committee 
to be less useful resulted in symbolic compliance and decoupling. The board’s committees are a 
subset of BOD, so the audit committees are also dominated by controlling families similar to the 
board of directors (see section 7.4.1.1). The interviews data revealed that similar to the BOD, 
internal audit committees are also comprised of close family members and relatives. One 
company secretary revealed that: 
“… when BOD is dominated by family members, how is it possible that internal 
audit committees will consist of non-family or independent members…for example, 
our BOD is dominated by [a] controlling family so [is] our audit committee.”  
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Thus, controlling families perceived audit committees and internal audit functions less 
productive and as a burden on family businesses.  
In addition to the internal audit, every listed company shall appoint an external auditor who has 
been given a satisfactory rating under the QCR program of ICAP. The BOD will appoint an 
external auditor on the recommendation of the internal audit committee. The Companies 
Ordinance 1984 (Section 255) defined the powers and duties of auditors. Auditors are required to 
give their opinion as to whether the company accounts are providing a true and fair view of the 
company affairs and its operating performance of the financial year. The Codes require that all 
listed companies shall change their external auditors every five years. The IFC survey revealed 
that the rotation of auditors after every five years is very unpopular amongst the companies due 
to the unavailability of high quality auditors. A CFO of a listed company stated: 
“…initially we had only [an] external auditor. Now this code requires having [an] 
internal audit, external audit, and auditing committees. What changes can these 
control bring in?...The code demands us to change auditor after every five years and 
that auditor should have [a] QCR rating. It is difficult to find [an] auditor in Pakistan. 
We had a good relationship with our old serving external auditor. They knew our 
business. It will take time for [a] new auditor to understand our business… The 
biggest problem is SECP that is obsessed with the West and wants to bring 
everything here in Pakistan, where ground realities are totally different.” 
The independence of auditors is very important in ensuring transparency. However, the state of 
the auditing profession in Pakistan is dismal and lacking in independence (see section 5.3.2). 
Litigation against the auditors is a very important mechanism in the West to stop any collusion 
of auditors and management. After the formation of SECP, according to the SECP annual report, 
the enforcement and monitoring team identified many cases of negligence from auditors. 
However, one owner-director stated  
“…in family-owned and -controlled listed companies, who will blow a whistle? No 
one!  As every function, every committee, and every person in the company is 
controlled by the families.”  
170 
 
On the other hand a very senior auditor explained the weak status of the accounting profession in 
Pakistan and said:  
“…[the] law puts huge responsibilities on the shoulder of auditors, but [we] never 
thought about how much we are getting against this. So, we are doing what we are 
getting.” 
On the other hand, interview data revealed that actors at the organisational level argued that the 
Code increased a company’s audit fee substantially. Now companies have to pay external 
auditors for the review of half-yearly accounts. One interviewee said: 
“…we don’t see any benefit of codes; however, what is very clear is its 
implementation cost. For example, now we have to prepare and publish quarterly, 
half-yearly company reports and we have to pay extra cost to external auditors for 
reviewing half-yearly accounts.”   
7.4.2.2 Human Resource and Remuneration Committee (HR&R) 
Another committee the Code 2012 requires the board to establish is the human resource and 
remuneration committee. The committee should be comprised of at least three members, the 
majority of whom should be non-executive directors. Independent directors and the CEO can be 
included in the committee. The committee shall be responsible for recommending HR policies: 
recommending selection, evaluation, compensation and succession planning of CEO, CFO, CS 
and head of internal audit committee. The HR&R committee was not required in the Code 2002.   
Similar to the audit committee, the HR&R committee is also a subset of BODs. The interview 
data revealed that similar to the audit committee, family listed companies are symbolically 
complying with the requirement and the HR&R committee is dominated by controlling families. 
Interview data reveled that in most of the family-controlled listed companies ‘Abba G’ decides 
the remuneration of directors and managers. A young director of a family listed company said: 
“… [my] father is [the] final authority in our company. Our company has its own 
reward and payment system. ‘Abba G’, after evaluating [the] performance of each 
director and manager, ultimately decides who will get [a] reward, who will get [an] 
increment, [and] how much increment, etc.” 
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Interview data revealed that most of the directors, CEO, CFO and chairman were not aware of 
any requirement of having an HR&H committee on the board. When inquired about the 
committee, one CFO firmly said “there is no such requirement”. He was surprised when the new 
code of CG (2012) and its requirements were presented to the CFO. The only person who was 
aware of this committee was the company secretary. One company secretary said: 
“…our company directors, CEO, [and] chairman don’t know much about the Codes’ 
requirement. They have allocated this task to me to maintain paperwork. I [company 
secretary] formed an HR&R committee within the guideline of Code 2012 and got 
approval of our CEO [family head].” 
He [company secretary] smiled and said that: 
“…if you go to our CEO now and enquire about the HR&R committee, he will not 
be able to tell you anything.”  
The business families’ lack of interest resulted in symbolic compliance and decoupled CG 
practices in family-controlled listed companies. 
7.4.3 AGM – zero output 
According to the Company Ordinance 1984,
36
 all companies shall hold AGM within eighteen 
months from the date of its incorporation and thereafter at least once every calendar year. The 
AGM notice should be mailed to shareholders at least three weeks before the meeting date and 
must be published in one Urdu and one English newspaper. The meeting notice must include the 
date, time, location, and agenda of the meeting.
37
 The decisions related to approval of accounts, 
declaration of dividends, elections of directors, and appointments of auditors are commonly part 
of the AGM agenda. In case any special business is on the agenda, then a “statement setting out 
all material facts” related to special business must be attached to the meeting notice. The quorum 
for a General Meeting is a minimum of 25% of total votes, and at least 10 voting shareholders. If 
companies fail to hold an AGM, then the company and every officer who is part of the failure 
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will be liable to pay a fine not less than Rs. 50 thousand. Another penalty is delisting a company 
from the stock exchange if it does not hold an AGM for two or more years.  
According to SECP annual reports, the numbers of companies holding AGMs on time are quite 
high. A survey on CG practices conducted by IFC in 2007 observed that companies are 
complying with the ordinance in respect to the AGM. Keeping in view the importance of AGM 
and efforts to protect minority shareholders’ rights, SECP is paying special attention to ensure 
that AGMs are held in the required manner. In the financial year 2012-13, SECP issued a 
direction to 22 companies to hold their overdue AGM and penalties were imposed on 5 listed 
companies who failed to hold an AGM within the prescribed time period. The numbers showed 
that less than 4% of companies failed to hold an AGM within the prescribed time period. 
Table 7-1: Non-Compliance with Timely Holding of the AGM (Source: SECP annual reports (2008-2014) 
Years 
Number of listed 
companies 
Companies failed to 
hold AGM 
% that failed to 
hold AGM 
13-14 558 19 3% 
12-13 569 14 2% 
11-12 591 1 0% 
10-11 639 16 3% 
09-10 652 17 3% 
08-09 651 24 4% 
 
The AGM provides a once in a year opportunity for shareholders to interact with the company 
management and board to ask about business affairs and the figures presented in the financial 
statement. However, the fieldwork indicates that the AGMs in family-controlled listed 
companies failed to achieve set objectives due to a lack of shareholder interest. There is a 
unanimous consensus amongst all the respondents that the outcome of AGM is zero in Pakistan. 
One senior and experienced company secretary disappointedly remarked: 
 “…I am very unhappy with the way AGM is conducted in this country. This is an 
area of corporate governance where no growth has taken place.”  
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One CFO of a family listed company said that:  
“…shareholders never showed any interest in business affairs. They are just there to 
enjoy a fine dining experience and blindly agreed to whatever [was] presented to 
them. The shareholders devalue themselves: they are more interested in the food 
being offered instead of showing concern towards the company management. One of 
the biggest dilemmas in Pakistan is that a shareholder buys one share for a whole 
year for merely availing dining facilities at various clubs/hotels with their entire 
family.” 
One owner-manager linked shareholders’ lack of interest with SECP intentions to increase 
representation of minority shareholders in BODs. He very angrily rejected the idea of 
shareholder representation in the board and said: 
 “…you have to see how they behave in the AGM: all they want is a gift. I always 
wondered [do] such small gifts and one dinner in the whole year provide enough 
reasons to buy a share of this company?”  
One newspaper reports that:  
“…AGMs are usually drowned in the cries of ‘gift’ by the small shareholders…gift 
culture has witnessed [a] dramatic fall in recent times…but at some companies old 
habits refused to die and even as the Secretary announces the first item on the 
agenda, small shareholders begin clamouring for a ‘gift’ for every one 
present…many men split their meagre shareholdings of [a] few hundred shares in 
such companies among themselves, wife and children…so each member of the 
family then becomes ‘eligible’ for the gift.” (Dawan, 2002). 
The family listed companies have no problem in conducting AGM on a regular basis. This is 
because they are holding a majority of the shares and know that they are insulated from minority 
shareholders’ activism. One very senior owner-CEO stated that: 
“…for us holding AGM is not an issue. We conduct AGM every year, but hardly any 
shareholder attends these meetings. I think they saw no benefits as we are holding [a] 
majority of the shares, and they can’t change our decisions. Disorganised and 
demotivated, [the] minority shareholders’ situation is very favorable to us: no one 
questioned anything, and we are ok with the compliance as well.”  
The Companies Ordinance, 1984 permits companies to hold AGMs at the registered offices, if 
they wish. Family-controlled listed companies have their company offices close to the plant 
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which is located in a remote area. Thus, sometimes it is not feasible for small shareholders living 
in big cities to travel long distances just for attending AGM. An analyst in the newspaper argued: 
 “…most of the family-controlled listed companies’ registered offices are located in 
remote areas where the factory is situated. Mostly small shareholders are from big 
cities, and it is not always feasible to travel to the meeting place.”  
Shareholders elect or remove board members for a three-year term in the AGM. Anyone can 
nominate himself for the post of director. No shareholder with the voting right can be prevented 
from casting a vote.
38
 The shareholders can cast their vote through cumulative voting or through 
proportional representation.
39
 Due to this cumulative voting or proportional representation 
scheme, it is very difficult to elect a director against the will of families holding majority shares. 
A former SECP chairman commented: 
“…the selection of a candidate through cumulative voting by stockholders with less 
than 8 percent interest each was a difficult task.” 
The most common practice to cast votes is by show of hands. IFC survey reported that 67% of 
the respondents said that voting at AGM took place by means of “show of hands”. The law does 
not support voting by post or electronically. The current laws and regulations provide immense 
power to majority shareholders to take board control by electing their favourite candidates. In a 
statement of compliance with the code, a family-controlled listed company explained that no 
independent shareholder applied for the director post, thus they were unable to hire an 
independent director: 
“…In the previous election of directors none of the directors possess criteria [for an] 
independent director. Further, no independent shareholder came forward to contest 
the election as a director: hence the shareholders of the company were unable to elect 
[an] independent director. However, [the] management of the company is fully 
committed and planning to appoint an independent director in the next board's 
election.” 
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In summary, many factors including concentration of ownership, lack of shareholder interest, 
and location of the company’s registered offices in remote areas hampered purpose of AGMs in 
family-controlled listed companies. Most of the family-controlled listed companies are 
complying with the requirement regarding AGM because they perceived themselves to be 
insulated from shareholder activism.  
7.4.4 Dividend - resistance 
It is very surprising that the Codes did not pay much attention to dividends. Under the company 
ordinance 1984 section (248), a listed company has no implied requirement to declare dividends 
even if it has earned profit. Dividends can be declared only in AGM when a company has 
divisible profits, and its financial position is such as to permit it to declare such dividends. 
Dividends must be paid within 45 days of the declaration.
40
 The board of directors has the power 
to recommend dividends in AGM.  
Fieldwork indicates that there is a variable and unstable trend of dividend payments in Pakistan 
(Naeem and Nasr, 2007).  Research by Roomi et al. (2011) showed that all sectors are reluctant 
to pay dividends and the dividend rate offered by most of the sector ranges from 1.5% to 5%. 
Mehar (2005) found that listed companies in Pakistan are reluctant to pay dividends. Batool and 
Javid (2014) argued that because dividend payout is voluntary, this is why few companies are 
declaring dividends. Interview data indicates that family-controlled listed companies are not 
keen on declaring dividends. These families are already holding key positions in the companies 
and enjoying company funds for personal benefit. A very senior CFO informed that:  
“…being a director they have multiple advantages. For example, they control the 
company: enjoy [a] social status in the society, ROI in the form of executive 
compensation, and huge salaries. In addition, these directors enjoy other fringe 
benefits including [a] company maintained car and house, travelling expenses, utility 
bills, family medical expenses, club memberships, etc. In such a way, these families 
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are already receiving huge ROI. Thus, there is no benefit for these controlling 
families to declare the dividends and ultimately minority shareholders suffer.”  
A shareholder said:  
“…why I should invest in [the] capital market, when there is no trend of declaring 
dividends? I can earn guaranteed profit from banks or through investment in real 
estate.”  
Several measures have been taken by government and regulators to push companies to declare a 
dividend. According to the listing regulations, companies need to declare a dividend at least once 
every five years. The Finance Act, 1999-2000, had made it mandatory for all listed companies 
with free reserves of more than 40% of the paid-up capital to distribute at least 50% of the taxed 
profit in cash dividends to shareholders. SECP proposed a fiscal disincentive of a 3% higher tax 
than the normal for listed companies not distributing a minimum of 30% of its after-tax profit as 
a cash dividend. A very senior academician supported this proposal: 
“…[a] mandatory dividend will provide an alternative investment option to the 
investor and channelised money from investment in [the] bank or real estate to ]the] 
equity market.”  
Table 7-2: Percentage of companies declaring dividend (Source: KSE annual reports (2004-2014) 
Year # of companies Dividend paying companies % 
2013 562 246 43.77% 
2012 573 243 42.41% 
2011 638 248 38.87% 
2010 644 252 39.13% 
2009 651 188 28.88% 
2008 653 231 35.38% 
2007 655 267 40.76% 
2006 651 294 45.16% 
2005 661 300 45.39% 
2004 661 282 42.66% 
 
Regulators faced huge pressure and threats from listed companies and considered this to be 
outside interference in the company’s internal matters. A banker opposed this proposal and said:  
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“…how one can dictate the manner in which companies should run? And this 
coercion to declare dividends is against the free market mechanism.” 
A family-controlled listed company considered it to be an interference of the job of the board of 
directors. They considered it a bottleneck for the company’s growth plans. A director from a 
family-listed company criticised this proposal and angrily said: 
“…NO! This is not right. We have our long-term expansion plans. If you force us to 
pay a huge amount of dividend, this will result in a reduction in investment and will 
create hurdles in executing our plans.” 
Another interviewee explained: 
“…we always had our expansion plan. Instead of accumulating stock it is better to 
use money in [a] productive way.”  
Powerful business families using their network are able to suspend this mandatory dividend 
declaration requirement in the Finance Act 1999-2000. A national newspaper reported that major 
industrial groups in the textile, cement and energy sectors threatened to buy back shares and seek 
delisting. A newspaper report says that: 
“…[the] SECP effort to make dividend declaration mandatory proved very effective 
resulting in payment of additional cash dividends, but then quietly removed, not 
without reason.” (Dawn, 2014).   
For family-controlled companies’ distribution of gifts and luxury lunches or dinners is enough as 
a dividend. A shareholder who attended AGM was very pleased about the food offered by the 
company for a stock worth just Rs. 2, and referred to it as a delicious ‘dividend in specie’.  
The field study revealed that controlling families have been transferring profits of listed 
companies to other family’s private companies. Families used listed companies’ funds in the 
establishment of their private business (Roomi et al., 2011). According to the code of corporate 
governance section 35 (x), it is compulsory for a company to place details of related party 
transactions before the audit committee and before the board for review and approval. The 
approval of related party transactions is not difficult due to family dominant boards. SECP 
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received and investigated more than two hundred complaints of inter-corporate financing in the 
last five financial years. According to the Code 2012, all transactions which are not executed at 
arm’s length price shall be placed in front of the audit committee and board for approval. The 
field study revealed that family-controlled boards are not hesitant to approve related party 
transactions. The director of the family-controlled listed company argued: “…it’s our money, 
and we can use [it] wherever we want to use it.” The CFO of a family listed company who is 
managing both the listed and private business of a family, disclosed: 
 “…It is a lengthy and cumbersome process to negotiate with banks. To avoid banks’ 
high interest rate and condition of personal guarantee, it is always feasible to get a 
loan from other profitable unit.”  
7.4.5 Financial Reporting – a threat to family secrets 
The preparation, presentation and disclosure of financial reporting in Pakistan are mainly 
influenced by the Company Ordinance 1984, and guidelines from IAS/IFRS. The Codes required 
directors of listed companies to annex statements along with the director’s report prepared under 
the Companies Ordinance (Section 236). The statements
41
 annex with the director’s reports 
include: That the financial statements present the fair state of the company’s operations; the 
proper book of the company’s account has been maintained; appropriate accounting policies 
have been consistently applied; IAS/IFRS have been followed in the preparation of financial 
statements; the sound system of internal control has been implemented and monitored; and there 
are no significant doubts upon the continuation of the company. 
All listed companies shall publish a statement of compliance with the Code 2012 along with their 
annual report.
42
 The Code 2012 provides a standard format of statement of compliance (see 
appendix C), that is a fill-in-the-blank document. The statement of compliance should be 
company specific and supported by substantial evidences. The external auditor must review and 
                                                 
41
 Code 2012, Section (xvi) 
42
 Code 2012, section XI 
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certify the statement of compliance. The standard format requires listed companies to fill in: the 
company name; financial year; names of the directors and their designations such as independent 
directors or executive directors; the date of casual frequency that occurred and the number of 
days it took for the vacancy to fill up; the director’s training detail; and the composition of board 
committees.  
The field study indicates that a standardised format makes it more like a tick-box 
implementation. SECP (2003) reported that 95% of the respondents issue statements of 
compliance. A survey by (IFC et al., 2007) reported that 89% of the respondents’ companies 
published a statement of compliance. Interview data also revealed that the tick-box nature of 
compliance makes it easy for family listed companies to comply. For example, Code 2012 
requires listed companies to disclose the information regarding the number of board and 
committee meetings held during the year and attendance by each director. One family director 
revealed that: 
“…you will find in our annual reports that [the] company board met four times in 
[the] last year and the attendance record of all the directors. However, this disclosure 
is for compliance purposes only. All seven directors are sitting next to each other 
under one roof…This is the duty of [the] company secretary to manage all the 
paperwork for compliance purposes.” 
All listed companies shall prepare and publish unaudited quarterly, and audited half-yearly and 
annual financial statements. The annual statements should be circulated no later than four 
months from the close of the financial year. A senior official from SECP argued: 
“…high quality reporting standards is very important. Not only does it provide 
increased reliability and insight into company performance, in addition, it improves 
investor confidence in [the] overall business environment.” 
On the other hand, controlling families considered it a useless activity. One owner-director said: 
 “…this is a useless practice as no one bothers to read this document. We know that 
in Pakistan small shareholders do not have [the] required knowledge to interpret or 
understand financial data; even institutional representatives do not bother to read it. 
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They always came unprepared in the board meetings. Regulators neither have [the] 
capacity nor have time to read companies’ annual reports; for them it is a tick-box.”  
The Code 2012 required listed companies to circulate quarterly accounts along with the 
director’s review on the affairs of the company. According to IFC et al. (2007), most of the listed 
companies are generally fulfilling requirements of IAS/IFRS; however, they are complying only 
with mandatory requirements. Family-controlled listed companies are only reporting mandatory 
requirements and are reluctant to provide voluntary information related to their article of 
association, remuneration of board of directors, market share, sales and marketing, environment 
and social responsibility, biography of the members of the board, stock option policies or to 
provide a management discussion and analysis section in their annual report. Interview data 
revealed that families are hesitant to share business information with outsiders. In family 
businesses, disclosing information is seen as exposing business secrets. A family director very 
angrily stated: 
“…this law requires us to disclose very sensitive information to our competitors. 
This law is developed in [the] USA and UK, not for the country like Pakistan. Why 
should I disclose our future business plan, human capital and other sensitive 
information?”  
Family-controlled listed companies considered listed companies as their private business. This 
mindset of personal ownership and control is stopping these families from disclosing full 
information.  It was a great surprise when the researcher requested a copy of the annual report 
from a company secretary; he refused to give it and said, “you are not a stakeholder of the 
company”. A long serving CFO of a family-controlled listed company explained: 
“…family businesses regardless of their percentage of shares in the business always 
considered it their personal business. From one point of view, it is very good because 
they remain committed and loyal with the business. However, this thinking or mind-
set is stopping them from making their business open through proper disclosure to 
[the] public and regulators.” 
The fieldwork identified that family-controlled listed companies are fabricating their annual 
reports. The accuracy of the information disclosed in annual reports is questionable. In family 
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businesses, favourable reports are generally prepared to obtain loans from the bank. A company 
secretary disclosed that:  
“…annual reports are most of the time artificial and made for certain purposes and 
intentions, for example, for obtaining loans. Annual reports are not reflecting [the] 
real performance of the company.”  
Another senior CFO confirmed the production of fabricated reports and said:  
“…in the family business it is [a] very common practice to produce two reports: one 
artificial report for regulators and other stakeholders and, one for internal use.”  
Although there are many requirements, however, as discussed earlier (see section 5.2.4), SECP is 
lacking in sufficient resources and staff to monitor companies’ actual operations. One family-
director commented:  
“…it is very easy to fabricate annual reports as [the] regulator has no mechanism to 
check the authenticity and accuracy of the information presented. My observation is 
if you are doing fine in terms of profit, [the] regulator will not question your 
practices unless you show a loss.”  
In summary, family listed companies are hesitant to disclose their company’s performance in the 
name of family secrets and symbolically complying with financial reporting requirements. SECP 
is lacking in capacity to evaluate companies’ actual performance. 
7.4.6 Unintended consequences – a delisting trend 
The empirical evidences presented that the CG mechanism was introduced to protect minority 
shareholders such as the inclusion of independent and non-executive directors representing 
minority shareholders on the board; strengthen the role and powers of directors; introduce the 
board committees; provide a mandatory dividend scheme; have effective AGMs and improve the 
financial reporting framework which are perceived less useful by the family-controlled listed 
companies. This perception has consequently resulted in symbolic compliance and decoupling of 
CG mechanisms from routine organisational practices and processes. Furthermore, the SECP 
introduced Codes with the belief that Codes implementation will boost investors’ confidence and 
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facilitate in the creation of thick equity markets, which is a popular stance of advocates of the 
Anglo-American model of CG (Mueller, 2006). Contrary to this belief, during the last 10 years, a 
huge numbers of companies delisted from the stock exchanges and the majority of them were 
family-controlled listed companies (figure 7-1). Currently, the number of companies listed in the 
KSE is abysmally low at 558, indicating a huge drop from 712 companies in 2002 at the time of 
the introduction of the code. The fresh floatation which averaged at eleven a decade ago, has 
now gone down to four year. An analyst at the brokerage Topline Securities compared the listing 
trend in KSE:  
“…since 2008, an average of four new companies have offered their shares every 
year (excluding right shares) to [the] public, which compares unfavourably with an 
overwhelming number of 30 IPOs a year in [the] 1990s and seven every year 
between 2000 and 2007.” (Dawn, 2013).  
Figure 7-1: Number of companies delisted from KSE (Source: KSE annual reports (2002-2014) 
 
The fieldwork revealed that many family-controlled listed companies adopted an escape strategy 
(Oliver, 1991) from the domain within which pressure is exerted. In order to avoid regulatory 
compliance, family-controlled listed companies are increasingly delisting themselves through a 
voluntary buyback option. The interview data indicates that strict codes of CG and an absence of 
listing incentives are a few of reasons for the delisting trend in Pakistan. A national newspaper 
highlighted the concerns of financial analysts on listing trends in KSE:  
“…listing of companies on the local bourse remained at low levels after the financial 
crisis of 2008. Strict code of conduct for listed companies, slowdown in industrial 
growth, absence of government offerings of shares in state-owned enterprises and 











































































the bourse, are key factors listed by market participants for the sad state of things on 
the new listings front [emphasis added].” 
The majority of companies delisted themselves voluntarily since the introduction of the Code in 
2002, as they found the Code 2002 too costly to implement (Iqbal, 2012). A CFO of a family 
listed company said: 
“…this code turned family businesses from [a] simple operation to difficult 
operations which is having more costs than benefits. The code increased business 
costs in terms of [the] reporting cost (quarterly reporting, biannual reporting), costs 
of CFO, CEO, audit committees, extra involvement of ID and DTP.” 
A CEO of a public listed company which is now a private family-owned company delisted from 
the stock exchange after the introduction of the Code 2002, provides reasons for delisting and 
said:  
“[… [the] cost of maintaining membership at the stock exchange was quite high 
without any significant benefit to the shareholders… and the application of the code 
of corporate governance under the stock exchanges’ listing rules would be 
cumbersome and a burden on the efficient performance of the company.”  
A company secretary of another delisted family controlled company makes a point: 
 “…our shareholding was around 90%, so for only 5-6%, we were not ready to 
comply with the code. So we decided to delist and avoid implementation of the 
code.” 
According to Mumtaz Abdullah’s study (cited in, SECP, 2003), presented at the SAFA
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conference in Karachi, listed companies have been bearing an estimated extra code 
implementation cost of Rs. 3 million per annum (table 7-3) However, SECP claimed that the 
Codes have resulted in an extra cost of estimated Rs. 0.8-1.2 million.  
The researcher asked participants at the organisational level about why their families listed their 
companies. Respondents explained that families listed their companies to enjoy tax benefits 
rather than to raise capital. A CEO and founder of a family listed company revealed: 
                                                 
43
 South Asian Federation of Accounting 
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“…in the beginning listed companies were given tax incentives. Many companies 
only listed to save tax. In doing that, they only offered [a] small portion of shares to 
[the] public.”  
Table 7-3: Extra Costs in Rs in ’000s Due to Implementation of the Code 
Extra Costs in Rs in ’000s Due to Implementation of the 
Code  
Extra Cost in Rs. 
(’000s)  
1 Internal Audit  300 
2 Account’s Department  500 
3 Secretary’s Department  100 
4 CFO  400 
5 Printing of Reports  400 
6 
Printing of Extra Copies of Register of Shareholders 
Policies etc.  
100 
7 Additional Postage  300 
8 Directors T.A.  200 
9 Meeting Expenses  150 
10 Telephone and Fax  150 
11 Statutory Fees  200 
12 Registrar and CDC  100 
13 Audit Fees  100 
TOTAL  3,000 
 
Another founding family director provided a detailed explanation and said: 
“…we have to go back into the history. When KSE was formed, government adopted 
a strategy that all those companies having [a] certain level of fixed and current assets 
were forced to go public. This strategy was not only lacking in vision, in addition to 
that, minority shareholders in Pakistan were not having equity finance knowledge.”  
He further added that: 
“…in order to overcome non-availability of shareholders, government instructed its 
own institution (e.g. National Investment Trust NIT) to purchase shares and sit in 
companies’ boards. The dichotomy between owner and management was created and 
laws were made and nothing further was done.”  
Another long-serving CFO of a family-controlled listed company said:  
“…government first move towards listing was wrong. Government asked existing 
family-owned businesses to list themselves and operate like a public listed company. 
Whereas these businesses didn’t want to raise capital this way neither [was] it was 
possible for them. So [the] whole spirit of the initiative was lost and listing 
regulations suffered from symbolic compliance.” 
Thus, family businesses were forced to become listed and were provided with a tax rebate as an 
incentive. Later, when this tax incentive was revoked and the code of CG was introduced, 
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family-controlled listed companies started worrying. The interview data indicates that the 
family-controlled listed companies though reluctant to comply with the Code 2002, they 
symbolically complied with Code 2002 because it was voluntary and implemented as a “comply 
or explain” regime. A very senior-owner CEO commented: 
“…in the beginning government facilitated and forced companies to list and provide 
huge tax incentives. Later, government revoked tax incentives, but we kept ourselves 
listed because Code 2002 was easy to comply [with] and SECP was not interfering in 
our business.”  
However, Code 2012 is mandatory with stringent requirements. As discussed earlier, the change 
in requirement from voluntary to mandatory received huge resistance from family-controlled 
listed companies. Business families perceived that now it was difficult for them to cope with the 
mandatory Code 2012. In anticipation of compliance difficulties, sixty-eight companies delisted 
themselves just before the introduction of the Code 2012 (figure 7-1). A family director said: 
“…the Code 2012 has several issues: one it is mandatory, second it increases our 
implementation cost when there are no benefits, and third, now there is a continuous 
interference from the SECP in our business.” 
The interview data identified that many family-controlled listed companies either have decided 
or are planning to delist. A family director said, “…now there is no point to remain listed, we are 
also planning to delist.” Another interviewee stated: 
“…our shareholding is around 90%, so for only 5-6% [of the] shareholding, we are 
not ready to comply with the Code. And we will resist…this Code as much as we 
can, otherwise we will go for delisting.” 
Another interviewee stated: 
“…now listed companies need to do more activities and paperwork, e.g. need to 
prepare and distribute quarterly accounts to [the] public, and conduct AGM, etc. In 
order to avoid all extra work and tough code requirements, companies prefer to get 
delisted or remain private.” 
One owner-director said in grief: 
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“…now we have realised that we were working better as a private company. Now we 
have to face lots of regulations. Delisting is the top most agenda on our list. Once we 
will have enough money to buy back our shares, we will go for it.”  
Another company secretary of a listed company pointed out the drawbacks of being listed in the 
stock exchange: 
“…if we haven’t listed, then we can save our time, money, and energy to do others 
important things. Now we are wasting our time in preparing reports, hiring and 
selection of directors, CFO, CEO bla bla bla…whatever I am discussing with you is 
based on my personal knowledge as my job is to manage compliance otherwise, even 
in this big organisation no one knows what CG [is]?” 
He further suggested that: 
“…if regulator wants more stringent regulations, it is fine. However, the way they 
push us to get listed and force us to behave like a public listed company, this time 
they should facilitate us in delisting. We have [the] majority of shares in the 
company: we want to delist but [the] regulator is not facilitating us.”  
The fieldwork revealed that the delisting trend created tension amongst the organisations at the 
organisational field level. The officials at the stock exchanges were very worried about the 
delisting trend.  An anguished senior official from KSE raised concerns about the strictness and 
implementation cost of CG codes: 
“…a successful reform program must be holistic. It must take into account the cost 
and benefits of the people on whom you are putting this compliance function. [The] 
introduction and implementation process of CG code should be properly sequenced 
and follow [a] carrot and stick approach. In Pakistan, there is only [a] stick without 
the carrot.”  
He urges that:  
“…why [the] tax rate is [the] same for both listed and private companies, which is a 
huge disadvantage for companies to expose themselves against high international 
standards of CG codes. The outcome of this is that large numbers of companies are 
exiting the stock market which means we are encouraging the undocumented 
economy. If we want equities to have [a] place in people’s portfolios, it depends a lot 
on incentives we will provide [to] companies to get/remain listed.”  
Another company secretary of a stock exchange angrily said: 
“…SECP doesn’t want to analyse [the] situation and have closed their eyes. [The] 
regulator job not only uses [a] stick but also provides [an] enabling environment, 
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gives incentives to business to bring their documentation, provides benefits against 
extra costs of code implementation, [and] improves corporate sector growth. The 
new code of CG is an obstacle for new companies to list and call it “superimposed” 
and lacking in spirit.”[emphasis added]. 
The multitude of pressures including symbolic compliance, decoupling, delisting trends and 
concerns from stock exchanges put huge pressure on SECP. In order to reduce compliance 
difficulties, SECP relaxed some of the stringent requirements introduced in Code 2012 (see 
section 6.2). To motivate local private companies to be listed, SECP proposed to the Federal 
Board of Revenue (FBR) to reduce corporate tax rates which is currently 34% for all three types 
of companies (private company, unlisted public company and a listed company). A national 
newspaper reported that the for tax year 2015, the SECP proposed a 31% tax on listed companies 
giving cash dividends and tax rate of 32% proposed for listed companies not giving cash 
dividends (Business Recorder, 2014). However, government only reduced the corporate tax rate 
from 34% to 33% (FBR, 2014). The KSE proposed government to reduce the corporate tax rate 
from 33% to 25% in the federal budget 2015-16 as the current tax rate is higher in the Asian 
region averaging  22.89% (Tribune, 2015).  
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented empirical evidences of the state of CG practices and processes in the 
family-controlled listed companies. The findings revealed that presently the Codes seem to be 
struggling to institutionalise at the organisational level within family-controlled listed 
companies. Family-controlled listed companies have perceived the Codes as less useful and 
consequently are lacking in motivation to implement them in true letter and spirit. The family 
listed companies are symbolically complying with CG codes and have decoupled routine CG 
practices and process from intended CG controls. Since the introduction of Code 2002, family 
listed companies are escaping from the CG regulations domain by adopting a delisting strategy. 
The symbolic compliance, decoupling, and delisting trend puts pressures on actors and 
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organisations at both the organisational field and SPE level to reconsider their strategy. The 
pressures were visible in the efforts of SECP and stock exchanges to facilitate family businesses 




Chapter 8: Process of institutionalisation of CG 
regulations in Pakistan: discussion and analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is to discuss and analyse the findings presented in chapters five and six 
with respect to the multi-level analytical framework and research objectives. Chapter five 
presented the regulatory context within which the CG codes have been implemented and 
evaluated. Chapter six has presented the empirical evidences of the emergence and development 
process of the CG Codes 2002 and 2012 within the socio-political and economic context of 
Pakistan. Chapter seven has empirically addressed the state of CG mechanisms and processes in 
the family-controlled listed companies. Chapter seven presented to what extent the CG codes 
have been institutionalised within family-controlled listed companies’ routines and processes and 
their unintended consequences.  
A multi-level analytical framework for institutional dynamics is comprised of Neo-Institutional 
Sociology (NIS) theory, structuration theory and Weber’s axes of tension (see chapter 3) which 
will be used to analyse the institutionalisation, transposition, deinstitutionalisation and 
decoupling of CG codes at three levels of context. Institutional theory enables analyses how CG 
codes are institutionalised, transposed and implemented in a top-down manner from the Socio-
Political and Economic (SPE) level through the field and organisational level. The use of 
structuration theory in conjunction with institutional theory gives insight into the bottom-up 
perspective as agents interact with the imposed CG codes. The incorporation of axes of tension 
enables identification of competing structures which explain conflict, crises, decoupling and 
unintended consequences. Within each societal level the legitimating grounds, representational 
schema, domination perspective and role of agency will be explained. The role of agents 
interacting with structures of legitimation, signification, and domination at each level will enable 
analyses the potential for conflict, crises, unintended consequences, and possibilities for 
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institutional change. The analytical framework adopted in this study enables understanding of 
both the context and process of institutionalisation, transposition, implementation, and 
deinstitutionalisation of CG regulations, and its unintended consequences.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section (8.1) provides a discussion on the process of 
emergence and development of CG codes at the SPE level. This section provides critical 
analyses of the CG codes’ development process and examines the role of government, IFAs, 
SECP and business and political families within the confines of the analytical framework. This 
chapter will then move to the next part of the discussion on the implementation and evaluation 
context of CG codes at the organisational field level. This section provides a critical reflection on 
the state of the regulatory context and implementation and evaluation process at the 
organisational field level. The following section, (8.3), is concerned with an assessment of the 
state of CG mechanisms in the family-controlled listed companies. This section critically 
evaluates the role of controlling families in the institutionalisation of CG codes at the 
organisational level and unintended consequences. The chapter ends with a conclusion.  
8.2 Institutionalisation of CG regulations in Pakistan 
Using the conceptual framework adopted in this study (see chapter 3), the process of 
institutionalisation, transposition, implementation, and deinstitutionalisation of CG regulations in 








Figure 8-1:  Institutionalisation of CG regulations in Pakistan 
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8.3 Socio-Political and Economic (SPE) level 
The first part of the discussion is concerned with first research objective of this study. The first 
research objective is to explore the wider socio-political and economic environment in relation to 
the process of emergence and development of corporate governance regulations in Pakistan. At 
the social-political and economic level, criteria for the institutionalisation of CG practices were 
established through regulations and legislation. The societal level context comprises both 
national and transnational actors including government, IFAs, transnational institutions, SECP, 
and political and business families (see figure 8-1). The regulations and legislations formulated 
at this level were influenced by the taken-for-granted norms and values, dominant actors and 
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coalition that are available at all three context levels. The institutionalisation of the regulations is 
dependent upon the interrelationship of competing axes of tension and therefore three structural 
types (legitimation, signification, and domination). This section reflects on the power relations 
and political negotiations within and between the government, donor agencies, SECP, and 
business families at the socio-economic and political level. This section first discusses the 
research question, i.e. why and how did CG regulations emerge and develop at the socio-political 
and economic level? Moreover, it also discusses how the organisational field and organisational 
level factors influence the transposition process at the socio-political and economic level.  
8.3.1 The emergence of CG codes (2002, 2012) at the socio-political and economic 
level 
The legitimacy and efficiency reasons for CG codes in Pakistan are intertwined. SECP had 
adopted the Code 2002 to gain legitimacy from donor agencies, but promoted this code in the 
name of efficiency and conveyed it as a significant step towards investor protection. The 
legitimating forces for the introduction of Code 2002 and Code 2012 were quite different from 
each other. The impetus for the introduction of CG regulations in Pakistan has been a 
combination of IFA’s pressures and the emerging role of SECP (see section 6.2). The 
government in power in the mid-1990s faced financial crises and sought help from international 
donor agencies. The donor agencies conditioned financial help with the Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP). In order to obtain a loan, the government of Pakistan was not only required to 
establish a new oversight governing body, i.e. SECP, but was also required to initiate the Capital 
Market Development Program (CMDP) as prescribed by donor agencies. Thus the coercive 
pressures on the government of Pakistan from the donor agencies seemed to be more prominent 
in the establishment of SECP and Code 2002 (see section 6.1.1). From an efficiency perspective, 
both donor agencies and SECP legitimatised changes in Pakistan’s capital market based on 
objective symbolic representation of economic growth. They promoted that by having an 
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independent regulator and internationally accepted CG practices, this would have resulted in 
efficient allocation of resources and an increase in investors’ confidence. The findings are in line 
with the prior studies, which have documented a similar stance of IFAs while promoting SAPs in 
other developing countries (Siddiqui, 2010, Mukherjee-Reed, 2002, Reed, 2002, Arnold, 2012).  
Coercive pressures resulted in the introduction of Code 2002; however, mimetic and normative 
pressures appeared more influential in the adoption of the Anglo-American model of CG in 
Pakistan. SECP opted to learn from the experience of regulators from the developed countries 
instead of developing their own country-specific codes based on the assumptions that 
governance issues are similar around the world (see section 6.1.1). SECP was of a view that 
shareholder protection from management discretion is a universal norm. They considered that the 
main purpose of CG regulations is to protect minority shareholders and Pakistan is by no means 
a different terrain. In order to protect shareholders, SECP mimics Code 2002 with the Anglo-
American model. The findings also revealed that professional accounting institution ICAP also 
put normative pressure on SECP in promoting Code 2002 in line with the Anglo-American 
model.  
SECP, being an apex regulator, is responsible for regulating, monitoring and supervising the 
corporate sector and capital market. The legitimating force for the introduction of Code 2012 as 
claimed by SECP was to enhance the efficiency and acceptability of Code 2002 based on 
internationally accepted practices for investors’ protection and to mitigate investment risks. The 
role of agency appeared to be more prominent in the introduction of the Code 2012 when SECP 
wanted to assert more control and power over regulatory matters (see section 6.2.1). However, 
findings revealed that SECP justified the revision process of Code 2002 as an effort to make 
existing CG codes more robust and in line with the development in internationally accepted CG 
practices. Transnational organisations promote principles of shareholder protection, economic 
efficiency, and free trade. SECP incorporated these principles in the Code 2002 and Code 2012.  
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In sum, the findings of this study confirm and go beyond the prior work at the socio-political and 
economic level (Siddiqui, 2010, Arnold, 2005, Arnold, 2012, Mukherjee-Reed, 2002, Reed, 
2002) that only focuses on legitimacy vs. efficiency reasons of CG diffusion in the developing 
countries. The findings support prior studies that argued that developing countries have 
introduced the Anglo-American model of CG regulations due to coercive, mimetic and 
normative pressures from international donor agencies and transnational and professional 
institutions (Siddiqui, 2010, Uddin and Hopper, 2003, Mukherjee-Reed, 2002, Reed, 2002). The 
adoption of international best practices of CG provides an opportunity for the developing 
countries to improve their image in the eyes of IFAs (Siddiqui, 2010). However, the regulatory 
change in Pakistan neither resulted in economic and political crises (Hancher and Moran, 1989, 
Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013) nor did innovative practices emerge at the organisational level 
(Dillard et al., 2004). Rather it was promoted by donor agencies to develop the securities market 
in the developing countries as a part of the globalisation process (ADB, 2005, Arnold, 2012). 
The way SECP came into being, it had limited options other than to follow donor agencies’ 
guidelines. Thus, SECP introduced the Code 2002 in Pakistan to gain legitimacy from donor 
agencies but promoted efficiency reasons. However, this study contends that the process of the 
emergence and development of CG reforms cannot be confined to limited efficiency vs. 
legitimacy reasons of CG reforms. The underneath process of the emergence and development of 
CG regulation at the socio-political and economic level is complicated and political due to the 
existence of contesting interests and powers. The next section discusses how the existence of 
competing structures at the socio-political and economic level in Pakistan has influenced the CG 
codes transposition process.    
8.3.2 Multiple competing structures at the socio-political and economic level 
Multiple competing structures can exist at the socio-political and economic level. Multiple 
criteria may peacefully coexist, compete, supersede each other, blend or hybridise or reach a 
195 
 
temporary truce (Suddaby et al., 2007). The analysis has revealed that multiple competing 
structures do exist in Pakistan. As illustrated in table (8-1), the newly established structure of 
power and control through the introduction of Code 2002 and Code 2012, and the prevailing 
structure of family dominance are two competing structures. The institutionalisation of Codes 
(2002, 2012) is dependent upon the interrelationship of: 1. formal rational criteria of efficiency; 
2. objective representation of shareholder protection; and 3. formal hierarchical structure of 
domination. The institutionalisation of family capitalism is dependent upon the interrelationship 
of: 1. substantive rationality of family growth; 2. subjective representation of family wellbeing; 
and 3. informal structure of domination.  
Table 8-1: Contradictions at the SPE level 
Contradictions at the Socio-political and Economic Level 
     
Socio-political and 
Economic Level 
  CG Codes (2002, 2012)   Family Capitalism 
     
Legitimating grounds 
(norms, values, laws, & 
regulations) 
 Norms and values are grounded in 
formal rational CG practices by listed 
companies to improve economic 
efficiency, shareholder's/investor's 
protection, financial administration, 
accountability, and reporting practices. 
 Norms and values are 
grounded in substantive 
rationality of family growth, 
retention of ownership & 
control over firm resources 
throughout generations. 





Objective representation of investor 
protection, efficiency, performance, 
productivity/objective representation 
of economic efficiency.  
Subjective representations of 
family wellbeing. 
     
Domination perspective  Formal hierarchical structure of CG 
codes implemented through listed 
regulations. SECP, stock exchanges 
and other institutions are responsible 
for monitoring compliance and 
performance assessment.  
 Informal structure seeks to 
gain power and control for 
families through a network 
with government and other 
institutions. 




IFAs (funds), Government (appointing authority), Regulator (regulations, 
inspection, penalties), Business families (network) 
The analysis revealed that multiple criteria at the socio-political and economic context in 
Pakistan are competing and have produced unintended consequences. An unintended 
consequence of this is the marginalisation of the newly established oversight regulatory body, 
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SECP, the dilution of CG codes at the societal level, and resistance, decoupling, and symbolic 
compliance at the organisational field and organisational level. 
8.3.2.1 Codes (2002, 2012): legitimation, signification, and domination 
The CG codes (2002, 2012) are the representational schema that informs legitimate CG practices 
which organisational actors are required to implement. Initially, Code 2002 established the 
criteria for CG practices, lately replaced by Code 2012. The codes of CG in Pakistan are 
consistent with the Anglo-American model (see section 6.3). SECP implemented CG codes 
through listing regulations which led to legitimation structures of a more formal, calculative 
rationality in their assessment. The significant structure of CG codes represents objective 
measures of efficiency, productivity, and investor protection. The objective criterion for the 
board of directors including board composition with a defined number of independent directors, 
representing minority shareholders, and non-executive directors; CEO, chairman, and directors 
appointments; meetings of the board; responsibilities, powers and functions of the board; board 
committees; and corporate and financial reporting framework, have been the defining features of 
CG codes.  
From a dominant perspective, a new formal hierarchical structure was introduced at the societal 
level, as the new regulatory oversight body, i.e. SECP, was set up to regulate, supervise, and 
monitor activities at the organisational field and organisational level. The SEC Act 1997 defined 
the powers and responsibilities of SECP to perform its statutory duties. Furthermore, CG codes 
also introduced a formal hierarchical structure for the organisational level as well. Criteria 
established in Code 2002 and Code 2012 provides more powers and controls to the board of 
directors to supervise and monitor organisational activities. The main criteria includes separation 
of the CEO and chairman, introduction of audits, HR, and directors remuneration committees 
and stringent disclosure requirements, which was an effort to shift the balance from informal 
control to a formal hierarchical structure.   
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8.3.2.2 Family capitalism: legitimation, signification, and domination 
The most frequently referenced drivers of shareholder values are separation of ownership and 
control (Berle and Means, 1932), evolution from managerial to investor capitalism (Useem, 
1996), rise in the shareholder movement and threat of a hostile takeover (Davis and Thompson, 
1994), and hyperactivity in the capital market (Davis and McAdam, 2000). The analysis of the 
SPE level shows that these drivers are seemingly absent in Pakistan. Similar to traditional 
societies as described by Dyball et al. (2006), in Weberian (1978) terms, institutions, state, and 
market in Pakistan are not set to function as autonomous and separate but are conjoined and are 
accountable to and serving the interests of few families (see section 5.2). 
In general, long-established political and industrialist families dominated the corporate landscape 
of Pakistan. The capitalist class in Pakistan remains small and concentrated in the hands of few 
political and business families (see section 5.2). Government industrialisation policies and the 
relationship between political and business families have produced a transfer of public wealth in 
the hands of few families. The socio-political and economic context faced by most organisations 
in Pakistan is family capitalism (see section 5.1). The legitimation structure of norms and values 
is grounded in substantive rationality of family growth, retention of ownership and control over 
firms’ resources throughout generations, personal relationship development, and Socio-
Emotional Wealth (SEW) (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2012, Uddin, 2005, Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2008). The significant structure represents a subjective representation of family 
wellbeing. Any individual or organisation operating within this context will garner more 
legitimacy if they can emulate or symbolically reproduce this rationality (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977).  
The domination structure traditionally in Pakistan has been both the military regime and political 
families. Government exercised control over regulatory institutions by being an appointing 
authority. For example, to keep regulatory institutions under control, government employed 
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‘influence’ and ‘control’ strategies by placing their loyal supporters in various key positions in 
regulatory institutions. Government has the power to interfere in regulatory matters through 
appointing the head of SECP and through the parliamentary process. Business families dominate 
firms through the control or ownership of a large and significant number of shares. Business 
families having informal relationships with vital external actors in government and institution in 
the socio-political and economic level campaigned to protect their interests. The laws and 
regulations often serve the interests of political and businesses families (Alavi, 1983, Gardezi, 
1998, Gardezi and Mumtaz, 2004). 
8.3.3 Multiple contradictions, role of agency and unintended consequences 
The existence of competing criteria makes the institutionalisation process of CG regulations at 
the societal level an ineluctably political struggle. The institutionalisation of criteria of CG 
practices depends on the key actors, powers, and resources these actors hold and the nature of 
interaction between them. Previous studies implicitly assume that diffusion at the SPE level 
leads to isomorphism and treats local actors (individual, organisations) as unproblematic in the 
adoption of the Anglo-American model of CG. However, the relational boundary among the 
actors is not static, as conflict or struggles may arise over resources, stakes and access (Oakes et 
al., 1998) and structuration does not produce a perfect reproduction (Holm, 1995). The 
introduction of CG regulations at the societal level can be symbolic in nature, giving the 
impression of something more substantive. The SECP highlighted the similarities with the 
internationally accepted CG model more than the compromises and differences. Power relations, 
interests, goals and strategies are embedded in the local context and are institutionally, culturally 
and historically shaped (Fligstein, 2001, Friedland and Alford, 1991). These power relations and 
resources available to different local actors provide them opportunities or sometime possibilities 
to exert power over the context at a particular point in time (Bourdieu, 2011, Ezzamel and Xiao, 
2015). The analysis revealed that transnational actors, government, regulators, professional 
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bodies, and business families enrolled their resources to shape regulations with their own 
imprimatur. 
SECP has the power to introduce new regulations and legislations over its constituents; however 
its power is also subject to influence of interests and powers of other actors in the socio-political 
and economic context. Donor agencies’ command over allocative resources allowed them to 
manipulate countries’ poor economic conditions. In comparison, government and business 
families have command over both allocative and authoritative resources. When the regulator is 
exposed to multiple competing requirements from multiple powerful actors, Oliver (1991, p.162) 
predicts that “passive acquiescence to institutional demands is difficult to achieve when 
acquiescence to one constituent precludes the ability to conform to alternative constituents with 
conflicting expectations”. This study argues that it is politically and strategically important for an 
organisation to meet multiple expectations imposed by multiple institutions. Brunsson (2002) 
suggests that an organisation may resolve contesting requirements by meeting some demands, 
some by talk, and others by decisions. Prioritising one demand over the expense of others may 
decrease the organisation’s chance of survival.  
At the time of introducing Code 2002, the newly established regulatory body, SECP, was 
witnessing the dialectic of power and control relations among the donor agencies and political 
and businesses families. In the family capitalist context of Pakistan, it was not possible for SECP 
to simply ignore the prevailing dominant structure. The criteria set in Code 2002, in line with the 
Anglo-American model to evaluate the organisation’s CG practices, were competing with 
historical dominant family power and control. The Code 2002, in line with the Anglo-American 
model, prioritised investor’s protection and economic efficiency over family interests. The Code 
2002 introduced new CG practices and evaluative criteria for the organisational field and 
organisational level. The introduction of the new model of CG above those of family interests 
represents an effort to break the family controlled model of corporations and a major shift in firm 
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priorities. Donor agencies led SAPs resulted in the establishment of SECP, a new domination 
structure in the form of a regulatory body, to augment the traditional familial dominance.  
The diffusion of organisational practices over a contested terrain bears the risk of backlash 
(Snow and Benford, 1988). SECP was aware of the fact that regulations which represent one 
dominant ideology are likely to be resisted by other dominant ideology. The role of agency was 
evident when SECP anticipated resistance from family listed companies if it were to implement 
the Anglo-American model of CG in full. SECP wants to maintain the control of being a 
legitimate principal regulator in the eyes of donor agencies while at the same time wants to 
accommodate both government and business families to avoid domestic resistance. Unintended 
consequences of this is that SECP introduced Code 2002 in line with the Anglo-American model 
to gain legitimacy from the donor agencies, however, this diluted Code 2002 in a form which is 
more acceptable to family businesses (see section 6.1.2). Under the notion of duality, in the case 
of Code 2002, the regulator tried to reproduce the prevalent dominant family structure. At the 
same time, the SECP concealed their non-compliance from donor agencies and investor 
community by highlighting the similarities with the internationally accepted CG model more 
than the compromises and differences. The findings that self-interested agents may adopt 
acquiescence and compromise strategies to reduce conflict and gain legitimacy from multiple 
pressurising constituents (Oliver, 1991).   
The institutional reasons and institutionalisation process of Code 2012 at the societal level were 
substantially different from Code 2002. When regulators are dependent on other actors and 
resources they control, bargaining and negotiations become necessary (Canning and O’Dwyer, 
2013). Findings revealed that the emergence and development of Code 2012 in Pakistan resulted 
in significant negotiations among actors embedded at the societal level. SECP in collaboration 
with UNDP started a project on CG to assess the efficiency of Code 2002. In light of findings 
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from this study, SECP recognised enhancement in the Code 2002 to improve its acceptability. 
The local and self-regulatory effort from SECP led to the introduction of the new code of CG.  
Actors need sufficient resources such as political, financial and organisational resources 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006) to create or bring change to the existing norms and values. If 
actors lack these resources or do not control rewards and punishments, they can make allies with 
those individuals and organisations which have these capabilities. Actors construct rationale and 
reasons and communicate these to other powerful actors, convincing them why they should 
support or at a minimum not resist the institutionalisation of the project in question (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996). Self-regulated, independent regulators free from state interference are an 
important assumption in Anglo-American countries (Greenspan, 1998). SECP wants to assert its 
power as an independent regulatory body. However, the SECP Act (1997) provides SECP with 
administrative authority and financial independence to carry out its regulatory and statutory 
duties. However, in the socio-political and economic context of Pakistan, SECP’s regulatory 
powers are still subject to political interference. In formal hierarchical structures, SECP reported 
to the Parliament and the government, where both had considerable power and influence over its 
work, given that government appointed its chairman and commissioners (see section 5.2.4). The 
role of agency was visible when SECP tried to manipulate government economic dependence on 
donor agencies. The government of Pakistan is always in need of funds from donor agencies. In 
order to secure funds they accept that they must implement some basic international standards 
(see section 5.2.3). In order to assert its regulatory power over regulatory matters and mitigate 
political interference, SECP initiated the revision process of Code 2002 in collaboration with 
IFC to insulate itself from government interference and re-assert its authority as an independent 
regulator. Furthermore, SECP was also able to secure funding for the development of Code 2012 
from IFC.  
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Newly introduced practices sometimes do not entail a significant impact on prevailing practices 
because dominant actors may do things differently to remain dominant (Greenwood et al., 2002, 
Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, Suddaby et al., 2007). Political and family interests are aware of 
threats to their power and control posed by a newly established regulatory body and CG codes. 
That is why they resist change and reassert their influence using their strategic positions. The 
entrepreneurial role motivates government to avoid having independent, powerful regulators like 
SECP at the SPE level. The role of agency was evident in the role of the appointing authority, as 
government appoints loyal persons in key positions to control regulatory institutions. 
Furthermore, having the head of regulatory institutions on a temporary basis, regulatory 
institutions were forced to serve and protect families’ interests.  
On the other hand, since the inception of CG codes, family businesses have been in a continuous 
quest to shape codes in their favour. At the socio-political and economic level, family business 
using their resources and political network influenced the institutionalisation process of CG 
codes. Family businesses lobbied to the Parliamentary Senate Committee to influence and 
ultimately reduce the scope of the Code 2012 (see section 6.2.2). At the organisation level, 
business families want to keep control of listed companies as their private empires and have 
resisted any effort to weaken their control. Family businesses’ resistance to CG codes was the 
result of scepticism of the usefulness or social legitimacy of the codes, self-interests, and 
determination to retain control. Disputes over CG codes become particularly visible when 
criteria for an independent director was made mandatory in the Code 2012. The tension between 
the competing criteria at the organisational level incited many family listed companies to delist 
themselves from the stock exchange. The delisting trend has prepared the ground for potential 
backlash between SECP and stock exchanges. Family businesses also raised concerns about 
resource implications and the inability to comply due to extenuating circumstances (see section 
7.4.6). Consistent with resource dependency theory, family businesses resisted the CG codes 
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because they were holding the majority of shares and were not overly dependent on equity 
financing.  
Thus, the institutionalisation of CG codes was not only influenced by legitimating grounds, 
representational schema, and the domination of the perspective at the socio-political and 
economic level, but also from the organisational field and organisational level (figure 8-1). The 
role of agency was evident in producing the dominant structure. SECP needs to placate powerful 
interests and gain legitimacy from IFAs, but the family capitalism dominance prevailed. In figure 
(8-1), the solid line using Weber’s axes of tension represents the dominance of family capitalism 
over weak market capitalism (dotted line) in the context of Pakistan. The institutionalisation, 
transposition, and implementation process of CG practices in Pakistan revealed how the change 
process was initiated to serve the public interests but actually represents and reproduces 
prevailing dominant interests. Institutionalisation of CG codes exacerbates the clashes over 
rationalities, powers, and material issues. SECP acknowledgement and reproduction of the 
family capitalist structure are perhaps evidence that the socio-political and economic context of 
Pakistan consists of competing criteria (table 8-1). The next section discusses how the CG codes 
developed at the SPE level are implemented and evaluated at the organisational field level.  
8.4 Organisational field level – weak implementation 
The above section analysed how the CG codes in Pakistan are the product of a political struggle 
and negotiations amongst powerful actors at the SPE level. The political struggle has resulted in 
diluted, compromised, and weak CG codes which are accommodating the needs of multiple 
powerful actors. This section is concerned about the second research objective which is to 
identify organisation field level factors that may affect the implementation process of corporate 
governance codes at the organisational level in Pakistan. This section will answer the question of 
how has the CG codes’ institutionalisation process at the organisational field level has been 
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constrained and/or enabled by the ideas prevailing at both the socio-political and economic level 
and organisational level in relation to the conceptual framework. 
Table 8-2: Organisational field level criteria for CG regulations 




CG Codes (2002, 2012), Companies 
Ordinance (1984) 
  Family Capitalism 
Organisational field level 
criteria & practice   




(norms, values, laws, & 
regulations) 
 Formal rational criteria for all listed 
companies to comply with Code 2012 
and the Company Ordinance 1984, 
general purpose financial reporting, DTP, 
Auditing 
 Substantive rationality of 
family protection and control 




Objective representation such as 
transparency, shareholder protection, 
efficiency, cost, profit  
Subjective representations of 
family wellbeing 
     
Domination perspective  Formal hierarchical structure populated 
by accounting professional and 
educational institutions, stock exchanges 
 Informal structure. 
Domination is exercised 
through holding key positions 
based on relations of personal 
loyalty.  




Stock exchanges (listing regulations), PICG (DTP), ICAP (QCR rating), 
External Auditors (auditing), business families (key positions) 
 
     
 
The conceptual framework used in this study considered that the process of institutionalisation 
occurs across three levels of analysis, i.e. SPE, field and organisational level. The SPE level 
specifies the institutional context for the organisational field level. The organisational field level 
translates norms and values established at the SPE level into a more legitimate form to evaluate 
organisational level activities. The organisations at the organisational field level develop roles, 
guidelines, and interpretations as to how regulations could be implemented at the organisational 
level. Furthermore, organisations also develop criteria to evaluate the performance of 
organisations at the organisational level against the regulations and guidelines that have been set. 
The conceptual framework used in this study envisaged that what is institutionalised at the 
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organisational field level is influenced by dominant actors, norms and practices institutionalised 
at both the SPE level and the organisational level (figure 8-1). 
The criteria for CG regulations developed at the SPE level were translated into stock exchange’s 
listing requirements (table 8-2). In terms of the interrelationship between axes of tension and the 
dimension of structuration, the CG regulations were implemented as: legitimation (formal 
rational criteria of listing requirement), signification (objective representation of shareholder 
protection, transparency and efficiency) and formal hierarchical structure of domination. The 
legitimation structure at the organisational field level is that all listed companies are required to 
comply with the Code 2012 and the Companies Ordinance 1984 (hereafter the Ordinance). The 
Code 2012 and the Company Ordinance 1984 (hereafter Ordinance) are defining the formal 
rational criteria of CG practices for the organisational level. Listing requirements continued to 
require listed companies to operate in accordance with the Ordinance guidelines for auditing, 
dividends, AGM and financial reporting. In addition, the Code 2002, latterly replaced by the 
Code 2012, supplements the Ordinance and enhances the legitimate criteria for BOD, board 
committees, auditing, dividends and the financial reporting framework. 
The significant structure at the organisational field level reflects the structural properties arising 
from both the SPE level and organisational level. Similar to the SPE level, competing 
signification structures also exist at the organisational field level. The SECP and IFAs at the SPE 
level are requiring the organisational field level organisations to establish an objective economic 
efficient context which derives shareholder protection, transparency and profit. In contrast, 
families want a subjective context which derives from family wellbeing. According to Weber 
(1978), familial domination is a traditionalist culture (Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999). The 
empirical evidences show that under the notion of duality, knowledgeable reflexive agents 
reproduce the familial dominant structure. In order to cater to the contradictory requirements, 
regulatory organisations established a context which enables both competing representational 
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schemas to exist simultaneously. The empirical evidences show that the Code 2002, which was 
in line with the Anglo-American model, was voluntary under the ‘comply or explain’ principle. 
The ‘comply or explain’ approach was first introduced in the UK after the issuance of the 
Cadbury Report of 1992 (Solomon, 2010). The Anglo-American model of CG was implemented 
in Pakistan, however the voluntary requirement under the ‘comply or explain’ principle allows 
family listed companies to decide whether or not the Code 2002 is appropriate for them (see 
section 6.1.2). It was the job of investors to accept or reject a company’s explanation in case of 
non-compliance and consequently sell their shares.  
SECP, in collaboration with PICG, drafted a new version of the CG code (see section 6.2.2). The 
revised version’s representational schema represents the objective measure of efficiency, 
productivity, and investor protection. The objective criterion for composition, responsibility and 
functioning of the board of directors and board committees, audit, dividends and corporate and 
the financial reporting framework, have been defining features of CG codes. These criteria 
represent a structural contradiction with the family’s subjective rationality of family control and 
wellbeing. These structural contradictions resulted in conflicts and struggles at the organisational 
field level and symbolic compliance, decoupling and unintended consequences at the 
organisational level. The role of agency was evident when families using their political links at 
both the SPE and organisational field level influenced the Code’s 2012 development and 
implementation process (see section 6.2.2). The political pressures, symbolic compliance and 
decoupling resulted in the review which seeks to reconcile competing signification structural 
conditions. The final version of the CG code at the time of introduction in 2012 relaxed many 
stringent requirements proposed by the PICG task force in the initial draft. The criteria of CG 
practices defined in the Code 2012 were still contradictory with family subjective representation 
of family control and wellbeing. The evidences show that sixty-eight listed companies delisted 
themselves from the stock exchange just before the introduction of the Code 2012 to avoid the 
207 
 
mandatory regulatory requirement. The delisting trend resulted in tension between the regulatory 
institutions (SECP and stock exchanges) and another round of review which provided further 
reduction in mandatory criteria of CG practices for companies at the organisational level (see 
section 6.2.2). This study suggests that the regulator tried to change the traditionalist familial 
culture to a formal rational market capitalism, however, dominant families intervened, 
reproduced and strengthened familial capitalism (Uddin, 2005, Gardezi, 1998, Weber, 1978).  
The domination structure refers to those who control resources at the organisational field level. 
The organisational field for this study comprises stock exchanges, PICG, ICAP and professional 
accounting firms and families. In cases of non-compliance with listing requirements, stock 
exchanges have the authority to take punitive action against listed companies. Stock exchanges 
can grant, abandon or cancel corporate licenses. The stock exchange’s listing requirements 
required listed companies to appoint an external auditor who has been given a satisfactory 
Quality Control Rating (QCR) from the ICAP. The ICAP is a self-regulatory accounting body 
that issues satisfactory QCR to firms engaged in audits of listed companies. The Ordinance 
defined the powers and duties of auditing firms. The legitimation structure makes sure that 
auditing firms comply with professional auditing standards and objectively evaluate and 
maintain that the company’s accounts provide a true and fair view of the company’s financial 
performance. The Code 2012 required all listed companies to arrange orientation courses for 
their directors. The criterion was legitimated to acquaint directors with CG codes, relevant laws, 
their duties, and responsibilities to enable them to objectively perform their role effectively on 
the behalf of the shareholders. In the beginning, PICG was the only institute offering a Director 
Training Program (DTP). Now three other institutes, after getting approval from SECP, are 
offering DTP. In a formal hierarchical structure, listed companies are accountable to stock 
exchanges, accounting professional and educational institutes at the organisational field level. 
The institutions at the organisational field level are accountable to government and SECP at the 
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SPE level. The Codes were implemented through a formal hierarchical structure where stock 
exchanges are responsible for making sure that companies at the organisational level are 
complying with listing regulations. 
The capital market and accounting structure presented above have a similar position and role in 
implementing CG Codes as that in Anglo-American countries. The efficacy of the Anglo-
American model relies on a well-developed capital market and autonomous and established 
accounting bodies (Arnold, 2005, Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, Millar et al., 2005, Mueller, 
2006, Robson and Cooper, 1990). Formal rational CG codes along with formal hierarchical 
institutional arrangements are expected to ensure transparency and accountability of public listed 
companies to stakeholders. In theory, the coercive implementation of the Codes through listing 
regulations provides considerable power to CG institutions at the organisational field level. The 
substantial evidences drawn from interviews and other secondary sources analysed in this study 
indicate that regulatory power, autonomy and independence of CG institutions are subject to 
government and political interference (see section 5.3). This study exposed a lack of efficacy of 
current regulatory organisations and challenges they faced in performing their role as an 
independent regulatory body.  
The empirical evidences show that similar to the SPE level, the institutionalisation of formal 
rational CG regulations at the organisational field level are competing with a familial culture. 
The organisational field for this study is also dominated by the political and business families 
(see section 5.3). The reproduction of family capitalism at the organisational field level is 
dependent upon legitimation (substantive rationality of family protection and control), 
signification (subjective representation of family wellbeing), and domination through informal 
structure (table 8-2). The findings show that in Pakistan, families continue to augment their 
power whilst weakening the regulatory institutions. The families in Pakistan are a source of 
authority that competes with the state and regulators’ authority. Similar to other developing 
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countries in the region, personal relationships develop market and state transactions in Pakistan 
(Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999, Uddin and Choudhury, 2008, Uddin and Hopper, 2003) For 
example, evidences show that in order to undermine rule of law and keep regulatory institutions 
under their firm control, families appoint their loyal supporters in various key positions (see 
section 5.3). Instead of following the enacted rules and protecting the publics’ interests, the 
institutions and the admin staff are primarily geared towards protecting the families’ interests 
and needs (Weber, 1978).  The overall inference is personification, poor law enforcement, and a 
lack of high quality and independent accounting structure that enables families to mediate the 
development of any rational/legal corporate law such as CG codes. The regulators’ efficacy has 
stalled because tenacious and resilient families exist in Pakistani society. This is similar to other 
traditional societies where families have more power than the state and other regulatory bodies 
(Weber, 1978, Dyball et al., 2006, Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999, Uddin, 2005, Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2008, Uddin and Hopper, 2003, Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005).  
8.5 Organisational level – routine practices and processes 
In addition to focusing on how and why CG regulations emerged and developed at the SPE and 
organisational field level, this study has also focused on understanding the organisational context 
in relation to imposed CG regulations. Similar to the discussion at the SPE and field level, the 
research objectives and research questions guide the discussion in this section as well. This 
section presents answers to how and to what extent the institutionalisation of corporate 
governance codes occurred at the organisational level. The SPE level provides the societal 
context and the organisational field level establishes parameters of rationalising organisational 
practices. The organisational field provides an immediate context for the organisational level to 
operate. Using the adopted conceptual framework, the discussion mainly focuses on the 
influence of CG codes on the family-controlled listed companies’ routine and processes and their 
unintended consequences.  
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It is important to highlight here that although the development the phases of Code 2002 and 
Code 2012 are analytically separable and provide a valuable basis for discussing and 
understanding their emergence and development process, they are not clearly distinguishable in 
practice. As interviews were conducted only after one year of the introduction of Code 2012, 
many of the interviewees were not aware of the differences between the two sets of Codes. Thus, 
pertaining to several commonalities among them, the common term of CG Codes was used 
during interviews while discussing their implementation at the organisational level. However, 
when deemed necessary to identify the differences between the two sets of Codes, terminology 
of Code 2002 and Code 2012 was employed. 
The Code 2002 latterly replaced by the Code 2012 and the Ordinance are the main signification 
structures drawn upon by the actors at the SPE and field level to rationalise organisational level 
practices. The institutionalisation and the subsequent reproduction of Codes at the organisational 
level are dependent upon the interrelationship of legitimation (formal rationality), signification 
(objective representation) and domination (formal hierarchical structure) (table 8-3). The Codes 
were developed to provide means of objectively and accurately represent the CG practices at the 
organisational level. The organisational practices will be considered legitimate if actors meet the 
requirements embedded in the Codes. The organisational structure will be considered legitimate 
if it gives privileges to the minority shareholders. The formal hierarchical domination structure 
represents the coercive implementation of Codes as a part of the listing regulation. The Code 
2002 followed the ‘comply or explain’ principle; however, the Code 2012 is mandatory.  
The conceptual framework adopted in this study recognises that the regulations developed at the 
SPE level, as they cascade down through the organisational field level to the organisational level, 
are subject to agents’ interpretations and understanding at each level. To what extent these codes 
are seen as legitimate will affect their institutionalisation at the organisational level. The findings 
indicate that the family-controlled listed companies have no confidence in the state and its 
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regulatory institutions (see section 7.2). They see that the state, regulators and other institutions 
failed to provide a business-friendly environment. The interview data signified political 
instability, inconsistent economic policies and poor infrastructure as some of the main concerns. 
The controlling families argued that the socio-political and economic context of Pakistan is 
different from that of Anglo-American countries. However, actors at the SPE level ignored these 
differences and introduced corporate laws which were irrelevant to the local context. Family-
controlled listed companies feel that government and SECP are more inclined towards IFAs due 
to their economic dependence. They recognise that many laws and regulations in Pakistan were 
introduced to obtain loans. This study illustrates that family-controlled listed companies’ lack of 
confidence in government and regulatory institutions influenced their perception towards the 
usefulness of laws and regulations developed at the SPE level and consequently their 
implementation. The findings implied that family-controlled listed companies identified Codes 
as less useful and irrelevant (see section 7.3).  
The analysis revealed that SPE and organisational field levels are characterised by two 
competing structures. The unintended consequences of that were dilution of Codes at the SPE 
level and weak capital market and poor legal enforcement at the organisational field level. The 
substantial evidences presented in this study indicate that same competing structures are also 
prevailing at the organisational level (see table 8-3). Substantial evidences presented in this study 
(see section 5.2.2) demonstrated that the majority of the listed companies are directly or 
indirectly owned and controlled by few families (Papanek, 1967, Rashid, 1976, Cheema, 2003, 
Ghani and Ashraf, 2005). Family control and growth have been the accepted norms in family-
controlled listed companies. An economic action is substantively rational if it addresses the 
needs, values and ends of a specific social group. Otherwise, it is irrational economic action 
(Colignon and Covaleski, 1991). The business families are sources of authority that compete 
with government and the regulators. In family-controlled listed companies, action will be 
212 
 
considered legitimate if it serves the family interest. In terms of Weber’s axes of tension the 
formal rational codes are competing with the substantive rationality of family control. In order to 
present the extent to which Codes have been institutionalised in the family-controlled listed 
companies, routine practices and processes of CG mechanisms, i.e. BOD, board committees, 
dividend, disclosure and AGM, are discussed separately. The findings showed a varied level of 
resistance and compliance commitment from one CG mechanism to another. The discussion 
follows the order from the most resisted CG mechanism BOD to the least AGM (as depicted 
from left to right at the organisational level in figure 8-1).  
8.5.1 BOD – a nexus of conflict 
The BOD has been considered as a major part of the Western corporate governance model 
(Uddin and Choudhury, 2008, Baysinger and Butler, 1985). The BOD has the power to monitor 
company management and resolve conflict of interest between shareholders and management 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985). This is very similar to the CG Code for Pakistani companies, at 
least in legal terms. By employing a conceptual framework, this section discusses how boards 
operate in family-controlled listed companies. To what extent does the Board of Directors 
(BOD) represent and protect shareholders’ interests, particularly outsider minority shareholders 
in family-controlled listed companies? Overall, has this CG measure been able to institutionalise 
in family-controlled listed companies?  
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Table 8-3: Criteria of CG mechanism at the Organisational Level 
Key CG 
mechanisms
BOD Board Committees Auditing AGM Dividend Financial Reporting
Legitimating 
grounds (norms, 
values, laws, & 
regulations)
Formal rational criteria of 
board composition, duality of 
CEO and chairman, quarterly 
board meetings, 
responsibilities and powers 
of BOD, and director's 
training
Rational criteria of 
committees structure, 
non-executive 
directors and IDs on 
board committees
Rational criteria of 
appointment, QCR 
rating, rotation every 
5 years, free from 
conflict of interest  
Formal rational criteria 
of conducting AGM, 3 
weeks advance notice 




Formal rational criteria 
of declaring dividend, 
non-mandatory, 
preference to general 
shareholders, at least 
once in 5 years, fiscal 
disincentive
Formal rational criteria of 
preparation and reporting 
statement of compliance, 
Director's reports,  use of 













Objective representation of 
director's report, statement of 
compliance, board meeting 
record, prepared and 
published in annual report on 






and published in 
annual reports.
Auditor's report to 
management, 
disclosure of auditor 
and audit and non-
audit  fee
Objective 
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In terms of dimensions of structuration and Weber’s axes of tension, the intended criteria of the 
BOD routine and practices defined in the Codes and the Ordinance are presented in table (8-3). The 
legitimation structure consists of formal rational criteria such as: listed companies shall have 
preferably one third of the total number or at least one independent director; duality of CEO and 
chairman; the board shall meet once every quarter of the financial year; the BOD ensures that 
professional standards and corporate values are met; and listed companies shall arrange a training 
program for all directors (see section 6.3). The signification structure of objective representation 
requires listed companies to publish the director’s report and statement of compliance of CG in their 
annual report. The dominations structure consists of a formal hierarchical structure in which 
management is accountable to BOD and BOD are responsible to regulators and shareholders. The 
criteria of BOD composition, powers and responsibilities suggested in the Codes are consistent with 
the Anglo-American model of CG. The legitimating grounds of representing minority shareholders 
or independent directors were predicated on the power and control allocated to general shareholders 
to protect their investments.  
This study revealed that the institutionalisation of rational BOD criteria was facing a great deal of 
resistance within family-controlled listed companies. There is a clear tension between the formal 
rational requirement of BOD with the substantive rational view of family control, given that Codes 
require listed companies to have at least one independent director on the board representing minority 
shareholders. Findings implied that controlling families have considered the concept of 
representation of minority shareholders or that the independent director is operable in the context of 
Pakistan. Interview data revealed that controlling families see that the domination of outsiders will 
make the board ineffective and dysfunctional. In addition, controlling family perceived that the 
implementation of the Codes will weaken family control over the company’s operations and will 
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generate family succession planning issues (see interview quotes in section 7.4.1.1). The study 
illustrates that an unintended consequence of this is symbolic compliance and decoupling of rational 
criteria from organisational routine practices and processes. The findings demonstrated that family-
controlled listed companies were symbolically complying with the requirement of board 
composition and decoupled actual organisational practices. The controlling families are holding a 
majority of the board positions in family-controlled listed companies. In cases where the controlling 
family does not have enough family members, they appoint proxy directors. The role of agency was 
evident when controlling families appoint their close friends as proxy directors to fulfil the 
requirement of the Codes. It is very common in family businesses that key positions are filled by 
members of the controlling family or clan (Weber, 1978). Owning the large shareholdings and 
positions in the board of directors, these public listed companies are operating as privately held 
family companies. The interview data revealed that these proxy directors, due to their close 
connections with controlling families, were not interested in becoming actively involved in the 
company affairs or raising a voice of dissent. The concept of representing minority shareholders is 
completely missing in family-controlled listed companies. The empirical example (see section 
7.4.1.1) depicts that the rational requirement of separation of the office of the CEO from the 
chairman did not weaken family control on listed companies. The offices of the CEO and the 
chairman were shared amongst members of controlling families. In family businesses, directorship 
is considered as a reward for long-serving employees who survived internal competition (Gerlach, 
1992). The Codes resulted in fury amongst the non-family managers as well. This study argued that 
the Codes have generated competition amongst the family members to get the post of director and 
that the doors for long-serving non-family employees to get a directorship are all but closed.  
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In line with the findings of the prior studies (Uddin, 2009, Uddin and Hopper, 2003, Uddin and 
Tsamenyi, 2005, Singh and Zammit, 2006, Mueller, 2006, Arnold, 2012), this study argues that the 
adoption of an Anglo-American model of CG Codes resulted in unintended consequences in 
Pakistani listed companies. The family dominant boards were found to be passive and failed to 
perform their fiduciary duties. The substantial evidences demonstrated that passive boards in family-
controlled listed companies were gearing their accountability more towards controlling families than 
enacted rules. The formal hierarchical structure is overshadowed by the informal family dominance. 
The interview data depicts that in family-controlled listed companies the head of family, ‘Abba G’, 
is the final authority on all issues including the appointment, promotion, reward, punishment and 
dismissal of company directors and management. Formal rational criteria of conducting board 
meetings, active participation of directors and recording minutes of board meetings were also 
missing. The findings depict that the average time of board meetings was between thirty minutes to 
one hour, which indicates that board meetings were only a formality to symbolically comply with 
the Codes.  
In summary, this study demonstrated that competing structures (formal and substantive) are at play 
here. The routine board practices and processes in family-controlled listed companies contradict the 
formal rational criteria of BOD composition, powers, and responsibilities. However, the routine 
practices do fit with the substantive rationality of family dominance and control. Weber (1978) 
ascribed that traditional familial domination tends to reproduce traditional attitudes. Under the 
notion of duality of structure, agents at the organisational level reproduced norms and values which 
support family dominance. Rational CG measures failed to deinstitutionalise the familial way of 
doing business. The general perception that emerges from the findings shows that the rational 
mechanism of BOD was symbolically complied with and decoupled in order to serve family’s 
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interests and desires. This study argued that the rational mechanism of BOD failed to institutionalise 
in the family-controlled listed companies as controlling families are interfering in the 
institutionalisation process.  
8.5.2 Board committees – conflict and symbolic compliance 
In addition to examining the composition and functioning of BODs, this study has also looked into 
the structure and functioning of board subcommittees. The most important issues seen and discussed 
by the BODs typically originate at the subcommittee level (Kesner, 1988). As committees are a 
subset of BODs, they influence the performance of the entire BODs (Xie et al., 2003). Following the 
same line of reasoning, the Codes require Pakistani’s listed companies to establish board 
subcommittees which in turn help entire boards to perform their fiduciary duties. BODs, while 
making some decisions, shall keep in view the recommendations of the subcommittee of the boards 
that may be set up for that purpose.
44
 The Code 2002 guideline requires listed companies to 
voluntarily establish internal audit committees. However, the Code 2012 made it mandatory for all 
listed companies to have audits and a Human Resource and Remuneration (HR&R) committee. The 
institutionalisation of the formal rational criteria of board committees defined in the Codes makes 
routine practices and subsequent reproductions dependent upon the interrelationship of legitimation 
(formal rationality), signification (objective representation) and domination (formal hierarchical 
structure) (see table 8-3). The formal rational criteria require listed companies to establish board 
committees to comprise of independent or non-executive directors. All of the listed companies have 
to objectively represent the statement of compliance along with the director’s reports in annual 
reports. The subcommittees within the formal hierarchical structure are accountable to BODs.  
                                                 
44
 The Code 2012, Section (v-g) 
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In contrast to the argument that board committees influence board performance (Xie et al., 2003), 
this study argued that as board committees are a subset of BODs, the performance of these 
committees is dependent upon the performance of BODs. In family-controlled listed companies 
where BODs are dominated by controlling families and passively serving the interests of controlling 
families, the board committees may not be the correct CG measure for the protection of minority 
shareholders. The findings of this study revealed that the internal audit committee failed to 
institutionalise in the family-controlled listed companies. Substantial evidences presented in this 
study demonstrated that substantive rationality of family control was resisting implementation of 
formal rational criteria. Interview data implied that controlling families see this CG measure as 
unwanted and as a bottleneck in running their business efficiently. Families perceived that this is an 
effort to transfer the company’s control from their hands to outsiders (see section 7.4.2.1). The 
unintended consequence of this was that family-controlled listed companies were symbolically 
complying with the criteria and decoupled from the routine of organisational practices. The audit 
committee and its accountability to minority shareholders in family-controlled listed companies 
were also dominated by controlling families or clans. Similar to the BOD, family-controlled listed 
companies have established audit committees due to the regulative requirement. Interview data 
revealed that these committees are comprised of family members and only exist on paper. The 
family domination on boards and subcommittees was primarily focused on keeping the family 
secrets safe; this is very common in the familial structure (Weber, 1978). The Codes require listed 
companies to publish committee members’ names along with their designation. This study found 




This study finds it difficult to provide a detailed analysis of HR&R committee routine practices in 
the family listed organisations. Interviews were conducted one year after the introduction of Code 
2012. Although the Code 2012 required listed companies to immediately establish an HR&R 
committee, this study argued that it is difficult to confirm the extent to which criteria of formal 
HR&R committees has been institutionalised in family-controlled listed companies. However, 
following the routine practices of audit committees in the family-controlled listed companies, this 
study can argue that it would be difficult for formal rational criteria of HR&R committees to be 
institutionalised in family-controlled listed companies.  
The board subcommittees are an important part of the Anglo-American model of CG structure. The 
prior studies argued that the composition of board committees influence market perception 
(Davidson et al., 1998). Anderson and Reeb (2004), argued that the most valuable publicly listed 
companies is where independent directors balance family representation. Following the same 
legitimating grounds, at the time of the introduction of Code 2012, it required all listed companies to 
establish audit committees that shall be comprised of at least three members, with the majority of 
them being be non-executive directors. The chairman of the audit committee shall be an independent 
director. Similarly, the HR&R committee shall be comprised of a three members majority of which 
should be comprised of non-executive directors.  
Giddens (1979, 1984) says that all social relations involve power but exercise of power is not a 
unidirectional process. Roberts and Scapens (1985), reiterated Giddens and argued that no one in the 
social system is entirely without resources and regulated frequently have resources at their disposal 
to influence regulations to their own advantage. The notion of ‘dialectic of control’ is evident here. 
The coercive implementation of Codes through listing regulations is defining a unidirectional 
system of accountability from regulated to regulator. However, this study revealed that families have 
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power through political connections, loyal supporters in regulatory organisations, etc., and may thus 
influence the regulatory process. The conceptual framework adopted in this study considered that 
actors and routine practices at the organisational level can influence the laws and regulations 
developed at the SPE level (see figure 8-1). The formal rational CG measure of establishing board 
committees comprising of a non-executive director and headed by an independent director faced 
great resistance from businesses families. The formal rational criteria were competing with and 
contradicting the routine practices. In order to influence the regulatory process, families formed 
lobbies to oppose the rational criteria of board committees’ composition set in the Code 2012. The 
findings revealed that family listed companies, by employing their political connections and dissent 
voices in roundtables meetings, forced SECP to relax the stringent requirement (see section 6.2.2). 
In January 2014, SECP amended the mandatory requirement of appointing the independent director 
as chairman of the internal audit committee as voluntary to improve compliance with the Code 
2012. This is similar to the findings of (Shapiro and Matson, 2008) and (Canning and O’Dwyer, 
2013), where actors form lobbies to influence accounting regulations. This supports our point of 
view that families are dominant in Pakistan and actors at all three levels are reproducing the status 
quo of family dominance.  
8.5.3 Auditing – serving family interests 
The availability of independent and quality external auditors is an important part of the Anglo-
American model of the CG structure. Auditing can resolve agency problems between management 
and shareholders by acting as a monitoring mechanism (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2007). 
Following the same line of reasoning, the Companies Ordinance 1984 (Section 255) and Codes 
defined the powers and duties of external auditors. The institutionalisation of auditing criteria into 
routine practices and subsequent reproduction are dependent upon the interrelationship between 
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legitimation (formal), signification (subjective) and domination (formal) (see table 8-3). The 
legitimation structure at the organisational level translated into formal rational criteria of the 
auditor’s appointment, rotation, and being free from conflict of interest. Objective measures were 
translated into the auditor report to management, auditors’ declaration that companies’ accounts are 
providing a true and fair view of the company affairs and its operating performance and disclosure 
of audit and non-audit fees. The domination structure is translated into a formal hierarchical 
structure where auditors are accountable to BOD, regulators and shareholders. The auditing rules are 
similar to the Anglo-American model of CG (Singh and Zammit, 2006, Siddiqui, 2010).  
However, this study demonstrated that auditing firms in Pakistan are lacking independence and 
struggling to perform their fiduciary duties (see section 5.3.2). The numbers of auditing firms having 
a satisfactory QCR rating are very few. Prior studies have also revealed that business families are 
disrupting the auditing function because they do not want to disclose family secrets. Due to their 
long relationship, auditors are more loyal to the controlling families and protect their interests. The 
study shows that audit fees in Pakistan are very low which resulted in compromised auditing. In 
Code 2012, SECP introduced a new rule requiring all listed companies to change their external 
auditors after five years of consecutive audits. The rationale was to break the nexus between 
controlling families and auditing firms. The interview data indicates that the new requirement was 
very unpopular amongst the controlling families due to the shortage of auditors with a satisfactory 
QCR rating. Overall, similar to the other developing countries, independent and competent auditing 
firms are lacking in Pakistan (Uddin, 2009, Abdul Wahab et al., 2015).  
8.5.4 Annual general meeting – an exercise in futility 
One of the direct ways in which shareholders can monitor and resolve conflict with company 
management is AGM. Shareholders can influence the way in which a company should run through 
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voting in AGM (Solomon, 2010). The AGM provides a yearly opportunity to shareholders to 
interact with the company management and board to ask about business affairs and the figures 
presented in the financial statement. The criteria for routine practices of AGM in terms of axes of 
tension and the dimensions of structuration are presented in table (8-3). The Ordinance provides a 
legitimation structure of conducting AGM and objective representation in annual reports. The 
formal domination structure gives privileges to shareholders to elect directors and monitor company 
management performance. Under the listing regulations, companies are accountable to regulators 
and in case of failure to hold AGM, management is liable to pay a fine. SECP can delist a company 
from the stock exchange if it failed to hold AGMs for two or more years.   
In contrast to the compliance with other CG measures discussed above, this study demonstrated that 
family listed companies in Pakistan have no problem in conducting AGM on a regular basis. 
According to the findings, family listed companies are complying with CG measure and the majority 
of the companies are conducting AGMs on a regular basis. This finding is quite different from other 
studies in a traditional setting where family listed companies have been found to be reluctant to hold 
AGMs and used delay tactics (For example see, Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). In line with (Uddin 
and Choudhury, 2008) that “holding AGMs still does not guarantee accountability and transparency 
to general shareholders”, this study argued that in closely held family listed companies, rational CG 
measures such as AGM are an exercise of futility. According to the findings, high concentration of 
ownership is insulating controlling families from shareholders activism. The cumulative voting or 
proportional representation enables controlling families to elect close family members to the 
company board. Family-controlled listed companies are conducting AGMs in their registered offices 
located in remote areas, which makes it difficult for minority shareholders to attend AGMs. In 
general, AGMs are very informal and short and controlling families completely dominate AGMs’ 
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proceedings. These examples show that actors at the organisational level are reproducing family 
dominance and rational CG measures failed to change routine practices and processes. 
According to the interview data, controlling families know that minority shareholders in Pakistan 
are dispersed and have no interest in active participation in AGM. General shareholders’ attendance 
in AGMs is very poor. The interview data revealed that in cases where some shareholders attend 
AGMs, they are more interested in gifts and lunch. Findings support the argument that the CG 
structure in Pakistan is weak and raises concerns about regulators’ efforts to introduce an Anglo-
American CG model which assumes an active role of shareholders in the company’s governance 
affairs.   
8.5.5 Dividend – an issue of family growth 
Dividend is income distributed to shareholders by the company and dividend payout is the effect of 
the company share price and growth (Fama and French, 1988, Powers and Al-Twaijry, 2007). In 
terms of axes of tension and dimensions of structuration criteria of dividend payout is presented in 
table (8-3). Formal rational criteria give general shareholders a strong preference for dividends. 
According to Ordinance, it is not mandatory for listed companies to declare their dividend even if it 
has earned profit. BODs have power to recommend dividends and they can be declared in AGM. 
The signification structure requires listed companies to publish accounts whereby shareholders can 
evaluate a company’s financial performance. In formal hierarchical domination structure, companies 
are accountable to regulators, stock exchanges and ultimately shareholders.  
As illustrated in table (8-3) the dividend policy is where privileged general shareholders are 
competing with family substantive rationality of growth and wellbeing. Substantial evidences 
presented in this study indicate that family listed companies are reluctant to declare dividends. 
224 
 
According to findings in the last decade, on average 40% of profit-making companies declared 
dividends. Interview data revealed that family-controlled listed companies preferred to reinvest 
profit to build the family empire.   
In order to increase the practice of declaring dividends, SECP has taken many steps. The Finance 
Act 1999 made it mandatory for listed companies to distribute at least 50% of their cash dividend of 
the taxed profit. Interview data revealed that controlling families considered it as interference in the 
job of BODs. The role of agency was evident when family listed companies threatened regulators to 
remove the mandatory requirement of declaring dividends, otherwise they would buy back their 
shares and get delisted. In response, SECP quietly removed the mandatory requirement. This is 
another example that supports this study’s argument that actors at all three levels are reproducing 
and strengthening the family structure. In addition, this example also illustrates that the family 
structure is interfering in the institutionalisation of rational CG measures.  
The findings implied that controlling families are not keen to declare dividends because they are 
holding the majority of the managerial and board positions and are already enjoying huge salaries 
and fringe benefits. The findings also revealed that controlling families are transferring listed 
companies’ profits to their private companies. Although stock exchanges require listed companies to 
get approval from audit committees and BODs before doing any transaction with the controlling 
family’s other private companies, approval from the board is very easy to obtain. The family-
dominated boards ensure family protection and growth by not recommending dividends. Hence, 
competing structures are in a continuous struggle and produce unintended consequences. 
Controlling families in Pakistan continue to bypass, ignore and resist rational CG measures imposed 
on them, and similar findings have been observed in the prior studies (Tsamenyi et al., 2008, Uddin 
and Choudhury, 2008, Uddin and Hopper, 2003, Dyball et al., 2006, Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999).  
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8.5.6 Disclosure - a threat to family secrets 
Increasing corporate transparency is one of the most important aims of CG reforms (Cadbury 
Report, 1992). Prior research has argued that improvement in disclosure results in improvement in 
transparency and it is critical for efficient functioning of the capital market (Millar et al., 2005, Price 
et al., 2011, Solomon, 2010). The disclosure criteria for routine and practices at the organisational 
level in terms of axes of tension and dimensions of structuration are presented in table (8-3). Formal 
rational criteria require listed companies to prepare and disclose information in annual reports. 
Information includes the director’s report, statement of compliance with CG codes, operating and 
financial review, balance sheet, P/L statement and some other mandatory items. The Codes require 
listed companies to publish and circulate statements of compliance with CG codes in a given 
standard form. Listed companies are also required to prepare and circulate unaudited quarterly and 
audited half-yearly financial statements with the director’s reports. Objective representation of the 
annual statement is prepared under the guidelines of the Ordinance, the Codes and IAS/IFRS 
whereby performance can be evaluated. The formal hierarchical structure is where companies are 
accountable to regulators and stock exchanges and ultimately to shareholders. The legitimating 
grounds are predicated on improving transparency.  
The findings revealed that competing structures are in action (see section 7.4.5). As illustrated in 
table (8-3) the formal rational CG measure to improve transparency is competing with the 
substantive rationality of securing family secrets. The unintended consequences of this were 
symbolic compliance with only mandatory requirements, fabricated annual reports and tick-box 
implementation. The findings indicate that the standard statement of the compliance form with CG 
codes makes it easy for family listed companies to comply and consequently resulted in the 
implementation of the tick-box form Family listed companies are preparing and publishing 
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fabricated reports and disclosing only mandatory requirements. Interview data demonstrated that 
controlling families considered listed companies as their private businesses and hence are reluctant 
to disclose family secrets. As a result, this study argued that in family-controlled listed companies 
there are limitations in improving transparency using rational CG measure of the financial reporting 
framework. Controlling families are resisting and symbolically complying with CG codes imposed 
on them. In addition, findings illustrated that regulators are lacking in staff and resources to monitor 
companies’ actual operations. This supports the earlier argument that the CG structure required to 
work on the Anglo-American model of CG efficiently is missing in Pakistan.  
8.5.7 Delisting trend – an avoidance strategy 
Many institutional theorists recognise that organisations may adopt an avoidance strategy as a 
response to institutional pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, Oliver, 1991).  The above discussion 
revealed that competing structures that existed at the organisational level resulted in symbolic 
compliance and decoupling. The Code 2002 was implemented under a ‘comply or explain’ 
principle; however the Code 2012 is mandatory. The findings highlighted the role of agency in an 
escape strategy adopted by the controlling family to avoid regulatory compliance. The findings 
pointed out the delisting trend in Pakistan. According to the findings, a major reason for delisting is 
to avoid compliance with the criteria of BODs set in the Codes. In addition, family listed companies 
perceive the Codes as useless, costly to implement and as an obstacle to the company’s growth. The 
numbers of listed companies in KSE are 558, which is a huge drop from 712 companies at the 
introduction of the Code 2002. Further to this, the number of companies offering shares dropped to 
4 from 30 in the 1990s. This trend is contrary to the belief that the adoption of the Anglo-American 
model will result in investor’s confidence and consequently a thicker equity market (Mueller, 2006). 
The findings implied that controlling families are taking extent decisions to reproduce and 
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strengthen their dominance and control over their companies. This suggests that regulations or 
reforms that emerge and develop at SPE and the field level are competing with familial interests and 
will meet great resistance in institutionalisation at the organisational level, as predicted by previous 
researchers (Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999, Uddin and Choudhury, 2008, Uddin and Hopper, 2001, 
Uddin and Hopper, 2003, Ansari and Bell, 1991, Arnold, 2012, Morck et al., 2004).  
In summary, this study, on the basis of the above discussion, can safely argue that the 
institutionalisation of the Codes faces resistance from the controlling families. The CG mechanisms, 
in order to protect minority shareholders at the organisational level, are implemented through an 
interrelationship of legitimation (formal rationality), signification (objective representation) and 
domination (formal hierarchical) structure. As illustrated in table (8-3) it is competing with family 
legitimation (substantive rationality), signification (subjective representation) and domination 
(informal) structure. The unintended consequences were symbolic compliance, delisting and 
decoupling of CG mechanisms from organisational routine practices and processes. Family listed 
companies are completely dominated by controlling families. The general conclusion that emerges 
from the discussion at the organisational level is that the family listed companies are symbolically 
complying with CG mechanisms and decoupled them from routine practices and processes in order 
to serve the family’s interests. The CG mechanisms BOD, audit committees, AGM and disclosure 
are overshadowed by the family dominance. The BOD, audit committees, and HR&R committees 
are informal and are dominated and controlled by families. The financial statements are often 
fabricated. Families are resisting declaring dividends. In addition, families are escaping from 
complying with the Codes. Thus, this study argued that controlling families have coercive and 
informal control on organisations and are disrupting the institutionalisation of CG mechanisms 




This chapter provided a discussion and analysis of findings in relation to the conceptual framework 
and research objectives. The multi-theory and multi-level conceptual framework comprises Neo-
Institutional Sociology (NIS) theory, structuration theory and Weber’s axes of tension which were 
used to analyse the process of institutionalisation, transposition, deinstitutionalisation and 
decoupling of CG codes at three societal levels. Within each societal level the legitimating grounds, 
representational schema, domination perspective and role of agency were explained. The role of 
agents interacting with structures of legitimation, signification, and domination at each level enable 
analyses of the potential for conflict, crises, and unintended consequences, and possibilities for 
institutional change.  
In summary, this study, on the basis of above discussion, can safely argue that the 
institutionalisation of the Codes faces resistance at all three societal levels. This study demonstrated 
that contested structures are in action. The CG codes’ structure [legitimation (formal rationality), 
signification (objective representation) and domination (formal hierarchical)] is competing with 
familial [legitimation (substantive rationality), signification (subjective representation) and 
domination (informal)] structure. The unintended consequences are diluted, compromised and weak 
CG codes at the SPE level; poor and weak implementation and evaluation at the organisational field 
level; and symbolic compliance, decoupling and delisting at the organisational level. The coercive 
pressure from IFAs resulted in the emergence of CG codes in Pakistan. However, the divide 
amongst the opponents during the critical phases, the impressive amount of government interference 
and commitment to control regulatory institutions, tensions amongst the regulatory institutions, and 
increasing delisting trends resulted in diluted, compromised and weak CG codes at the SPE level 
and weak implementation at the organisational field level.  
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Notwithstanding, the organisational level, the formal existence of BOD, independent directors, 
board committees, and internal audit committees, the control is in the hands of controlling families. 
Under the notion of duality of structure the family-controlled listed companies continued to value 
family dominance and control over board and company resources. The management is more 
accountable to families than enacted rules and regulations. The discussion indicates that within 
family-controlled listed companies, informal internal control represents the owners’ whims rather 
than the formal hierarchical system of professionally run corporations of market capitalism. Family 
controls over organisations allocative and authoritative resources greatly affect CG mechanisms and 
disrupts their institutionalisation. While it contradicts the Anglo-American model’s formal rationale 
for board efficiency, such an approach to the functioning of BOD is entirely consonant with family 
capitalism, which considers the business as a vehicle to support familial growth and wellbeing. 
Controlling families’ resistance to implementing CG mechanisms was by virtue a system of family 




Chapter 9: Conclusion, contributions and directions for 
future research 
9.1 Introduction  
The focus of this chapter is to summarise this research in order to identify the contributions of the 
study. The limitations of the study are also identified and some potential avenues for future research 
are also highlighted.  
Prior work on CG reforms in developing countries has mostly considered institutionalisation as an 
outcome rather than a political process (Siddiqui, 2010) and the roles of power and interest have 
been overlooked (Dillard et al., 2004, Yoshikawa et al., 2007). In order to fill this gap, the first 
research objective of this study was set to explore the wider socio-political and economic 
environment in relation to the process of emergence and development of CG regulations in Pakistan. 
This research objective led to the first research question that is “why and how have CG regulations 
emerged and developed in Pakistan?” The second research objective aimed to identify the factors 
that have shaped the development and implementation process of the CG codes in Pakistan. The 
focus here was to analyse the regulatory context which has a major role in the development and 
implementation of CG codes in Pakistan. This study has not only attempted to demonstrate the 
development and implementation process of CG codes but also to understand how these CG codes 
have influenced routine practices in family-controlled listed companies. The third objective of this 
study was set to examine organisational level factors that may have affected the institutionalisation 
of corporate governance codes in family-controlled public listed companies in Pakistan. This 
research objective led to the second research question which explored the extent to which the 
institutionalisations of corporate governance codes have occurred in the family-controlled listed 
companies (see chapters 1 and 2). 
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This study has developed a multi-theory multi-level analytical framework of institutional dynamics, 
which offers insight into both macro analysis to understand the emergence and development process 
of CG regulations and micro analysis of family-controlled listed companies’ response to CG codes 
and interactions between them. The analytical framework incorporates institutional theory, 
structuration theory and Weber’s axes of tension to understand institutionalisation, transposition and 
deinstitutionalisation processes across all three societal levels (see chapter 3). This study has 
employed qualitative documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews to address the research 
objectives based on the critical paradigm as the underlying philosophical assumption (see chapter 4). 
The longitudinal analysis enabled us to tease out how local actors influence the emergence and 
development process of CG regulations (Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and 
Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo 
and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 
2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and 
Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo 
and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 
2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and 
Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo 
and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 
2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and 
Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo 
and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 
2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and 
Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo 
and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 
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2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013)(Mahadeo and 
Soobaroyen, 2013).  
The analysis presented in chapter 8, using the analytical framework based on findings in chapters 6 
and 7, highlighted that the historically established familial structure of substantive rationality 
(legitimation), subjective representation (signification), and informal control (domination) is 
competing with coercively diffused Anglo-American CG codes from IFAs, based on the market 
structure of formal rationality (legitimation), objective representation (signification), and formal 
hierarchical control (domination) at all three societal levels. The unintended consequences of 
competing structures on the development process of CG codes are the introduction of compromised 
CG codes at the SPE level, a weak regulatory context at the organisational field level and symbolic 
compliance, resistance and decoupling at the organisational level. The analysis revealed that 
coercive, mimetic and normative pressures from powerful actors at the SPE level resulted in the 
introduction of CG codes in line with Anglo-American CG model. SECP coercively implemented 
CG codes as a part of listing regulations. However, political and business families, by employing 
their powers and resources, diluted CG codes at the SPE level, weakening the implementation and 
evaluation process at the organisational field level. At the organisational level, family-controlled 
listed companies were symbolically complying with CG codes due to regulative reasons and 
decoupled routine practices and processes from intended CG controls.  
This crucial role of agency was visible at all three societal levels. The analysis depicts that actors at 
all three societal levels (SPE, field, organisational) are reproducing and strengthening family 
structures and resisting institutionalisation of CG regulations. At the SPE level, power relations and 
political bargaining amongst key actors have resulted in weak CG codes. At the organisational level, 
family-controlled listed companies are adopting delisting strategies to avoid regulative compliance 
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with CG codes. The analysis revealed that the delisting trend is an unintended consequence of 
imposed coercive/regulative CG regulations in Pakistan. In sum, this study has highlighted that the 
CG codes, in line with the Anglo-American model, are facing resistance from controlling families 
and are struggling to get institutionalised in family-controlled listed companies in Pakistan. The next 
section presents the contributions this study makes.  
9.2 Contributions 
This study contributes to the theory, empirics, and policy and practice in the field of accounting in 
several ways. The contributions of this study are as follows:  
9.2.1 Contributions to theory 
This study contributes to the theory by adopting process centred approach in examining the process 
of development of CG regulations. The study developed a multi-theory multi-level analytical 
framework for analysing the process of institutionalisation, transposition and deinstitutionalisation 
of the CG codes across three different societal levels, i.e. the Socio-Political and Economic (SPE) 
level, organisational field level and organisational level. The present applications of agency theory 
and institutional theory have been too narrow to understand and incorporate the complexity of 
accounting regulations’ development and implementation processes (Dillard et al., 2004, Caramanis 
et al., 2015). In addition, the existing debate within the accounting literature either focuses on macro 
issues or on micro issues. There is a dearth of research focusing on both macro and micro issues and 
their interplay simultaneously. Given that this study seeks to understand the emergence and 
development process of CG regulations at the SPE level (macro-level) and behaviour of family-
controlled listed companies in response to institutionally imposed CG codes (micro-level), a 
framework which offers insight into both the macro and micro levels and interactions between them, 
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is considered valuable. This study complements the conventional focus of institutional studies on the 
impact of the environment on organisations by examining the development process of CG across 
institutional levels and shows how organisations can influence their environment. This study has 
exhibited that the analysis presented in chapter eight using a multi-level analytical framework has 
depicted a better understanding of institutional and organisational aspects of CG. 
The analytical framework for institutional dynamics developed in this study is comprised of Neo-
Institutional Sociology (NIS) theory, structuration theory and Weber’s axes of tension. Institutional 
theory enables analyses of how CG codes are institutionalised, transposed and implemented in a top-
down manner from the SPE level through the field and organisational level. Structuration theory 
helps in making sense of social processes and highlights the role of agency in the production and 
change of social structures. The use of structuration theory in conjunction with institutional theory 
gives insight into the bottom-up perspective of how an agent at the organisational level interacts 
with top-down institutionally imposed CG codes. The framework recognises that actions of agents at 
all three levels of analysis can initiate, resist or facilitate institutional change. Structuration theory’s 
notion of ‘dialectic of control’ offers insight into the power relations which were clearly visible 
during the development process of CG codes in the context of Pakistan. The incorporation of 
Weber’s axes of tension enables to recognition of the existence of competing structures, which 
explains how deinstitutionalisation, decoupling and unintended consequences occur.  
This study argues that a multi-level, multi-theory framework developed in this study could offer 
better analysis of the process of institutionalisation, transposition and deinstitutionalisation of 
accounting regulations in a given social context. The analytical framework recognises that 
institutionalisation process of CG regulations is complex due to the existence or emergence of 
multiple competing social structures in a given context. The existing social structures (signification, 
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legitimation, domination) may influence the development process if new regulations challenge or 
threaten their existence.  The analysis shows that in Pakistan, the newly established structures of 
power and control through the introduction of CG codes, i.e. that in line with the Anglo-American 
model and prevailing structures of family dominance, are two competing structures (see figure 8-1). 
The institutionalisation criteria in the CG codes are dependent upon on the interrelationship of 
signification (objective representation), legitimation (formal rationality) and domination (formal 
hierarchy) structures. In contrast, the family capitalism is dependent upon the interrelationship of 
competing structure of signification (subjective representation), legitimation (substantive rationality) 
and domination (informal). The existence of competing structures made the institutionalisation of 
CG reforms a complex process and resulted in conflicts, contradictions and unintended 
consequences at all three societal levels. Hence this study suggests that institutionalisation of the 
Anglo-American CG model is facing difficulties in Pakistan because existing structural conditions 
(legitimation, signification, domination) are different from the developed world where this model 
originates. Overall, in the context of Pakistan, political and business families’ dominance prevailed. 
The conflicts between multiple actors, the quest for power and, autonomy, and the willingness to 
continue with the status quo that diluted Code 2002 still dominates and could erode the effectiveness 
of Code 2012.  
9.2.2 Contributions to the literature  
This study contributes to accounting literature in general and corporate governance in particular by 
examining the emergence and development process of CG regulations in a family dominant context 
of Pakistan. Thus, this study is expected to make contributions to research on corporate governance, 
family businesses, diffusion, and developing countries as follows. 
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This study by adopting process centred approach has presented a longitudinal analysis of the 
emergence and development of CG codes within Pakistani context from 1995-2014.  In contrast to 
the argument that CG regulations in most of the developing countries are converging towards the 
Anglo-American model of CG due to the pressures from IFAs (Siddiqui, 2010), this study has 
demonstrated that the emergence and development process of the CG codes is an expression of 
power and politics. CG codes exacerbate the clashes over rationalities, power and material issues. 
This study adds complexity to the efficiency-legitimacy and divergence-convergence debate by 
revealing that the development process of CG regulations is dynamic, political and non-linear as a 
result of complex interactions at the three societal levels of analysis. This study recognises 
institutionalisation of CG codes as a process and not merely as an outcome. The analysis has 
highlighted power relations and political negotiations within and between the state, IFAs, SECP and 
business families’ lobby in the emergence and development process of CG codes in Pakistan. IFAs 
promoted the Anglo-American nature of reforms due to normative and efficiency reasons, however, 
they also coercively forced developing countries to impose these codes as part of their loan 
conditionality. SECP, in order to placate powerful interests and to gain legitimacy from IFAs, 
introduced CG codes in line with the Anglo-American CG model. However, interests and powers of 
local powerful actors influenced both the process of emergence and development of CG reforms and 
their outcomes. Historically dominant political and business families did not accept it and 
consequently, influenced and shaped the development process of CG codes. Business families 
successfully shaped CG codes in their favour by putting pressure on SECP and using their political 
connections and loyal supporters on key posts in government institutions. This study has suggested 
that the diffusion of CG regulations will likely influence a more diverse array of forces that cannot 
be reduced to the orthodox concept of efficiency-legitimacy and divergence-convergence 
(Caramanis et al., 2015).  
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This study has also analysed institutionalisation of CG codes within family-controlled listed 
companies at the organisational level and its unintended consequences. In doing so, this study 
extends the family businesses literature by illustrating various degrees of symbolic compliance and 
decoupling from CG codes in family-controlled listed companies and then identified the unintended 
consequences (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). This study has illustrated 
that CG codes are struggling to institutionalise at the organisational level. Family listed companies 
are complying with CG mechanisms due to regulatory reasons, however, they also decoupled 
routine practices and processes from intended CG controls defined in the Codes. Family-controlled 
listed companies have perceived CG codes as less useful and as a threat to their control and 
dominance in company affairs, and thus lack the motivation to implement codes in true letter and 
spirit.  Close family members and relatives, whether they are holding majority of the shares or not, 
are controlling and managing listed companies’ operations. The majority of the positions in the 
board of directors and board committees are occupied by founding family members and relatives. In 
a majority of the cases, positions of CEO and chairman are shared between the father and the son. 
The management is more accountable to families than enacted rules and regulations. The state of 
AGM is poor and families are resisting in declaring their dividend. Financial and governance 
disclosures in annual reports are fabricated and lack quality and transparency. Overall, this study 
found that family-controlled listed companies were reluctant to comply with the CG rules and 
regulations.  
This study has overcome the limited focus on the role of agency in the prior CG diffusion studies 
which employed agency theory and institutional theory as theoretical lenses. This study suggested 
that the simplistic assumption of the powerful role of IFAs and the submissive role of national actors 
need to be revised to aid the analysis of agents and institutional actions. This study highlights the 
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active and resistive role of national actors in the institutionalisation, transposition and 
deinstitutionalisation of CG codes across three societal levels of Pakistan. This study argues that due 
to the coexistence of competing structures at all three societal levels, the institutionalisation of CG 
reforms became an ineluctably political struggle and resulted in compromised and half-measured 
regualtions to bring a temporary truce. The analysis of the development process of CG regulations 
demonstrated that in response to both the external and internal pressures, regulators (SECP) at SPE 
level balanced multiple competing demands by introducing toothless or diluted CG codes in 
Pakistan, which lack the ability to achieve the intended goals of general shareholder protection. At 
the organisational level, family-controlled listed companies are symbolically in compliance with CG 
mechanisms and decoupled actual practices. In addition to the legal change, corporate governance 
reforms also require an agreement and consensus amongst political and business elites (Gordon et 
al., 2004). The analysis from this study suggests that instead of focusing on the divergence-
convergence debate, diffusion studies should identify the different degrees of compromises as a 
result of complex political negotiations that occurred in a given context.  
Last but not least, this study contributes to the literature of accounting studies in the developing 
countries by presenting an ideal case of Pakistan. Pakistan is an agrarian developing economy where 
both political and corporate powers lie within the hands of few families. This study, while analysing 
the institutionalisation of CG reforms, revealed that in Pakistan where families’ interests have been 
protected since independence, it is difficult to introduce laws and regulations such as CG codes, 
which can harm family interests. This study has demonstrated that state, regulators and families 
have different competing interests, which influenced the institutionalisation process of CG 
regulations. On the basis of analysis presented in this study, it can be argued that Pakistan has its 
own unique business environment, where families are not only controlling industries at the 
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organisational level, but they also have a presence in government institutions, where they can turn 
the situation in their favour. The findings are in line with prior studies which highlighted the 
powerful and resistive role of ruling families in the institutionalisation of governance reforms (Yapa, 
2014). Family capitalism in Pakistan has influenced and resisted the institutionalisation of CG 
reforms at all three societal levels. The institutionalisation of CG regulations in Pakistan shows that 
the relationships and motivations are more complicated and are beyond the scope of agency theory 
and institutional theory as standalone theoretical lenses. The types of relationships, efforts, 
motivations and values can only be acknowledged rather than calculated. This study argues that 
economic reasons alone are not sufficient to explain the growth of these familial industrial houses in 
Pakistan; relationships, networks and connections between main players are also key factors. Thus, 
the study of corporate governance regulations and practices in unique family dominating business 
environments of Pakistan is considered as a valuable contribution to the accounting literature.  
9.2.3 Contributions to policy and practice 
This study contributes to the policy-making by questioning the effectiveness of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP) offered by IFAs in the developing countries (Uddin and Choudhury, 
2008, Uddin and Hopper, 2003, Arnold, 2005, Arnold, 2012).  
First, IFAs are promoting capital market reform in line with the Anglo-American market based on 
efficiency grounds. They claim that such reforms will boost investors’ and general shareholders’ 
confidence and consequently result in fostering economic growth and a thick capital market 
(Mueller, 2006). However, this study has demonstrated that CG codes, which are in line with the 
Anglo-American model, have produced unintended consequences in Pakistan. For example, analysis 
shows that family-controlled listed companies, which are in the majority, are voluntary delisting 
from stock exchanges to avoid compliance with the CG codes. Since the introduction of the CG 
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codes, only from the Karachi Stock Exchange have more than 150 companies have been delisted. 
The family-controlled listed companies found CG costly to comply with without any substantial 
benefits. This study suggests that IFAs’ claim that shareholder centric CG regulations would result 
in investor confidence and a  thick equity market is a normative theory.  
Second, if the efficiency assumption is considered unquestionable, this will lead to the illusion that 
institutionalisation of the American model is crises-prone. However, the introduction of 
compromised CG codes as a result of a huge struggle and political negotiations at the SPE level and 
delisting trend at the organisational level question the IFAs’ assumption that coercive diffusion of 
the Anglo-American model through loan conditionality will ensure wider acceptability. The analysis 
suggests that the institutionalisation of CG reforms is a complex process due to the existence of 
multiple competing interests and powers in a given context that may shape the regulations and 
consequently influence their effectiveness. This study argues that IFAs need to reconsider their 
naïve assumptions that efficiency reasons and coercive diffusion through loan conditionality will 
ensure wider acceptability of capital market reforms in the developing countries. On the basis of 
analysis presented in figure 8-1, this study suggested that if existing social structures (signification, 
legitimation, domination) are not competing with diffused practices, this will reduce resistance in 
the institutionalisation of the CG model in a given context.  
This study has some implications for the development and implementation of CG reforms in family-
controlled listed companies. Most of the publicly listed companies and almost all private companies 
are owned and controlled by few industrial families in Pakistan. However, analysis in this study 
revealed that IFAs and SECP have tried to introduce Anglo-American model CG reforms in 
Pakistan. The Anglo-American model of CG regulations is developed in countries where companies 
are mostly held by large numbers of shareholders. SECP (2003) in its report, acknowledged that:  
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“The corporate governance reforms, introduced by SECP, tend to be more effective in 
MNCs and in widely held companies. Although, presently, there is a dearth of widely 
held local private companies, the Code has played an important role in outlining an 
environment that in future, once there is a growth of widely held companies on the stock 
market.”  
This study demonstrated that institutionalisation of CG Codes in Pakistan are facing resistance from 
family-controlled listed companies. Unintended consequences of this are symbolic compliance, 
decoupling and a delisting trend. This study suggests that SECP, instead of forcing these family-
controlled listed companies to operate like widely held corporations, should introduce separate CG 
Codes which specifically focus on CG issues related to family businesses. This suggestion is similar 
to what the Ministry of Justice proposed in Japan, to have two CG systems to accommodate two 
different demands (Yoshikawa et al., 2007). On the basis of this proposal two CG systems emerged 
in Japan, one that resembles the Anglo-American model and one for traditional family-controlled 
companies. This study suggests that separate CG Codes for family-controlled listed companies will 
not only reduce resistance from family-controlled listed companies but will also stop the drainage of 
family-controlled listed companies from stock exchanges.  
9.3 Limitations of the research and future research directions  
This research has some limitations.  
As this study is based on the limited number of interviews from three societal levels, the 
generalisability of the analytical framework remains to be tested. In exploring the emergence and 
development of CG reforms in Pakistan, the views of key officials were obtained using semi-
structured interviews. Officials from SECP, KSE, ISE, PICG, and ICAP were interviewed. 
However, for the perspectives of representatives from IFAs such as the IMF, World Bank and ADB, 
the author relied on publicly available documents. This study suggests that interviews with 
representatives from IFAs such as the IMF, World Bank and ADB could enhance the arguments of 
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this study. Therefore, the role of IFAs in the diffusion of CG codes in Pakistan is limited to available 
data.  
Similarly, the author also faced problems in getting access to interviews at the field and 
organisational levels. This study has been conducted in the traditional familial context of Pakistan, 
where “secrecy is a major stumbling block” (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008, p 1031) for collecting 
and validating data. Therefore, the understanding of the CG implementation processes at the 
organisational field and level and CG practices at the organisational level is limited to these 
interviewees. The author recognises that more interviews would have provided further insight into 
the institutionalisation, transposition, and deinstitutionalisation processes of CG Codes. The failure 
to do so was due to the shortage of time and budget.  
This study covers the period from 1995 to 2014 during which the revised CG code was introduced 
and implemented in 2012. The author conducted the majority of the interviews during the months of 
April, May and June of 2013. Thus, this study mainly focuses on the institutionalisation of CG Code 
2002, and does not have a full picture of the institutionalisation of CG Code 2012 and its effects on 
family-controlled listed companies. A promising avenue for future research would be to study in 
greater detail the institutionalisation of CG Code 2012 in the family-controlled listed companies.  
This study has only focused on family-controlled listed companies. Although family-controlled 
listed companies are approximately 80% of the total listed companies in Pakistan, no claims can be 
made for generalisability. Even the findings cannot be generalised to all family-controlled listed 
companies. This study suggests that a comparative study of institutionalisation of CG codes in 




The analysis suggests that the quest to prioritise studies of global regulatory arrangements, while 
highly relevant given transnational developments, should not lead us to ignore studies of the detailed 
processes through which these global regulations are translated at the local level. This study calls for 
an enhanced appreciation of the influence of national political and social contexts on the 
development and interpretation of accounting regulation, whether arising from within these contexts 
or as part of local interpretations of global regulations. Despite the global nature of accounting 
regulation, the passivity of local regulators should not be readily presumed but subjected to 
continued careful scrutiny (Caramanis et al., 2015).  
Institutional studies arguing that the adoption of CG regulations is the outcome of mimetic, 
normative or coercive responses to institutional pressures fail to capture the political bargaining 
process that takes place in determining the contents of the adopted regulations.  The existing studies 
of diffusion of CG regulations around the world, particularly in emerging economies, usually 
focused on similarities between adopted codes and internationally accepted CG practices. These 
studies considered that isomorphism does not affect the substance of the codes. This study highlights 
that the regulation’s development process is an ongoing product of political effort of key actors to 
accomplish their goals. The national political and economic context may influence the process and 
outcome of the transnational actors’ efforts to diffuse internationally accepted accounting practices. 
In order to ascertain whether CG regulations are really converging towards the Anglo-American 
model of CG, the researchers not should only focus on similarities with the Anglo-American model 
but also the differences in the adopted CG codes. This allows analysis of the degree of compromises 
and dilution rather than just its resemblance with the Anglo-American model. Thus, this is a 
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Brief Description Manner of 
Enforcement 
Effective Date 
(i) Representation of independent non-executive 
directors, including those representing 
minority interests, on the Board of Directors 
of listed companies. 
Voluntary When  next  election   
is due 
(ii) Filing of consent by directors Mandatory When next election is 
due 
(iii) and (iv) Qualification and eligibility to act as a director Mandatory When  next  election   is 
due 
(v) Election/ nomination of a broker on the 
Board of Directors 
Voluntary When  next  election   
is due 
(vi) Tenure of office of directors Mandatory Immediate 
(vii), (viii) and 
(ix) 
Responsibilities,   powers   and   functions   of  the 
Board of Directors 
Mandatory July 1, 2002 
(x), (xi) and 
(xii) 





Significant  issues to be placed for decision by 
the Board of Directors 
 





July 1, 2002 
 
 
January 1, 2009 
(xiv) Orientation courses Mandatory July 1, 2002 
xv) Appointment    and    removal    of    CFO    and 
Company Secretary 










Requirement for CFO and Company Secretary 





























For accounting periods 
ending on or after June 
30, 2002 
 
For accounting periods 




Responsibility    for    financial    reporting    and 
corporate compliance 
Mandatory For accounting periods 









(xxvi) Disclosure   of  interest   by   a  director   holding 
company's shares 
Mandatory Immediate 
(xxvii) Auditors not to hold shares Mandatory Immediate 
(xxviii) Corporate ownership structure Mandatory July 1, 2002 
(xxix) Divestiture of shares by sponsors/ controlling 
interest 





Audit Committee Mandatory July 1, 2002 
(xxxv) and 
(xxxvi) 





Appointment of external auditors Mandatory When   next 
appointment   of 
auditors is due 
(xli) Rotation of external auditors Mandatory When   next 
appointment   of 
auditors is due 
(xlii) Appointment of a partner or employee of the 
external auditors in a key position within the listed 
company 
Mandatory Immediately   for 
new 
appointments 
(xliii) Management letter issued by external auditors Mandatory For accounting periods 
ending on or after June 
30, 2002 
(xliv) Attendance   of   external   auditors   at   Annual 
General Meeting 
Mandatory For accounting periods 
ending on or after June 
30, 2002 
(xlv) and (xlvi) Compliance    with    the    Code    of   Corporate 
Governance 
Mandatory For accounting periods 









Appendix B – Comparison of the Companies Ordinance 1984, Code 2002 and Code 2012  
Sr. No Issues The Ordinance 1984 Code 2002 Code 2012 
          
1 Board Composition Not Defined Defined Defined 
2 Number of Directors 7 to  ∞ 7 to  ∞ 7 to  ∞ 
3 # of directorships Not Defined Ten Seven 
4 # of Independent Director Not Defined Minimum one (Voluntary 
Clause) 
One independent director is mandatory 
while preference is for 1/3rd of the total 
members of the board to be independent 
directors. 
5 # of Executive Directors Not Defined There shall be not more 
than 75% executive 
Maximum number of Executive Directors 
cannot be more than 1/3rd of elected 
directors including CEO. 
6 Composition of 7 member 
board 
Not Defined Not Defined one ID, four non-executive directors, 2 
executive directors 
7 Eligibility to Become 
Director 
The Ordinance 
describes who cannot 
become a director of 
the company  
Defined Further Extends 




Definition was fairly 
broad (one explanation) 





9 Director Tenure 3 Years Three years, in case of 
vacancy position, should 
be filled within 30 days 
Three years, in case of vacancy position, 
should be filled within 90 days 
10 Office of CEO and 
chairman 
Not defined Chairman shall 
preferably be elected 
from non-executive 
directors 
CEO and Chairman shall not be the same 
person unless specifically provided in other 
laws, and chairman shall be elected from 
non-executive directors 
11 Appointing CFO and CS Not defined Appointed by CEO, 
approved by BOD 
BOD 
12 Meeting of BOD The BOD shall meet at 
least once in every 
quarter of the 
financial year 
Same Same 
13 Remuneration of 
Directors 
Not Defined Not Defined A formal and transparent procedure to be 
followed and disclosure of aggregate 
remuneration in the annual report 
14 Director Training Program Not Defined Mandatory Mandatory 
15 Board Evaluation Not Defined Not Defined Within two years of the implementation of 
the Code 2012, the Board has to put in place 
a mechanism for undertaking annual 
evaluation of the performance of the board 
16 Board Evaluation Criteria Not Defined Not Defined Not Defined 





18 Composition of Audit 
Committee 
Not Defined Not Defined Committee shall comprise of non-executive 
directors 
19 Criteria for the chairman 
of Internal Audit 
committee 
Not Defined chairman of the audit 
committee shall 
preferably be a non-
executive director 
Chairman should be Independent Director, 
who shall not be chairman of BOD 
20 Secretary Audit 
Committee 
Not Defined Shall appoint secretary of 
the committee 
shall be company secretary or head of 
internal audit, CFO shall not appoint as 
secretary audit committee 
21 Internal Audit Not Defined listed company shall have 
an internal audit, and 
head of internal audit 
shall have access to the 
chair of the audit 
committee,  At least 
three members, name 
should disclose in the 
annual report,  
The internal audit function may be 
outsourced by a listed company to a 
professional services firm or be performed 
by the internal audit staff of the holding 
company. In the event of outsourcing the 
internal audit function, the company shall 
appoint or designate a fulltime employee 
other than the CFO, as Head of Internal 
Audit, to act as coordinator between the 
firm providing internal audit services and 
























Should have QCR rating 
from ICAP, tenure will be 
five years, should not 
engage in any other 















Appendix C – Statement of compliance with code of CG 
 
 
Name of company…………………………………………………………………………Year ending………………………………………………. 
 
This  statement   is  being  presented  to  comply  with  the  Code  of  Corporate   Governance 
contained in Regulation No. .……………   of listing regulations  of ……………………   for the  purpose  of 
establishing  a  framework of good  governance, whereby  a  listed company  is  managed in 
compliance with the best practices of corporate  governance. 
 
The company has applied the principles contained in the CCG in the following manner: 
 
1. The  company   encourages  representation of  independent  non-executive  directors  and 

















The independent directors meets the criteria of independence under clause i (b) of the CCG. 
 
2. The directors have confirmed that none  of them is serving as a director on more than seven 
listed companies,  including  this company  (excluding the  listed subsidiaries of listed holding 
companies where  applicable). 
 
3. All the resident directors of the company  are registered as taxpayers and  none  of them has 
defaulted in payment of any loan to a banking company, a DFI or an NBFI or, being a member of a 
stock exchange, has been  declared as a defaulter by that stock exchange. 
 
4. A casual vacancy occurring  on the board  on ………….. was filled up by the directors 
within………….. days. 
 
5. The company  has prepared a “Code of Conduct” and  has ensured  that appropriate  steps 
have been  taken to disseminate it throughout the company  along with its supporting  policies 
and procedures. 
 
6. The  board   has  developed   a  vision/mission  statement,  overall  corporate   strategy  and 
significant  policies of the  company.  A complete  record  of particulars of significant  policies 





7. All   the   powers   of  the   board   have   been   duly  exercised  and   decisions   on   material 
transactions,  including  appointment  and   determination   of  remuneration  and   terms  and 
conditions of employment  of the CEO, other executive and non-executive directors, have been 
taken by the board/shareholders. 
 
8. The meetings  of the board  were presided  over by the Chairman and, in his absence, by a 
director elected by the board for this purpose  and the board met at least once in every 
quarter. Written notices of the board  meetings, along with agenda and working papers, were 
circulated  at  least  seven  days  before  the  meetings.  The  minutes  of  the  meetings   were 
appropriately recorded  and circulated. 
 
9.  The board arranged ………. training programs for its directors during the year. 
 
10.  The  board  has  approved   [1] appointment of CFO,  Company  Secretary  and  Head  of 
Internal Audit, including their remuneration and terms and conditions of employment. 
 
11.  The directors’ report for this year has been  prepared in compliance with the requirements of the 
CCG and fully describes the salient matters required to be disclosed. 
 
12.  The financial statements  of the  company  were  duly endorsed by CEO and  CFO before 
approval of the board. 
 
13.  The directors, CEO and  executives do not hold any interest in the shares of the company other 
than that disclosed in the pattern of shareholding. 
 
14.   The company has complied with all the corporate  and financial reporting requirements of the 
CCG. 
 
15.  The board  has formed an Audit Committee. It comprises …….  members, of whom  ………  are 
non-executive directors and the chairman of the committee is an independent director. 
 
16.  The meetings  of the  audit committee  were  held  at  least once  every quarter  prior to 
approval of interim and final results of the company  and as required by the CCG. The terms of 
reference of the committee have been  formed and advised to the committee for compliance. 
 
17.  The board  has formed an HR and Remuneration Committee. It comprises……..members,  of 
whom……are   non-executive   directors   and    the   chairman    of   the   committee    is    a/an 
………..….director. 
 
18.  The board  has set up an effective internal audit function/ or has outsourced the internal audit 
function to ……….. who  are considered  suitably qualified and experienced  for the purpose and are 
conversant with the policies and procedures of the company. 
 
19.  The statutory  auditors  of the  company  have  confirmed that  they  have  been  given  a 
satisfactory rating under the quality control review program  of the ICAP, that they or any of the 
partners of the firm, their spouses and minor children do not hold shares of the company  and that 
the firm and all its partners are in compliance with International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 





20. The statutory auditors or the persons associated with them have not been appointed to provide 
other services except in accordance with the listing regulations and the auditors have confirmed 
that they have observed IFAC guidelines in this regard. 
 
21.   The ‘closed  period’,  prior to  the  announcement of interim/final results,  and  business 
decisions,  which   may  materially  affect  the   market  price  of  company’s     securities,  was 
determined and intimated to directors, employees and stock exchange(s). 
 
22.   Material/price sensitive information has been  disseminated among all market participants at 
once through stock exchange(s). 
 
23. We confirm that all other  material principles enshrined  in the CCG have  been  complied with 
[2] except  for the  following, toward  which  reasonable  progress  is being  made  by the company 
















[1] in case of new appointments made after the CCG has taken effect 





Appendix D – Participant consent form 
Mr Zubair Ahmad 
PhD Research Student 
Essex University Business School 
Email Id: azubai@essex.ac.uk 
zubairahmad@bzu.edu.pk 
Mobile no.: +44(0)7807123782  
+92(0)3006306390 
 
To whom it may concern 
 I am currently conducting interviews on the issues of corporate governance regulations and 
practices in family-owned public listed companies in Pakistan. 
  
This research is being carried out for strictly non commercial purposes as part of a PhD project at 
Essex University Business School under the supervision of Dr. Idlan Zakaria and Dr. Iqbal 
Khadaroo. Interview respondents are assured that their personal details will not be used in any 
way, that the data gathered will be treated confidentially, and that interview material will not be 
quoted out of context.   
 
I would also like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and has received ethical 
clearance through the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Essex.  
  
Participant’s Agreement: 
I am aware that my participation in this interview is voluntary.  If, for any reason, at any time, I wish to 
stop the interview, I may do so without having to provide an explanation.  I understand the intent and 
purpose of this research and how information shared would be used and I consent to participate in today's 
interview. 
 
 Additional queries may be addressed to: 
 
Dr. Idlan Zakaria (idlan@essex.ac.uk)   Dr. Iqbal Khadaroo (ikhad@essex.ac.uk) 
 
_____________________     _________________________ 
Participant’s signature  Participant’s Name  
_____________________  _________________________ 





Appendix E – Interview guide 
 
Socio-economic and Political Level: 
1- Social, political and economic context? History?  
2- Economic dependence on IFAs? Current IFAs supported running programs in 
Pakistan? Current IFAs required programs in Pakistan?  
3- Why CG reforms (both CG Code 2002 and 2012)?  
4- Why Anglo-American model of CG reforms?  
5- How CG regulations developed? Role of different organisations, actors? 
6- How political and business families influenced the emergence and development 
process of CG reforms?  
7- How actors at SPE level perceive these reforms? Benefits? Obstacles? Issues? 
Relevance? Pressures? 
Organizational Field Level 
1- Regulatory context? 
2- Roles, powers, responsibilities of regulators? 
3- Pressures / issues / benefits / obstacles in the development and implementation 
process of CG reforms?  
4- Current outcomes and future directions?  
Organizational Level Interviews guide: 
1. How do you define corporate governance? 
2. How do you see corporate governance reform measures in Pakistan? Benefits? 
Obstacles? Issues? Relevance? Pressures? 
3. What do you think, why codes of CG were introduced in Pakistan?  
4. Has your company benefited from the reform measures? If yes, in what ways? If no, why 
not? 
5. How do you see board composition specified in CG Codes (2002, 2012)? Benefits? 




a. Board composition? Criteria? ID45 (role, availability, benefit, obstacle, issues)? 
Role of BODs? Meeting? Agenda? Actual/routine practices? Role of founding 
families in BODs affairs?  
b. Do you think that strong monitoring of top management of the internal corporate 
governance system (i.e., the board) can improve firm performance? 
c. Do you think that an outsider-dominated board will bring about benefits for your 
company or that such a structure is not applicable / suitable to your company? 
6. How do you see board committees (audit, HR&R, board evaluation) required by CG 
Codes (2002, 2012) to establish? Benefits? Issues? Obstacles? Relevance? 
7. AGM (benefits, obstacles, issues, pressures, role of shareholders, agenda, process, 
location, duration, role of founding families)?  
8. Dividend (practices, issues, pressures, role of families)? 
9. Financial reporting / disclosure (practices, issues, role of families)? 
10. What do you think shareholders will be benefited from these reforms? If yes, in what 
ways? If no, why not? 
11. How do you see the role of regulators e.g. SECP, Stock exchanges, PICG, ICAP etc. in 
the institutionalisation of CG regulations? 
12. Was there any social pressure for your company to conform to the governance reform? 
13. Has your company encounter any social pressure from industry or professional 
associations, media, legal communities etc. if Yes, in what ways?  
14. To what extent did the top management influence those reform measures? 
15. Do you think compliance with the current code is sufficient to establish the trust with the 
investors? 
16. Do you have qualified staff for the implementation of code of corporate governance? 
17. What do you think governance information (disclosures) provided in annual reports are 
sufficient for external stakeholders (e.g. Shareholders, regulatory bodies, institutional 
investors)?  
 
                                                 
45
 Independent director  
